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FOREWORD
Dr. Kamolnick’s book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda
Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview;
strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi;
and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy
and strategy. Through this comparison, he supplies
far greater clarity on, incisive analysis of, and potential answers for such key questions as: How is each
terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to
the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni “jihadism”? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How,
if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways
from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially
define these entities? How does each understand and
operationalize strategy? What critical requirements
and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally,
what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to U.S.
Government strategists and professional military educators?
Dr. Kamolnick’s book substantially advances
the knowledge and strategy pertinent to combating these terrorist entities more effectively. I highly
recommend it.

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
		
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to
degrade, defeat, and destroy two transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni
Islam: the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO). The present book has
been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators
to more effectively accomplish that objective. Chapter
1 documents the distinct history and doctrinal beliefs
of each organization; Chapter 2 examines AQO’s and
ISO’s basic strategic concept and terrorist modus operandi; and Chapter 3 recapitulates chief conclusions,
considers strategic implications, and supplies select
recommendations.
AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding interests of the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us
Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons. This
book finds that this is unsupported by the evidence.
Instead, AQO and ISO may be conceived in the very
terms of the Sunni Islam they themselves profess, as
deviant criminal terrorist organizations guilty of committing reprehensible and forbidden acts, undermining Islamic interests, and besmirching rather than elevating Islam in the eyes of the non-Muslim world. A
more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction
of each entity is therefore warranted. The world’s
Sunni Muslims must make that determination, however, and define for themselves where the bounds of
faith, godly fear (taqwa), and righteous conduct begin
and end; who may or may not legitimately claim to
speak and act in their name; and who may or may not
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be deemed a genuine ally, fellow soldier, friend, or
enemy in this historic endeavor.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite their common genus as violent transnational Sunni “jihadist” organizations, AQO and ISO
are distinct species that substantially diverge in conceptions of doctrine and creed, strategy, and terrorist modus operandi. Doctrinally, the original AQO
“idea” first arises in opposition to Palestinian-Jordanian Shaykh Dr. Abdallah Azzam’s conception of Sunni
global jihadism. AQO shares with “Azzamism” a
Sunni pan-Islamic ecumenical approach embodied in
Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi fusion.
This mission is originally one of lumping, not splitting, Church not sect, openness not exclusivity, and
emphasizes intra-Sunni solidarity, unity, community,
brotherhood, and the tolerance of differences among
all fighting elements willing to serve as force multipliers and allies within broader alliances in a nowfermenting Arab Muslim world.
AQO differs from Azzamism in two key respects.
Osama bin Laden sought to create an autonomous bin
Laden-led army; whereas Azzam viewed his role as
one of assisting, complementing, and subordinating
Arabic volunteers to the Afghan-led Islamic forces
fighting against the Communist-installed and backed
Afghan regime. Second, for Azzam, Palestine occupied
a privileged theater of future near-term operations,
whereas the original AQO, instead, de-privileged
Palestine and conceived itself as an Arab-led transnational military expeditionary force, a type of Arabic
jihadi Foreign Legion, serving as a force multiplier.
Consequently, they deployed high-quality operatives
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with advanced training possessed of the AQO worldview, belief-system, and a desire to co-opt localized
insurgencies into various AQO nodes, fighting to first
win Islamic lands with the intent of reestablishing an
Islamic Caliphate, and eventually launching a future
offensive jihad against the original infidels.
The AQO idea’s second chief opponent was jihadi
takfirism, i.e., rigidly-extremist sectarians who extravagantly accuse other Muslims of apostasy (Ridda).
Though bin Laden’s emergent “Base of the Jihad Organization” (Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad) viewed the Shia
as a wayward and deviant sect, it did not at any time
privilege a war against Shi’ism per se as the essential
starting point for the purification and revivification
of Sunni orthodoxy as a ruling imperium. Moreover,
AQO in its training camps deliberately policed and
opposed takfirism, and in its stead supplied indoctrination into the uniquely ecumenical AQO pan-Islamist
Sunni jihadist vision of a vanguard Sunni armed organization whose singular mission was to unite disparate struggles into a broader transnational struggle
to eventually restore a supranational Caliphal sovereign. The AQO idea is not exclusively Salafist, though
it includes a significant number. It is not exclusively
Salafi-Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it also includes
their number; it is not exclusively inspired by Sayyid
Qutb, though he is recognized and honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. It is rather a broad, transnational Church-like conglomerate whose vision, values, and mission statement prohibit extremely strict
“Muslimness” tests or other instruments designed to
split into ever-smaller numbers those considered virtuous enough to wage a united Sunni war against the
occupying “Crusaders” of Muslim lands.
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This original AQO idea was eventually transformed
into a terrorist entity controlled by bin Laden and focused nearly exclusively on orchestrating highly symbolic mass casualty attacks against all Americans—
civilian and military—wherever they may be found.
Five key elements, according to AQO chief spokesman
Adam Yahiye Gadahn, characterize this “bin Ladenism”: its global/international reach and membership
as a type of “Islamic Internationale”; its exclusive focus on fighting America, the Crusader West, and the
Jews; its lack of a written religious creed, doctrine, or
specific strategy that every prospective member must
agree to before joining; emphasis on the critical role of
Muslim popular support for an enduring, long-term
victory; and its unique privileging of, and subordination to, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (i.e., the
Afghan Taliban).
Bin Ladenism is characterized by a unique mixture
of profound ignorance, delusion, resentment, and hubris. It rests on a deeply flawed analogy between the
United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR), and a grossly caricatured understanding of the civil society foundations of enduring
American power. Moreover, there is no precedent in
Sunni Islam for bin Ladenism’s signature “Far Enemy” doctrine. It was never embraced by the vast majority of existing Sunni Islamist insurgents. Bin Laden
was deeply criticized from within his own ranks for
having caused the practical extinction of a decade’s
long effort to recruit, train, deploy, and create a global
Sunni jihadist movement, and by other Salafi-Jihadists as unlawful and at the very least imprudent. 9/11
may be usefully viewed as a “lone wolf” terrorist attack and AQO’s first and last great “one-off” based in
treachery, criminality, and the USG’s unpreparedness

xviii

for that plot’s unprecedented use of American civil
aviation as a weapon of mass destruction.
AQO’s most lethal affiliate, Qa’idat al-Jihad in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has amended but not
ended classical bin Ladenism. There is no discernible
difference from classical bin Ladenism as doctrine,
and its accompanying “Far Enemy” economic attrition conception of collapsing the American economy
and forcing its withdrawal from Islamic lands.
ISO, in stark contrast, is that very type of extreme
ultra-sectarian jihadi takfiri organization AQO opposes. ISO’s “idea” originates in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s
“Zarqawism,” and is characterized by three principal
doctrines: ultra-sectarianism, an abiding fundamental
commitment to annihilate in masse all Shia Muslims,
leader and lay; an unprecedented conduct of ultraviolence as a media-based spectacle; and focus on the
immediate creation of an Islamic State as a base for the
prophesied return of the Caliphate. Zarqawi’s original
notions are later extended to “Neo-Zarqawism,” and
its current incarnation as “Baghdadism.” Four doctrines uniquely characterize the present ISO’s “idea,”
each of which starkly contrasts with the AQO’s species of Sunni global jihadism: apocalyptic and eschatological beliefs informing its sense of temporality
and morality; its doctrine proclaiming the mass annihilation of all Shia Muslims; its prioritizing of the
“Nearest” and “Near Enemies,” and postponement
of jihad against the “original Kufr”; and, its belief in
its right to monopolize and immediately declare the
Islamic State/Caliphate. These key elements of ISO’s
worldview and doctrine place it on the remote fringes
not just of Sunni Islam generally, but also of the vast
majority of Sunni global jihadist organizations.
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AQO and ISO exhibit similarities as transnational
terrorist entities, but as the author’s Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA) heuristic confirms, they substantially diverge in their respective conceptions of
strategy and terrorist modus operandi. Bin Ladenism’s sequenced strategy requires the removal of U.S.
and allied militaries from the Arab Muslim world and
territories, thus undermining U.S. military presence,
power projection, and access to energy reserves; the
overthrow of so-called apostate pro-Western regimes
and replacing them with orthodox Sunni Muslim governments that adhere to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy;
uniting Muslim states into a supra-state caliphate that
shall serve as a religio-political base for further amassing Muslim power and conducting offensive jihad to
confront the remaining world of infidelity (dar al-Kufr); and, a sustained, permanent offensive jihad to be
fought until all other forms of worship and polity are
overthrown.
The USG, while still focused on AQO external
operations, intentions, and capacities, has practically
decimated AQO. Assisted by recent upheavals in the
Arab Muslim world, AQO has apparently shifted to
focus far more on the Near rather than Far Enemy. This
new direction suggests a more gradual, evolutionary
insurgent strategy involving a greater emphasis on
preaching (da’wa); embedding within various ongoing rebellions and working within and through the
various nationalist-Islamist currents often dominant
in these theaters; and rebranding as local supporters/
helpers for the rule of Islamic law (Ansar al-Sharia),
such as has appeared in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt.
AQO’s affiliate AQAP, while maintaining deep
doctrinal affinities to AQO, has substantially departed
in practice from the classic Bin Ladenist, top-down
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model for carefully planned, long-term, high-visibility, strategically symbolic “Far Enemy” targeting.
AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi is based in what it
calls “lone jihad” or the “lone mujahid” strategy. In
its essence, it combines media and non-media terrorist
operations to incite, galvanize, mobilize, train, and deploy individual persons—glorified in its media operations as “lone mujahids” whose martyrdom (Shuhada)
destines them for the highest reaches of Paradise—to
commit what the vast majority of Muslims consider
forbidden terrorist acts, such as sabotage, targeted assassination, mass arson, mass-casualty bombings, and
a vast array of highly deviant acts generally classified
within religious law as major sins and crimes, and
within secular law as intentional acts of malicious, felonious criminal conduct.
The ISO’s strategy and terrorist modus operandi
is carefully outlined in its inaugural online publication Dabiq, and ideally comprises five key stages: (1)
emigration from a hostile milieu to one where sanctuary exists or can be created through terrorist acts
(Hijra); (2) creation of the nucleus jihadist organization (Jama’ah); (3) destabilization of the existing “infidel” regime through inflicting mass injury (Nikayah)
eventuating in the collapse of existing authority, and
thereby fomenting chaos and mayhem (Tawahhush);
(4) creation and consolidation of a territory, resources,
and base accompanied with the immediate declaration of the Islamic State (Tamkin); and (5) further consolidation and expansion of the Islamic State with the
immediate declaration of the Caliphate (Khilafa).
However, this idealized five-stage blueprint for
restoring the Caliphate (Khilafa) was not followed in
practice. The very nature of the ISO as an ultra-sectarian jihadi takfiri organization led it to hereticize (takfir)
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virtually all other organizations, tendencies, groups,
and movements. As a result, the stage of Fitnah (conflict, strife)—a stage not specified in their ideal model—has accompanied ISO from its beginnings in Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi through each of its metamorphoses. Further, the ISO’s blueprint exhibits ambiguity
regarding the precise timing for declaring a State and
later Caliphate. ISO’s achievements have been substantially assisted by its fearsome and highly professional military leadership cadre, comprised of former
Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, and by
the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan
al-Maliki in the context of a dramatically changed regional dynamic enervated by the “Arab Spring.”
Our findings largely support existing USG policy
and strategy vis-à-vis classic bin Ladenism. What
arose in its wake, however—though AQO classic “Far
Enemy” attacks must still be countered—was an alternative “lone mujahid” terrorist modus operandi
currently employed by AQO’s most lethal affiliate,
AQAP. Current policy and strategy are sufficient to
meet that latter challenge. Findings also substantially
support current USG policy and strategy to degrade,
defeat, and destroy ISO, though further recommendations are suggested by the present author to address
its specific “stateness” dimension. Our findings also
strongly support current USG explicit repeated declarations that the USG could temporarily defeat ISO
within a brief period; however, the permanent defeat
of the ISO idea will only occur when Iraqis themselves
make the choice to create a new social compact in
which its Sunni citizens are respected, represented,
and protected.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Doctrine-independent recommendations include
advocating well-known methods for combating terrorism. Doctrine-dependent recommendations include developing a deeper understanding of Sunni Islam, of AQO’s and ISO’s extreme deviance in relation
to Sunni Islam, and of how Sunni Islamic orthodoxy,
including some militant strands, may be leveraged
to more effectively delegitimize, marginalize, and
implode these unlawful criminal terrorist entities.
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PROLOGUE
RELEVANCE
The present book holds relevance for military
planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding
of the strategically relevant differences between two
transnational terrorist entities, the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO).
The only investment required is one’s willingness to
sequester an afternoon or two for careful reading and
reflection. It is presumed that a significant sub-set of
readers do not possess requisite knowledge of Islam
generally, and militant Islamic politics specifically;
therefore, brief expository asides and explanatory
notes clarifying key Islamic religious and religio-political concepts are sprinkled throughout.
INTRODUCTION
This book analyzes the AQO (Tanzim Qa’idat alJihad) and the ISO (Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya) and
proposes U.S. Government (USG) strategies for their
permanent defeat.1 AQO and ISO claim to represent
the true and abiding interests of the world’s Sunni
Muslims (Ahl-us-Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4
billion persons.2 It is the argument of this book, however, that grounds exist for why this need not be the
case. AQO and ISO may be conceived in the theology
they themselves profess as two deviant organizations
guilty of committing major sins and besmirching the
Islamic Call. I believe a more optimistic prognosis for
the future destruction of each entity is warranted. It
will be for the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah)
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to make that determination; to define for themselves
where the bounds of faith, godly fear and piety (taqwa),
and righteous conduct begin and end; and who may
or may not legitimately claim to speak in their name.
AQO and ISO have distinct doctrines, methodologies, and strategies of victory. Each entails distinct
implications for USG strategy. This book is organized
as follows. Chapter 1 documents the distinct history
and doctrinal beliefs of each organization. In Chapter
2, AQO’s and ISO’s basic terrorist modus operandi is
examined. Lastly, in Chapter 3, a summary of conclusions is first supplied, and implications and recommendations are then offered for further enhancing
USG policy, strategy, and professional military educators’ effectiveness in expediting the demise of these
two terrorist entities.

2

CHAPTER 1
BELIEF-SYSTEM, CREED, WORLDVIEW,
DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept “doctrine” as used throughout refers
to a more or less presumed “worldview” or “ideology” rooted in a set of core beliefs about how the world
works, and in particular, about a presumed reality
that describes the factual state of Islam and Muslims
in the present socio-political, socio-cultural world.
Doctrine is rooted in belief-systems: it is about what
is true or false, real or unreal. Belief-systems are about
statements of fact; and for their adherents, about what
they take to be the definite factual reality of the world
as it is. Belief-systems are not knowingly rooted in the
will or intention to deceive others; they are Truth, and
a Truth to be known and shared. Beliefs are not therefore deceptive, manipulative, or intentionally distorted propaganda—a form of communication, which
will be discussed in Chapter 2. One can refer to an adherent as a believer, ideologue, or doctrinaire, but not
a deceiver, or not an intentional deceiver at least.
The term “doctrine” is similar but distinct from
the term “creed” (aqida) in that doctrine extends beyond orthodox beliefs that cannot be denied if one is
to maintain one’s status as an orthodox adherent of
a particular faith. They include religious faith but extend beyond to beliefs about past and current history
as it pertains to the origins, development, rise and
fall, and the current status of Sunni Muslims in the
present world. In other words, it also involves certain
fundamental beliefs about the how, why, and “what

3

for” of politics, culture, power, and violence that encompass and extend beyond the articles of creedal
faith that makes one an “orthodox Sunni Muslim,”
a term that seems to encompass both worldview or
weltanschauung—literally “world picture”—captures
these elements in a simple phrase and will be used
interchangeably with belief-system in this course of
exposition.
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II. THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION
(TANZIM QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD)
SUNNI ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY
AQO’s worldview or doctrine has been consistently propounded over the course of nearly 30 years and
is contained in a number of publicly available sources.
Relative to the ISO, it has been subject to extensive
scholarly analysis, and a more or less rough consensus has been reached regarding its essential premise.
Though simplified, the following is an accurate depiction. First, a Perfect and Final faith was revealed by
the seal of the prophet, Prophet Muhammad. Second,
the one and almighty sovereign, Allah (God), blessed
this singular faith to conquer the Earth and eventually to establish Allah’s rule, manifest especially in
the maintaining of essential legal requirements and
punishments contained in Allah’s Divine word, the
Quran and other sources and principles deemed essential to a proper legal judgment; for example, the
Traditions of the Prophet (ahadith), consensus of the
learned scholars and jurisprudents (ijma), and use
of analogical reasoning to infer to new cases from
past judgments (qiyas). Third, Allah’s rule on Earth
as manifest in conquered lands ruled by an imperial
Muslim religio-political sovereign, the Caliph, represented the singular triumph and exclusive example of
Allah’s word, law, and sovereignty. That Islam is the
perfected final faith—revealed through the perfected
final prophet and his immediate companions and
successors; blessed by the singular sovereign Allah
to conquer and rule; and to be manifest in an earthly
Caliphal imperium charged with upholding and further spreading the worship of Allah—is an essential
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starting point for discerning the AQO worldview.
Contained here is an inarguable premise within Sunni
orthodoxy that Allah is the one and only God, and that
Muhammad is his final messenger.
SUNNI SALAFISM/“FUNDAMENTALISM”
A “Salafist” sub-set of Sunnism is also key, however. Salafism as a genus—despite its varieties—is
manifest in the belief that Islam reached its noblest
and purest expression in Prophet Muhammad’s own
exemplary conduct (Sunnah), and those of his closest
companions and the first three generations of his successors known collectively as al-salaf al-salih (the pious
ancestors).3 Salafists seek to emulate these truest and
most faithful exemplars of the Prophet’s Message, and
believe that genuine Islam—Prophet Muhammad’s Islam—requires that one adhere as faithfully as possible
to what is known of their sayings and doings, without
amendment. To introduce innovation (bida) to what
is believed to be the Prophet’s own exemplary path
(Sunnah), or “the prophetic methodology” (manhaj),
is to insinuate an imperfect present into the perfected
past.
THE MUWAHHIDUN/WAHHABISM/
SALAFI-WAHHABISM
The reformist Muwahhidun (Oneness of Allah) or
“Wahhabi” movement established by the neo-Hanbali Najd Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d.
1792) and his faithful adherents and proponents furnish an essential re-statement of the orthodox Sunni
fundamentals in their most rigorous form.4 These consist in the following. Chief among al-Wahhab’s con-
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tributions was his reconceptualization of the manner
in which “faith” or Iman—what it actually means to
believe—is to be proven as fact. This also applies to
its opposite—Kufr (unbelief/infidelity), and whether
takfir (apostasy, heresy) is declared against persons accused of such. Al-Wahhab declared that genuine faith
is not merely a matter of an internal belief—belief of
the heart or the mind—of those twin creedal essentials
comprising the Shahada or first pillar of Islam—Allah
is One, and Muhammad is his final messenger. Private
confessions of faith are necessary, but insufficient.
Faith must also and especially be manifest publicly
through active worship of Allah in public utterance,
as well as deeds that openly signify the operationalization of the principle of Allah’s Oneness (tawhid) in
one’s life activities. Other pillars of Islam—the obligatory five prayers (salat), obligatory giving of alms (zakat), obligatory fasting on Ramadan (sawm), and the
obligatory pilgrimage (Hajj)—are essential dimensions of faith in action and as action.
Failure to actively and correctly worship Allah may
indicate ignorance, error, moral weakness, or coercion,
and an active program of education, instruction, and
moral rectification may be required. This is the function of preachers and learned scholars (ulema), and the
Call to Tawhid (da’wa). However, to voluntarily and intentionally deny in one’s mind, heart, tongue, or hand
these practical manifestations of faith; to willfully and
knowingly deny the worship of Allah through these
visible signs of submission and surrender, is to be
guilty of infidelity (Kufr). It is to deny Allah what is
owed to Allah. It is to be guilty of disloyalty, infidelity (Kufr). For al-Wahhab, the rigorous enforcement of
all practical dimensions of worship, including but extending far beyond an internal conviction of belief, is
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therefore essential to proving one’s faith in Islam. The
question of what exactly constitutes idolatry (shirk),
distinctions between greater and lesser shirk, and the
lawful and prudent means for combating shirk, are
core theological questions at the heart of the present
schism between AQO and ISO.
At the core of al-Wahhab’s preaching and program
for reforming Islam is the essential master concept that
Judaism, and later Islam, bequeaths to the world: the
concept of God’s/Allah’s Oneness (tawhid). Tawhid,
according to al-Wahhab, following Shaykh ul Islam
Ibn Taymiyyah’s (d. 1328) original coinage, comprises
three integral dimensions: Allah’s Oneness as Sovereign Creator, Sustainer, Provider (Tawhid al-Ruboobiyyah); Allah’s Oneness as Sovereign Lord worthy of
exclusive worship (Tawhid al-Uloohiyyah); and Allah’s
Oneness as His Unique Names (Tawheed al-Asma’ wasSifaat).5 The implications al-Wahhab derived from
this re-statement of Sunni orthodoxy was profound,
highly controversial, profoundly unsettling, and even
revolutionary for his present milieu. The opposite of
tawhid, and the greatest of sins in Islam which even
Allah does not forgive, is the sin of worshipping/
associating other deities with Allah (shirk). The absolute uncompromising monotheism represented by alWahhab’s Muwahiddun reformist movement demands
monolatry. It is unsparing in its denunciation and disavowal of, and obligation to, uproot shirk.
Theologically armed with a re-conceptualized notion of Iman as faith, as actualized in essential worshipful acts and rituals; and Tawhid actualized in
beliefs and actions displaying loyalty to the Singular
Absolute Sovereign that is Allah as Creator, Lord,
and Unique and Ineffable Names; al-Wahhab and his
Muwahiddun movement proceeded to purge the Saudi
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landmass and its immediate environs. Sharing a divine
kinship with Islam, we find the “People of the Book/
Covenant/Divine Scripture” (Ahl al-Khitab). Jews,
Christians, and often Zoroastrians, though deemed
guilty of adulterating original scripture were—owing
to their adherence to worshiping a singular Deity—
granted the right to retain ancestral faiths and practices, though not in Prophet Muhammad’s ancestral
homeland. Though subject to submission and humiliation displays, and liabilities to their further expansion and preservation, these groups could maintain
their worship in their status as dhimmis required to
pay a “protection” or head tax, the jizya.
Toleration, even if intolerant, was not to be extended any further, however. For the Muwahhidun
followers of al-Wahhab, the true eternal, abiding
threat to Allah’s Sovereignty does not come from the
original infidels (original Kufr)—obvious enemies
from without and against whom jihad, both defensive if necessary and offensive if legal and prudent,
be waged.6 True, targets outside the faith included
sorcerers, magicians, and others claiming intercessory
powers that the Muwahhidun claimed were the exclusive prerogative of Allah. However, within the faith,
the Muwahhidun waged war against Sufi mysticism
and its doctrines and practices granting mystics and
holy men intercessory powers. And, also against the
Shia—those partisans of the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali,
the fourth Caliph—who based in unique theological
conceptions endowing and privileging the Prophet’s
family with divinely-sanctioned spiritual powers, engaged in reverential treatment and worship of saints,
shrines, and tombs, and attributed divine qualities
and powers to an infallible Imamate.
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For the followers of al-Wahhab—the Muwahhidun—the genuine, abiding, and eternally greatest
threat is this internal enemy—this nearest enemy. At
best, it is the one who claims Islam, but who is either
a pretender (the hypocrite), or an innovator (bida) (the
heretic). At worst, it is a Muslim apostate (murtadd)
who willfully, with complete knowledge, publicly
disavows essential tenets of tawhid as conceptualized
by al-Wahhab and, if unrepentant, is guilty of Islam’s
greatest sin: apostasy (ridda). The narrowness of the
Muwahhidun bridge to salvation—rooted in its unique
conceptions of iman/Kufr, Sunnah/bida, tawhid/shirk—
narrows the distance between salvation and sin, salvation and heresy, and salvation and apostasy.
It is not just in Islam that the true enemy of genuine faith arises from within. It is the unique nature of
orthodoxy (literally, “correct belief”) that gives rise to
the fact that it is what is closest, not furthest and most
obviously distant, from one’s essential core tenets that
genuinely threatens one’s foundations. One only has
to recall the very origins of the concept of the satanic
in the Gospel of Matthew’s denunciation of the Jewish Pharisees,7 or the rise of the Reformation and its
inauguration of bloody centuries of intra-Christian
warfare, to understand an essential sociological law
explaining the intensity of conflict: i.e., that a feared
and dreaded treason within mobilizes far greater enmity, and policing, than the expected and prepared for
enemy without; again, the smaller the differences that
divide, the greater the perceived injury those smaller
differences make.8
This depiction of Sunni theological orthodoxy,
Sunni conservative Salafism, and Muhammad alWahhab’s Muwahiddun movement provides the essential theological background required for under-
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standing precisely how the AQO and ISO dip from the
same well—Sunni, Salafi-Muwahhidun/Wahhabi—but
with varying foci, in quite different doses, and with
quite different additives that led to novel synthetic
organisms.9 It marks an essential point of departure
required to understand their last shared common ancestor before their marked divergence as species, and
eventually with additional mutation, as contemporary
terrorist entities claiming to represent the worldwide
Sunni (Ahl-us Sunnah). Our first task is to describe
the terrorist species Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad (AQO). To
do so, we will trace a brief history that begins with
Abdullah Azzam and ends with the codification of
Osama bin Laden’s mature “Far Enemy” doctrine.
SHAYKH SCHOLAR-MUJAHID, DR. ABDALLAH
AZZAM: THE INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION TO
JOIN THE CARAVAN IN DEFENSE OF MUSLIM
LANDS: AN ARMED MUSLIM BROTHERHOODSALAFI-WAHHABI SYNTHESIS
Dr. Abdullah Azzam is the Palestinian-Jordanian
Shaykh, scholar, charismatic preacher, and inspirational organizer whose firebrand sermons and
passionate calls for mobilization against the Soviet
Communist-installed and militarily backed Afghan
regime, provides the entre point for understanding
AQO’s mature doctrine.10 Besides the qualities listed
earlier, there are three essential contributions Azzam
made toward AQO. First, Azzam characterized the
armed Muslim opposition to Soviet occupation as a
defensive jihad (jihad al-daf),11 and authored the key
legal opinion (fatwa)—backed by evidence from the
Quran, authoritative traditions (ahadith), and scholarly consensus (ijma) of all four Sunni schools (mad’haab)

11

of jurisprudence (fiqh)—requiring participation in the
anti-Communist jihad as an individual obligation
(fard ‘ayn) devolving on every able-bodied, capable
member of the Muslim community (the Ummah). This
opinion, Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation
After Iman, was vetted by highly-prestigious senior religious scholars, and provided what became the contemporary restatement of the classical jurisprudence
governing the waging of defensive jihad.12
Second, Azzam re-conceptualized the concept of
“defensive jihad” to justify military jihad against all
existing non-Muslim governments ruling over majority or minority Muslim populations. For this Shaykh,
and Sunni orthodoxy generally, once a land has been
conquered and ruled by Islam, it forever remains
a permanent territory belonging to the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) and Allah’s True Faith. Azzam’s
conception of a nation’s “Muslimness” is essentially
populist-territorial, and it is not the existence or nonexistence of Islamic law, but the existence of a Muslim
populace that defines the “Muslimness” of this land.
Having a people, and a land, what is needed is the
restoration of the state governed by the Sharia or legal prescriptions and proscriptions enjoined by the
Quran and learned jurisprudents and legal officials.
Of special importance to the Brotherhood, to Azzam,
and to many that would later be enticed to AQO’s
call, was what was regarded as the great catastrophe or nakhbah that befell the indigenous Palestinian
population following the creation of the State of Israel
in 1948; and over the next several decades, the degradation, humiliation, and powerlessness befalling a
Palestinian population uprooted, and now a diasporic
people unwelcome in other lands and occupying permanent refugee camps. While many Muslim peoples
now living in non-Muslim lands would eventually be
12

encompassed in Azzam’s transnational call to individual Muslims to assist brothers and sisters fighting
to recover, secure, or restore Muslim-ruled states or
statelets in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and the Philippines, for example, Palestine was without question
at the very heart of Azzam’s mission. It was the next
stop, after Afghanistan, which the caravan enjoining
defensive jihad should travel.
Azzam’s affiliation with and assimilation of a panIslamic and ecumenical conception of the Muslim
Ummah likely derives from his Muslim Brotherhood
roots. This earliest modern pan-Islamic organization,
conceived and founded in 1928 by the Egyptian school
teacher Hassan al-Banna, arose as a direct response
to his revulsion toward the European colonization of
formerly Islamically-governed territories and their
broader Western, secular, scientific civilizational imports that demoted and delegitimized a conservative
Islamic-centered polity, culture, and social order. As
a form of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-secular,
conservative religious social movement, the Brotherhood eventually spread to dozens of nations, and pioneered a variety of reformist strategies for re-Islamizing these secular liberal colonial-oriented states.
Azzam was also influenced, like many others of
his generation—as noted in his published writings—
by the emergence of a uniquely radical variant of
Brotherhood thought and activism originating in the
writings, personal example, and inspired followers of
the Egyptian literary intellectual and totalistic Islamic
philosophical system builder Sayyid Qutb.13 It was
Qutb who decried the gradualist, reformist, cultural,
and educational Islamization strategy of the existing
mainstream Brothers, and in its place, appropriating
key concepts from secular revolutionary thinkers like
Marx and Lenin, and also the thought and writings of
13

the Pakistani Islamist intellectual Mawlana Mawdudi,
he argued in favor of the creation of an elite vanguard
leading a comprehensive revolution against the existing Muslim and Western orders. This total revolution
was required to reinstall what Qutb believed had been
a Past Perfect Quranic revelation that owing to contemporary forms of non-Allah-centered sociocultural,
sociopolitical order was subverted and completely
extracted from current history. Qutb claimed that a
modern ignorance of Allah, a modern Jahiliyyah or
Age of Ignorance, one analogous to that Arab pagan
and polytheistic ignorance preceding the Truthful
Revelation received by the very first Quranic generation, had now enveloped all existing Muslim societies.
The overthrow of this Modern Jahiliyyah by a Revolutionary Vanguard re-immersed into the now-hidden
truth of Allah’s Absolute Rulership, was the method
required for a complete liberation.
The modern Jahiliyyah is defined by Man’s rule over
Man, subject to the tyranny of Man’s vicarious whims
and oppressive and unjust instincts, and ensconced in
materialist ethics. It was Man’s absolute and complete
dependence on God’s Absolute Sovereignty—the Rule
of Divine Law and the Divine Legislator—and complete and total submission to this Absolute, that is the
liberating condition of Man’s emancipation from the
Rulership of Man, and its replacement by the Absolute Sovereignty of God. Gone would be the alienated
social order evacuated from the contemporary world;
present would be the absolute authority of Allah at
the level of Rulership, Legislation, and Sovereignty.
Qutb’s principal contribution, then, was to propose
an amendment to Ibn Taymiyyah’s, and later Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s, tri-partite conception
of Tawhid. Added to Allah’s Unicity as Sole Creator,
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Sole Lord, and Uniquely Named, is Allah’s character
as Sole Divine Ruler/Legislator/Law-Giver and LawMaker, captured in the Qutbist employed concept
Hakimiyyah.
Qutb claimed that it was this fourth dimension of
tawhid, Hakimiyyah, then, that truly provides the missing master key explaining in total the abyss in which
existing Islam has fallen, and despite a somewhat enviable material success, the vacuousness, spiritual putridness, and worship of Man typified by the Western
mind, philosophy, and sociopolitical order remains.
We shall see that this Qutbian Hakimiyyah straddles
the AQO versus ISO divide, and each finds in it a
means of legitimizing the violent overthrow of every
existing Muslim order. For now, however, we return
to the remaining Azzamist contributions to the AQO
Doctrine.
Third, Azzam viewed his role as one of assisting and complementing the Islamic forces fighting
against the Communist-installed and backed Afghan
regime, and not one of creating an autonomous Arab
army that would usurp existing forces and impose
its will, vision, and particular Islamic creedal beliefs
on these indigenous forces. Melting into the fabric of
the Afghan jihad and assisting in the recruitment of
Arab manpower to its cause, Azzam played the role of
catalyst, charismatic preacher, and a scholar-mujahid,
not an imperious and distant commander demanding
obedience to an alien cause. Solidarity with the Afghan mujahidin, and the willingness to accede to their
unique cultural milieu and in solidarity fight the forces
of the invading Communist Kufr, was essential to his
mission.
Finally, Shaykh Azzam was remarkable for his
obsessive fascination with and prolific contribution
to what may be called jihadist martyrology. As ably
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documented by David Cook,14 ample precedent exists
within Islam for the production of a unique form of
literature, which exalts, celebrates, and creates a virtual cult around the superlative and extraordinary
rewards that accompany those who willingly sacrifice
themselves on the field of jihad. Killing in the process
of one being killed is viewed as a means of salvific
action, a means of worshiping Allah and receiving in
exchange for one’s life an eternal paradise resplendent
with the sumptuous delights befitting a noble knight
upholding with one’s life, honor, and wealth—Allah’s
True Word. The virtues, delights, and superlatives of
jihad as salvific martyrdom are another contribution,
we shall see, that also spans the AQO-ISO divide.
To summarize, Azzam’s main contributions to the
AQO Doctrine are the following: authoring the legal
opinion (fatwa) justifying defensive jihad (jihad al-daf)
in Afghanistan as an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn);
his conception that this defensive jihad was obligatory not just in Afghanistan but in all former Muslimconquered territories and peoples, now under the sovereignty of non-Muslim rulers; his prioritizing of the
Palestine question as central to the Ummah’s concerns;
and Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-influenced conceptions that first include commitment to an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, pan-Islamic Ummah, conceived
broadly and in non-sectarian terms in opposition
primarily to the original Kufr—European Christianity
and secularism in particular—and not in opposition to
other Muslims on the basis of their strictness in adherence to “Wahhabi” or Salafist orthodoxy. In addition,
the Qutbist legacy identifies the militant requirement
to privilege Allah’s Sovereign Rule as an element of
fully restoring the Islamic State.
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THE “BASE OF THE JIHAD”; AL-QAEDA
(QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD)
Al-Qaeda, or Qa’idat al-Jihad, is the name given for
a type of expeditionary or mobile global army—the
Revolutionary Sunni International fighting force—
that emerged in 1988 from the coalescence of several
fighting organizations from various lands who, having determined the Afghan jihad was nearing its end,
sought to create an enduring organizational form to
permanently institutionalize an elite army of Islamic
fighters—a kind of Islamic Foreign Legion.15 The idea
behind this organization, whose Founding Minutes
make for fascinating reading, was to basically seed
various theaters of jihad with a highly-skilled, highly
trained cadre of Islamic fighters whose goal was to
support and direct armed fighters toward the overthrow of non-Muslim or so-called apostate governments and supplant them with governments based on
the primacy of Islamic law or Sharia, and the rulership
of Muslim sovereigns. These Islamic insurgents, guerrillas, or “jihadis” differed from the vast majority of
insurgents by privileging a transnational, pan-Islamic,
Ummah-based concept. Just as in a previous century,
Karl Marx imagined workers who had no nation to
defend, or to lose, since it was only the universality
of the proletarian class and international communism
that represented the perfected future; this Qa’idat al-Jihad, though composed of specific fighters from specific lands, was to disprivilege land, people, nation, and
all other affiliations other than their soldiery on behalf
of Allah wherever Allah’s soldiers would be needed.
These quality recruits would be force multipliers, a
kind of highest quality recruit, a kind of special forces
operative, who would embed, train, supply, and assist
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in the triumph of polities whose identities would melt
into and become one node in a broader re-imagined,
and recreated proto-caliphate—though one in its very
earliest and barely sketched features. This Army of
Allah, or Islamic Army, had its marching orders.
The very name of this entity—The Base of the Jihad—tells all. This Base, as the Founding Minutes,
By-Laws, and Constitutional Charter confirm,16 was
initially understood in a military sense as a military
base camp for general and more highly qualified recruits that would—through a process of recruitment,
vetting, training, supplying, and deploying—make
the critical difference. The ultimate religio-political
goal is repeated in these earliest documents and is unambiguous: “To Raise the Word of Allah until it is triumphant throughout the Earth.” Moreover, the means
to pursue this ultimate objective is also unambiguous:
“Jihad.” Other organizations can be involved in relief
work, da’wa work, political work, educational work,
and cultural work. However, Qa’idat al-Jihad is exclusively dedicated to jihad as a fighting vanguard, as
Mujahidin—those who engage in military jihad—and
nothing else. This self-definition is aptly represented
in the term “jihadism” or “jihadist,” and in its adjectival form “global jihadism” and “global jihadist.”
This may also be expanded slightly and accurately to
“global Sunni Islamic jihadism.”
Contained in this formula is Qa’idat al-Jihad’s ultimate identity as a distinct type of fighting organization;
but also contained, as we will soon see, are the seeds
of its ultimate conflict with other types of “jihadist”
organizations whose passion and mission is far closer
to that espoused by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
and other variants of Salafism. The first fracture was
between Osama bin Laden and Shaykh Azzam over
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the precise nature and function of this newly constituted “Base.” Abdullah Azzam envisioned a more protracted involvement, with the Afghan mujahidin as a
supporting player and not the organizer of a separatist contingent of “Arab” Afghans.17 This tension was
evident at the time of the formation with bin Laden
of the Peshawar-based processing center, or Services
Center (Maktab al-Khidimat), for newly arriving Arab
recruits seeking to “join the caravan” in the Afghan
theater. Bin Laden had already embarked, despite his
lack of battlefield skill, on creating what amounted to
a private Arab army under his direct command, and
also a “legend” surrounding his actual role and accomplishments in a particular battlefield engagement
in Baiji against Soviet units. Lauded in the Arab press
at the time, bin Laden would (assisted by his financial
largesse and unique persona as a tall, wealthy, softspoken, deeply pious, apparently world-renouncing,
martyrdom-seeking son of a Yemeni-born Saudi billionaire father) continue to cultivate his image. It was
this emergent private army that bin Laden had assembled that became part of the founding moments of
“The Base.” A second dispute arose between Shaykh
Azzam and bin Laden over prioritizing the next phase
of the jihad. For Azzam, Palestine beckoned; for bin
Laden, despite definite allegiances shared over the
centrality of Palestine for Islam, it was other newly
emerging fields that beckoned, including the desire
to wage jihad in his ancestral homeland Yemen, its
southern half then occupied by a Marxist state.
On November 24, 1989, Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, who was a hugely significant inspiration for
the mobilization of Sunnis for the Afghan jihad, and
more generally the “defense of Muslim lands,” was
assassinated along with two of his sons by a road-
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side improvised explosive device (IED). His enemies
had earlier placed, and his allies discovered, a bomb
planted behind the lectern where he was to deliver
the mosque sermon. The case remains unsolved, with
various potential perpetrators in conflict with the
Shaykh being suggested: Ayman al-Zawahiri and the
Egyptians from Islamic Jihad; Osama bin Laden; or
others annoyed by his alleged role in mismanagement
or sequestering of funds for his beloved Palestinian
cause. Azzam’s absence was still notable by its presence in having inspired a reawakening to the necessity of defensive jihad, and those other contributions
noted previously (i.e., his legal argument, expansive
conception of defensive jihad and Muslim lands, and
his passionate jihadism and martyrological beliefs
and writings). The scholar-mujahid Dr. Abdullah Azzam’s exit further narrowed the leadership cadre and
self-definition of the post-Afghan phase of this newly
anointed global transnational conception of individualized Sunni jihadism.
Bin Laden’s other fracture was not with what
might be termed “Azzamism” or the Azzamist variant of Sunni global jihadism. In fact, it shares with Azzamism a Sunni ecumenicalism that has far more to
do with the Muslim Brotherhood quest for a unified
Muslim front, without strict tests of “Muslimness,” beyond obvious adherence to general tenets and a militant desire to confront the cultural and socio-political
imperialism encased in the modern, secular, liberaldemocratic—or Communist—state. The awakening of
a stupefied Muslim Ummah through education, proselytization, organization, and “lumping” rather than
“splitting” based on acid tests of “Muslimness,” was
the path, it was believed, for eventually reconquering
the state for Islam. This Sunni pan-Islamic ecumenical
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approach was embodied in Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi fusion; it was also at the heart of
how bin Laden envisioned the al-Qaeda mission and
doctrine.
The danger bin Laden detected came from the
Salafi-Wahhabi direction. It was represented in individuals, organizations, movements, and parties who
focused far more on the internal enemy than the external. In common with the mission of the Muwahiddun
movement and also many Salafist-inspired offshoots,
these groups espoused what from bin Laden’s and
many orthodox Sunni Muslim quarters is a deviant
and extremist penchant to emphasize sectarian purity,
which taken to its extreme lends itself to what may be
termed jihadi takfirism, or excessiveness in accusations
against and the willingness to takfir other Muslims.
This takes two forms. First, bin Laden’s emergent
Qa’idat al-Jihad, though viewing the Shia as a wayward
and deviant sect, did not at any time privilege a war
against Shi’ism per se as the essential starting point
for the purification and revivification of Sunni orthodoxy as a ruling imperium. The problem of Shi’ism
was a secondary matter that would await the necessary focus that now must be placed on the permanent
mobilization of Sunni mujahidin, and arousing of
the Sunni Muslim masses (Ummah), to rid formerly
Muslim-conquered lands of their infidel overlords.
From Spain to Indonesia, from Mauritania to Afghanistan, European and Westernized secular hegemony first required removal. Seeding the battlefields
of jihad as empires or secular despotisms receded or
collapsed—for example, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, and South Yemen—was the order of the day. The
fight against Kufr, and original Kufr at that, required
a Sunni Muslim “church” in the sociological sense—

21

that is, a broad-based, inclusive united front whose
criteria for membership was significantly broad and
its defining feature—the readiness and willingness to
join the caravan and fight in the path of Allah to make
Allah’s Word supreme in the lands now occupied by
the Cross.18 This United Sunni Front approach applied
equally to the key goal of recovering the now Zionistoccupied land of Palestine and the revered holy sites,
including al Haram Al Sharif (Temple Mount) and Al
Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem (al-Quds).
Additional sources of bin Laden’s penchant to
demote the struggle against the Shia likely includes
Qa’idat al-Jihad’s unique post-9/11 dependence on,
and sometimes exploitation of, their Iranian captivity.
Several high-ranking members of al-Qaeda remained
in what amounted to house arrest with restricted privileges, and al-Qaeda engaged in tit-for-tat bargaining
which in recent times, has led to the freeing of some
of the USG’s most sought after terrorist operatives.19
Additionally, bin Laden’s mother is Syrian with an
Alawite background, and his known filial tenderness
cannot be discounted. However, it is likely that these
factors were secondary to bin Laden’s vision of the
true and genuine enemy—the original Kufr. To this
day, al-Qaeda’s jurisprudence strictly differentiates
Shia culpability. Known and openly professing leaders engaged in war against the Sunni are legitimate
targets, and any and all who assist in the support of
subverting or denying Allah’s Rule are to be fought.
However, the Shia masses are not targeted, owing to
the fact that like the vast majority of Sunnis, they are
likely ignorant of the fundamentals of their own faith,
and this ignorance is a hindrance for takfir of the Shia
lay masses. Unlike the ISO, as we shall soon see, there
is no cosmic backdrop asserting that venomously
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treacherous Shia are the chief antagonists responsible
for present Sunni humiliation and powerlessness.
In short, a principled focus on targeting the Shia on
grounds of their apostasy, heresy, or supposed treasonous nature is rarely to be found.
The predominant sectarian threat for bin Laden
occurs within the people of the Sunnah (Ahl us-Sunnah). Sunnis attacking Sunnis on the grounds of their
insufficient creedal orthodoxy, or orthopraxy, led to
one negative object lesson in “How not to do jihad!”
This involved what began and could have ended as a
successful Sunni overthrow of a secular Westernized
Algerian Government, but instead led to a bloodbath,
which eventually consumed the jihadi movement itself. Takfir, Qa’idat al-Jihad proclaims, can be applied to
the ruling regime and its loyal and obvious supporters in the security forces, police, and essential internal
security apparatuses. This “takfir of the regime,” however, is very different from the “takfir of society.” In
the Algerian case, takfir was eventually extended, by
the bloody logic of its own extremist premises: first to
apply to the regime; then to supporters of the regime;
then to families—including women, children, and the
elderly—of the supporters of the regime; and finally,
to those denying that these persons are guilty of apostasy from Islam. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group
(GIA; from the French, Groupe Islamique Arme; Arabic,
Jama’ah al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha) became for al-Qaeda
in the mid-to-latter 1990s, and many other Sunni jihadists including senior Sharia official and operative
Atiyatullah al-Libi, a negative case study confirming
the fratricidal consequences that arise from what is in
effect, an uncontainable logic. This highly policed containment of takfirism within the “Base of the Jihad,”
and indoctrination into the uniquely pan-Islamist
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Sunni jihadist vision of a vanguard seeding various
insurgencies and rebellions against secular autocratic
rule, meant that al-Qaeda would be viewed as a broad,
inclusive, Sunni-armed organization whose singular
mission was to unite disparate struggles into a broader
transnational struggle to eventually restore a supranational Caliphal sovereign empowered to continue the
long-term battle against the original Kufr and continuing infidelity. This Qa’idat al-Jihad is not exclusively
Salafist, though it includes a significant number. It is
not exclusively Salafi-Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it
also includes their number; it is not those exclusively
inspired by Sayyid Qutb, though he is recognized and
honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. Qa’idat al-Jihad
is rather a broad, transnational church-like conglomerate whose vision, values, and mission statement do
not employ “Muslimness” tests, purity tests, or other
instruments designed to split into ever smaller numbers, those who are considered virtuous enough to
wage a united Sunni war against the occupying “Crusaders” of Muslim lands.
One excellent recent example illustrating this fact
is exemplified by Adam Yahiye Gadahn’s (whom we
shall later encounter) account of his own journey to
becoming a Muslim, and his answer to the question
“Who is a Muslim?”
Strictly speaking, one becomes a Muslim by pronouncing the Shahaadah even if there is no one around to
hear you; announcing it publicly is not a precondition
of your Islam to be correct for you to be considered a
Muslim in the eyes of God. Islam isn’t like the manmade and adulterated religions which have elaborate
and formal initiation ceremonies presided over by
priests and rabbis. Therefore, as soon as one comes to
the realization that Islam is the truth and all other reli-
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gions today are either false or abrogated, he must declare right then and there that there is no God worthy
of worship but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God (from the bottom of his heart and with full
conviction), and preferably in Arabic too (if possible),
because death can come suddenly and unexpectedly
and one never knows when his time might come; and
then after that, he is obligated to start discharging his
Islamic duties as they come along [italics in original].20

Gadahn’s view that becoming a Muslim is first
achieved as a deeply private act based in the “leap of
faith” one makes when professing a complete belief in
a chosen creed, is not based in the Hanbali, Salafi-Wahhabi tradition at all. It is essential to the Hanafi School,
the most “liberal” of schools; but for Salafi-Wahhabis,
it is a deficient and even heretical approach to faith
(Iman). As described earlier, faith for them consists
of “faith as action,” and only exists when beliefs are
externalized in visible, essential worshipful practices
that uphold the doctrine of Allah’s Oneness (tawhid),
and also, the complete disavowal and disassociation
from infidels, and avowal and love of worshipers of
Allah’s Oneness (al-wala wa’l bara).21
Shared by al-Qaeda and the worldwide Muslim
Ummah is the basic Quranic idea that humans are created with great moral liabilities, though they may aspire to righteous faith and virtuous conduct. Muslims,
like all human beings, are prone to sin; and as sinners,
are fallible, morally weak, prone to hedonic excess,
slow to forgive, and quick to anger. This basic conception of a constrained and limited capability for human
goodness, and the expectation of a permanent though
malleable imperfection, explains the general mercy
and leniency with which bin Laden and the senior
theoreticians, religious scholars, jurisprudents, and
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ideologues associated, extend to the Sunni Ummah,
and often though with far more restriction, beyond.
The project of purifying the Ummah of its moral foibles
and failings shall continue under the guidance of the
righteous scholars and Callers (Du’at; preachers).
FROM QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD TO BIN LADENISM
A final move is required before fully understanding the doctrinal DNA of Qa’idat al-Jihad: the shift from
Qa’idat al-Jihad to what may be infelicitously described
as “Bin Ladenism.” Let us examine this more closely.
Qa’idat al-Jihad’s original uniqueness was defined by
its conception as a military expeditionary force serving as a seeding mechanism, force multiplier, and
insurgency-directing organization that sought to
transform locally focused national liberation movements into transnational Islamic insurgencies. Following Gompert and Gordon,22 we may distinguish
among four insurgency types: purely local, based on
purely local resources; local, with external help; local,
transformed with internal and external support into
insurgency conceived in transnational, pan-Islamic
terms; and global, pure and simple. Qa’idat al-Jihad
is an excellent example of the “Type 3” insurgency
strategy, whereby high-quality operatives and training enter the fray and, based in its unique worldview
and belief-system, transform localized insurgents into
nodes seeking to win Islamic lands back generally,
and placing this local context, in those general Sunni
Islamic terms. However, this original Qa’idat al-Jihad
underwent what in retrospect must be deemed a great
metamorphosis.
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“Bin Ladenism”: The Far Enemy is the Master Key
to the Near Enemy.
The original Qa’idat al-Jihad “idea” arose as a joint
endeavor anointed in two meetings during August
1988 as referenced in the Founding Minutes cited
earlier. Over the next decade, this same organization
morphed into a terrorist entity controlled by Osama
bin Laden, whose uniqueness consisted in creating a
global conspiratorial underground terrorist organization. Its “brand” was based in a type of high-quality,
carefully-planned, mass casualty terrorist attack designed to monopolize the world’s attention, galvanize
the world’s Sunni population, and following successive assaults in a prolonged war of attrition, destroy
the American economy, eliminate the American presence in the Muslim Middle East and North Africa (and
other lands), eliminate American support for the Zionist occupation of Palestine, and over time, permit
the operational space to recommence the struggle
against apostate Muslim regimes, ultimately restoring
Islamic hegemony and the long-lost Sunni Caliphate
throughout the now-recovered Muslim world.
In retrospect, one may identify two unique causes
leading to the rise of “bin Ladenism” and the end of
the original Qa’idat al-Jihad “Base” concept. The first
is the failure of the violent Sunni armed movements
in the 1980s and 1990s to overthrow their respective
governments. This was especially the case with current Emir Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who took what was
a haunted, hunted, and bankrupt Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, and folded it into bin Laden’s enterprise. Joining Qa’idat al-Jihad in this manner amounts
to turning a vice—weakness, marginalization, implosion, repression—into a virtue, i.e., re-focusing one’s
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jihadi animus in the direction of a very different enemy known not for its nearness and apostasy, but
farness and original infidelity. The second was bin
Laden’s personal agenda.
Bin Ladenism’s Anti-Americanism and AntiSemitism: Irrational, Delusional, and Strategically
Disastrous.
Osama bin Laden’s mature doctrine arises in the
1990s. Its precise motivation is hard to discern, but
some hints exist. Beginning during the Gulf War commencing on August 2, 1990, and soon thereafter, the
original Qa’idat al-Jihad was transformed into bin Laden’s primary vehicle for plotting and planning mass
casualty terrorist attacks against the United States.
This began with his apparent humiliation and possible
deep resentment at the Saudi Government rejecting
his offer to use his private Mujahidin army to counter
Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait in July 1990.
This was seconded by his apparent humiliation and
resentment of having the United States invited instead
to fight against Saddam’s forces, and during the early
to mid-1990s, to be stationed in various installations
and barracks on Saudi soil. The Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia’s (KSA) reasoning was that, given Saddam
Hussein’s formidable military and the likelihood that
Saudi Arabia was also vulnerable to invasion, instead
of the mere paltry force of bin Laden’s hundreds or
few thousands, a massive counter-attack was required
for which only a great power could muster. Further,
there is precedent within Sunni jurisprudence for
seeking the assistance of infidel forces if deemed necessary and prudent if one is under attack by other infidel forces. Saddam’s Ba’athist regime was nominally
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secular, pan-Arabist, socialist, and anti-Persian racialist, and it was therefore permissible and legal, and the
KSA managed, though with controversy, to secure
from the Wahhabi senior ulema (religious scholars) the
necessary fatwa (legal opinion) permitting such.23
By the early-1990s, then, one can say the transition
occurred from the original Qa’idat al-Jihad to bin Ladenism as defined through an obsessive “Far Enemy”
focus on attacking the United States as the closest path
to freeing Muslim lands and occupied Palestine. Relocating to East Africa between 1992 and 1996, al-Qaeda
organized attacks in Aden in 1992 and in Somalia
in 1993. Bin Laden would soon declare war against
America in a 1996 message; and through a new selfnamed “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews
and Crusaders,” he would issue a February 1998 hukm
(judgment) asserting the Islamic legality of killing
Americans, civilian or military, anywhere they may
be found. The world would soon discover that this
legal cover was necessary for what would come to be
bin Laden’s inaugural signature attack: the August 11,
1998, major mass casualty terrorist attacks against two
United States embassies, one in Kenya and the other
in Tanzania.24
Over the next 13 years until his targeted killing by
the United States on May 2, 2012, bin Laden would
strike or attempt to strike the United States, its chief
allies, and interests. From the most infamous attack,
9/11, to others less spectacular or prevented, the newly defined enemy would be the supposed “CrusaderZionist,” “Zio-Crusader,” or “Crusader,” and bin
Ladenism’s chief charge would be repeated ad infinitum: that this supposed Zionist-Crusader alliance was
waging an unrelenting, hateful, deceitful war against
Islam; that bin Ladenism represented the chief adversary of this global conspiracy to subvert and destroy
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Islam and Muslims; and that the Mujahidin carrying
out these attacks were the vanguard of the worldwide
Ummah, nobly engaged in fighting the mortal enemies
of Islam in order to prevent the humiliation, subservience, and utter degradation of Islam and Muslims. Bin
Laden actually believed—or certainly seemed to believe—these things, not in words destined for public
consumption, but in words intended for the privacy of
secret communiques or spoken within his privileged
inner circle.
Bin Ladenism as a belief system—as a worldview—
is premised in what at best, must be regarded as profound ignorance and unlearnedness about the nature
of the enemies he believed he was destined to fight
and conquer—first and foremost, the United States. At
worst—and I suspect this is closer to the mark—bin
Ladenism is premised in hubris, or even a delusional
or nearly delusional conception of his own powers,
and those of his arch foes. The following assertions
succinctly summarize bin Laden’s beliefs sustaining
his obsessive focus on attacking the “Far Enemy.”
A Deeply Flawed Analogy and a Deeply Flawed
Strategy.
Osama bin Laden’s “Far Enemy” strategy was
based on a deeply flawed analogy. In his telling, it
goes something like this: The former Communist Soviet Union was a mighty empire. The Sunni Mujahidin, owing to their willingness and ability to wage
jihad, and to Allah’s Divine mercy and assistance,
dealt a crushing blow to this atheistic empire. Locked
into an unwinnable counterinsurgency, the Mujahidin
would force a war of attrition; and owing to its crushing economic costs, the Soviet empire would collapse.
Allah’s Divine aid, the Mujahidin’s glorious triumphs,
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the former Soviet Union’s atheistic shallowness, and
the economic costs borne were the necessary and sufficient factors explaining the Soviet withdrawal, and
later, the Soviet collapse.
Before interrogating bin Laden’s forced analogy,
it is worth offering an alternative account of these
events, one that does not require Divine aid or mythic
thinking, and one that is very much keeping with the
facts. The Soviet Union by 1979, the year of its decision
to intervene in Afghanistan to support a pro-Soviet
surrogate, was a weakened and weakening Communist state 6 years away from its future disintegration,
which began under Gorbachev’s call for “perestroika,”
or restructuring. The United States had entered upon
a Cold War commencing in the immediate aftermath
of World War II, its former tactical ally against Nazism and Japanese Imperialism, now a Stalinist totalitarian enemy whose social system and one-party state
represented the theoretical and practical antithesis of
the voluntarist, liberal-democratic capitalist federal
republican United States. The collapse of Soviet Communism began well before their Afghan debacle, but
the United States wasted no time in helping to turn
that debacle to the Soviet’s supreme disadvantage and
help to create for them a Soviet “Vietnam.”
Through an anti-Communist alliance involving
primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, money from the Saudis and Americans would be
funneled primarily through Pakistan, and through the
covert services of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
anti-Soviet guerrillas would be recruited, trained,
armed, and deployed. A decisive turning point occurred when the USG supplied the extremely lethal
anti-aircraft shoulder-fired, ground-to-air Stinger mis-
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siles to Islamist guerrillas. Suffering greatly in their
air campaign as a result, and increasingly bogged
down in an unwinnable war of attrition, the Soviets
determined they would end their involvement, and by
1988, began the exodus that was concluded by 1989.25
Though the Mujahidin inarguably played a role
in the Soviet defeat, without Saudi and U.S. largesse,
CIA and ISI involvement, and the furnishing of the
game-changing Stinger missiles to neutralize Soviet
air assets, the Mujahidin and others contesting the
Soviet intervention would likely have been crushed.
Possessed of a more objective account of facts, let us
now consider bin Laden’s deeply flawed analogy.
Bin Laden believed that, if subject to direct assault
through mass casualty terrorist attacks, the United
States—“the head of the [infidel] snake” or “base of
the tree”—would, like the Soviet Union, be pushed to
a state of economic exhaustion and ultimate collapse.
However, there is a serious problem here. The Soviet
Union’s collapse was not rooted in the exhaustion of
its economic resources, but rather, in a Communist order whose command economy, inefficiency, crisis of
human motivation, and corrupted totalitarian police
state, had developed deep and potentially irreparable
fractures. Furthermore, a calculated effort by stridently
anti-Communist American officials and citizens, who
rejected a policy of détente and peaceful coexistence
for rollback and collapse of the Soviet state, intentionally expedited this process of dissolution, decay, and
bankruptcy by inaugurating an arms buildup, placing
further massive pressure on an already creaking economic order. One may add to this the deliberate objective by these self-same persons of bogging the Soviet
Union down in a very expensive, unwinnable war of
attrition, and one comes much closer to a fuller understanding of the causes of the eventual Soviet collapse.
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Finally, just as it was not economic exhaustion
per se that doomed the Soviet Union, bin Laden profoundly misunderstood the true nature and power of
America’s liberal democratic capitalist social structure and its capacity for absorbing shocks, adjusting
course, empowering a free populace with expansive
opportunities for employment, education, mobility,
property ownership, self-government and, if deemed
necessary, deploying its fighting forces and economic
resources to challenge any foe that would endanger
such. Bin Laden failed profoundly to understand the
forces and values that lie behind the American economic juggernaut. This was a rather predictable consequence of his other prejudices to which we now turn.
Delusional Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism.
Bin Laden held an economic-reductionist theory of
America’s strength: that it is only owing to vast material and economic resources at its command, and it
possesses no other redeeming values. This wealth is
believed to be tightly held by a relatively small cabal
of soulless, greedy, powerful capitalists. Not only does
this wealthy money-grubbing capitalist elite control
American society through its control of capital, assets,
banking and finance, and stock and bond markets,
they are controlled in turn by an even tinier minority of Zionists. It is owing to this Zionist stranglehold
on the American Government, economy, and military, that the existence of de-fanged pro-American,
Zionist-accommodating regimes are put in place and
supported throughout the Arab Muslim world. As an
ultimate consequence, the Muslim world is robbed
of its wealth and energy reserves; subjected to antiIslamic tyrannies; the Zionist regime that usurped
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the Ummah’s sacred lands and rights is defended; and
the Sunni world, which should have the world beholden to it, kneels divided, subjugated, conquered,
and humiliated.
Bin Laden’s “demon theory” of Sunni Muslim humiliation, which is used to explain the present predicament of the Arab Muslim world, does not originate
with him. Rather, bin Laden is a fellow traveler perpetuating and trafficking in unfortunately commonly
believed frustration, resentment, and hate-based unidimensional, demonized caricatures widely circulating throughout these lands. While understandable as
products arising in despair, projection, humiliation,
scapegoating, and a will for revenge, these premises
utterly fail to accurately, coherently, and judiciously
comprehend the actual qualities of his chosen foe.
This preposterous caricature of American society,
economy, and government led bin Laden to massively
inflate his own strengths and capacities for inflicting
damage on America and Americans. This flawed preception caused him to massively underestimate the
actual power that would be brought to bear against
his terrorist enterprise and the actual sources of that
power.

34

FROM BIN LADENISM BACK TO QA’IDAT
AL-JIHAD? BACK TO THE FUTURE? HUBRIS,
DELUSION, DISASTER, AND THE REMAKING/
REBIRTH OF A POST-BIN LADEN, POST-ARAB
SPRING QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD
The Catastrophe (The Nakhbah).
Against the significant plurality of his own Shura
Committee, and with senior level dissenters having
made their opinions known, bin Laden nevertheless carried out the 9/11 attack.26 The United States
of America, it turns out, was in fact, far from being
a cowardly, hollowed-out, spiritually vacuous and
materialistic “Paper Tiger.” From that date until his
own demise nearly 11 years later, bin Laden would
face a global war of his own making, and in the process, its brand would suffer irreparable harm, and its
operatives would be practically hunted to extinction.
9/11 was in its essence a lone-wolf terrorist operation:
the final and successful operationalizing of a plan
originally attempted in its first incarnation by Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad’s (KSM) nephew Ramzi Yousef
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; successfully
thwarted owing to operational errors in its second incarnation as the 1995 Bojinka plot; and consummated
in a plot known fully to only a half-dozen insiders,
and excluding current Qa’idat al-Jihad Emir al-Zawahiri. The “planes operation” was suggested by KSM
to bin Laden in 1996, and 3 years later, finally set in
motion. Two years from then, KSM finally extracted
the revenge he and his nephew sought,27 their selfprofessed motive to punish America for what they
claimed was its support for authoritarian regimes
countenancing Israel’s existence and thus underwrit-
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ing and enabling “Zionist” attacks, oppression, and
the continued occupation of Palestinian lands. Whatever the imagined virtues of the 9/11 “planes operation” to its perpetrators were, the consequences were
clear: those whose unilateral actions to organize and
execute this ignominious attack—one based in stealth,
treachery, and the willful desire to murder thousands
in cold blood—and potentially tens of thousands of
ordinary civilians and residents, 32 of whom were
Muslim28—would launch a war to hunt down and
bring to justice those responsible. The world’s most
formidable superpower would—and did—act,29 the
consequences of which have led to what now appears
to be the latest metamorphosis in the Qa’idat al-Jihad
saga: a recent practical abandonment of bin Ladenism
as doctrine, and a return with a difference, to a previous strategy focused far more on the “Near” rather
than “Far Enemy,”30 and among its Qa’idat al-Jihad in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) affiliate, a new strategy of “lone mujahid” terrorism.
A Name Change Anyone?
Hunkered down in Abbottabad, Pakistan for several years, connected to the world through trusted
couriers and flash drives for uploading instructions to
key operatives, it appears bin Laden well-understood
the practical failure of his strategy to attack the “head
of the snake,” or the “base of the tree trunk.” Attacking the head of a snake does not make sense if you are
a gnat, and sawing at the base of a massive tree does
not make sense if you have a plastic knife. Strangely,
bin Laden had learned little from the theory and practice of asymmetric warfare or of the data reporting
that nations who believe attacks are existential will
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respond mercilessly to such.31 Owing to his prejudices, ignorance, arrogance, and hubris, he imagined that
he would be the new Salahuddin who would usher in
the age of a defeated Crusaderdom, and re-open the
Gates of Jerusalem to Allah’s faithful. Of the discoveries learned in Abbottabad,32 several are of relevance
to the issues under consideration here. First, former
President George W. Bush’s gut and basic instincts
proved exactly right in the aftermath of that dastardly
attack. It was not Islam that was at issue—a great faith,
with noble values, and fully welcomed in our pluralistic nation, even in a religiously conservative mode—it
was terrorism, and very specifically the Qa’idat al-Jihad
terrorist organization, with whom we were now “at
war.” Bush succeeded in detaching Qa’idat al-Jihad
from Sunni Islam far more effectively than bin Laden
detached President Bush from a legitimate war waged
in self-defense against terrorists. Terrorism belongs to
no religion, he would say. A murderer is not a martyr.33
Despite his Texas folksiness, and infamous “Bushisms,” Bush understood clearly what the battle lines of
this new war would be. Apparently, some years later,
bin Laden did as well. President Bush would declare,
in a joint session of Congress merely 9 days after 9/11:
The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known
as al Qaeda. They are some of the murderers indicted
for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole
. . . Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime.
But its goal is not making money, its goal is remaking
the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people
everywhere. The terrorists practice a fringe form of
Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim
scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a
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fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings
of Islam. The terrorists’ directive commands them to
kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans and make
no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children. This group and its leader, a
person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many
other organizations in different countries, including
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in
more than 60 countries. . . . The Taliban must act and
act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or
they will share in their fate. . . . I also want to speak
tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world.
We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many
millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are
good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the
name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect,
to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our
many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends.
Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every
government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped and defeated.34

Eight years later, during his 2009 speech in Cairo,
former President Obama would do the same:
I have come here to seek a new beginning between
the United States and Muslims around the world; one
based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and
one based upon the truth that America and Islam are
not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead,
they overlap, and share common principles—principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings. . . . Moreover, freedom in
America is indivisible from the freedom to practice
one’s religion. That is why there is a mosque in every
state of our union, and over 1,200 mosques within our
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borders. That is why the U.S. government has gone to
court to protect the right of women and girls to wear
the hijab, and to punish those who would deny it . . .
So let there be no doubt: Islam is a part of America.
And I believe that America holds within her the truth
that regardless of race, religion, or station in life, all
of us share common aspirations—to live in peace and
security; to get an education and to work with dignity;
to love our families, our communities, and our God.
These things we share. This is the hope of all humanity
. . . In Ankara, I made clear that America is not—and
never will be—at war with Islam. We will, however,
relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose
a grave threat to our security. Because we reject the
same thing that people of all faiths reject: the killing of
innocent men, women, and children. And it is my first
duty as President to protect the American people.35

In his November 2015 speech at the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kuala
Lumpur, the widely read, influential English-language daily Islamabad outlet The News International
would report:
US President Barack Obama has said that his country
cannot be at war with an entire religion simply because of the actions of the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh
militants . . . He added that many Muslim leaders
have joined the global movement against the terrorist
group, and Daesh only represents a ‘tiny fraction’ of
the Muslim community. He said that the US is not at
war with Muslims but with IS militants . . . whom he
described as a ‘bunch of killers with very good social
media.’36

Three months later, in his first speech as president delivered in an American mosque, President Obama on
February 3, 2016, again adamantly asserted that the
United States is allied with the vast majority of Mus39

lims in a common war not against Islam, but against
a terrorist fringe whose principal victims are mostly
Muslim and whose forbidden and reprehensible murderous acts committed against non-combatant civilians condemn them to the furthest fringes of deviant
criminality. Seven years after his 2009 speech in Cairo,
the President would again proclaim:
[T]here is an organized extremist element that draws
selectively from Islamic texts, twists them in an attempt to justify their killing and their terror. They
combine it with false claims that America and the
West are at war with Islam. And this warped thinking
that has found adherents around the world—including as we saw, tragically, in Boston and Chattanooga
and San Bernardino – is real. It’s there. And it creates a tension and pressure that disproportionately
burdens the overwhelming majority of law-abiding
Muslim citizens. . . . Groups like ISIL are desperate
for legitimacy. They try to portray themselves as religious leaders and holy warriors who speak for Islam.
I refuse to give them legitimacy. We must never give
them legitimacy. (Applause.) They’re not defending
Islam. They’re not defending Muslims. The vast majority of the people they kill are innocent Muslim men,
women, and children. (Applause.) And, by the way,
the notion that America is at war with Islam ignores
the fact that the world’s religions are a part of who we
are. We can’t be at war with any other religion because
the world’s religions are a part of the very fabric of the
United States, our national character. (Applause.) So
the best way for us to fight terrorism is to deny these
organizations legitimacy and to show that here in the
United States of America, we do not suppress Islam;
we celebrate and lift up the success of Muslim Americans. That’s how we show the lie that they are trying
to propagate. (Applause.)37
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In a telling letter from an unknown author, the damage done to Qa’idat al-Jihad’s “brand” is explicitly addressed. Not blaming AQO’s own terrorist modus
operandi as the principal culprit, this author instead
blames its name—“al-Qa’ida”—for it fails to signify a
cause, rather than merely an organization (Tanzim).38
An organization, no less, that now stands marginalized, divorced from its self-proclaimed mission as
vanguard of the people of the Sunnah (Ahl-us Sunnah).39 It is worth quoting in full:
I make mention to you (plural) of a very important
matter that came to me, which is changing the name of
[Qa’ida al-Jihad], because there are several necessary
and attention-worthy reasons to change it, of them:
1. This name (Qa’ida al-Jihad) was abridged by the
people and only a few people remember this name;
it has come to be known as (al-Qa’ida) and this name
reduces the feeling of Muslims that we belong to them,
and allows the enemies to claim deceptively that they
are not at war with Islam and Muslims, but they are
at war with the organization of al-Qa’ida, which is an
outside entity from the teachings of Islam and this is
what was raised repeatedly in the past as indicated by
Obama, that our war is not on Islam or on the Muslim
people but rather our war is on the al-Qa’ida organization, so if the word al-Qa’ida was derived from or
had strong ties to the word Islam or Muslims; or if it
had the name Islamic party, it would be difficult for
Obama to say that. It is clear from the past also that
they [the enemies] have largely stopped using the
phrase “the war on terror” in the context of not wanting to provoke Muslims, because they felt that saying
the war on terror could appear to most people to be a
war on Islam . . .
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2. The name of an entity carries its message and represents it. Al-Qa’ida describes a military base with
fighters without a reference to our broader mission
to unify the nation. Building on what is presented, it
would be nice if you could discuss and come up with
appropriate names that would not be easily shortened
to a word that does not represent us. It would help if
the name is a method of delivery of our message to
reach the sons of the Ummah/nation. 40

This unknown author then suggests potential alternative names that attempt to re-brand AQO in a manner that masks its militarist roots and terrorist modus
operandi:
These are some suggestions [for alternative names]:
Taifat al-tawhid wal-jihad (TN: Monotheism and Jihad
Group)
Taifat al-tawhid wal-difa’ an al-Islam (TN: Monotheism
and Defending Islam Group)
Jama’at i’at al-khilafat al-rashida (TN: Restoration of the
Caliphate Group)
Jama’at nasr al-Islam wal-aksa (TN: Support of Islam
and Al-Aqsa Group)
Jama’at wihda al-Muslimin (TN: Muslim Unity Group)
Tanthim al-Jihadi li-tawhid al-Ummah wa-inkathiha (TN:
Jihad Organization for Unification [Monotheism] and
Rescue of the Nation)
Tanthim al-Jihadi litahrir al-aksa wa-tawhid al-Ummah
(TN: Jihad Organization to Liberate Al-Aqsa and Unify the Nation)
Hizb tawhid al-Ummah al-Islamiya (TN: Islamic Nation
Unification Party)
Jama’at tahrir al-aksa (TN: Al-Aqsa Liberation Group)
Jama’at inkath wanahdat al-Ummah (TN: Rescue and Revitalization of the Nation Group)41

A second theme emerges from these captured documents.42 Bin Laden was in the midst of “new think42

ing.” Although killed in the beginning months of the
“Arab Spring,” bin Laden had earlier begun to question
whether an alternative path to the Caliphate might be
required. It was not the Muslim Brotherhood path of
education, politics, reform, eschewal of violence, and
pursuit of a long-term cultural revolution Islamizing
societies from below, slowly capturing them through
a creeping majority seeking, and winning office to
return Islamicity to the public square. Nor, however,
was it exclusively the planning and executing of mass
casualty terrorist attacks directed at the head of world
infidelity. This new direction seemed to suggest a
gradual, evolutionary insurgent strategy involving
a greater emphasis on preaching (da’wa), on embedding within various ongoing rebellions, and working
within and through the various nationalist-Islamist
currents often dominant in these theaters. This slow
march also called for working within existing “SykesPicot” borders, rather than advocating their smashing.
Nationalist sensibilities and territorial boundaries,
while anathema to the ultimate reconstituted global
Caliphate, were the necessary starting-points, and it
was crucial not to proceed faster than the Ummah was
prepared to go. Also, a rebranding of the local supporters and helpers for the rule of Islamic law (Ansar al-Sharia) is one organizational result that has appeared in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt, for example.43
It was still a seeding process, and the furnishing of
high-quality Qa’idat al-Jihad’s recruits, but the openings now presented by the tottering, falling, and decaying dictatorships called for a new way to approach
the question of raising Allah’s Word supreme; as well
as its timing, and alliance strategy.
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“WHAT IS QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD?” IN A
NUTSHELL: FAZUL ABDULLAH AND ADAM
GADAHN
Following bin Laden’s death, the non-linear course
of an unanticipated Arab Spring and AQO’s role
within it remained undefined. Some fresh beginnings
were suggested, and organizational forms founded.
What futures these hold remain to be seen in the coming years. It is prudent, however, to conclude this
historical account with a final summation of the classical AQO doctrine: that belief system, worldview,
doctrine, and a set of assumptions at the heart of bin
Laden’s declaration of a jihad against the Jews and
Crusader America; that which anchored his terrorist
campaign beginning in the early-1990s.44
Fortunately, two such accounts exist: the first is
a brief, telling excerpt from long-time AQO terrorist
mastermind Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, appearing
in the Spring 2013 10th Issue of AQAP online magazine, Inspire;45 and the second excerpt is by long-time
AQO member, senior AQO spokesman, and senior
communications operative Adam Yahiye Gadahn.46
Let us consider in turn each answer to the question,
“What is Qa’idat al-Jihad?” For Fazul Abdullah:
Al-Qaeda is an Islamic group which raises the flag of
Jihad to espouse and support the Haqq (truth of Islam)
wherever it is found.
Al-Qaeda literally means ‘a firm foundation,’ this
name is enough to clarify that it was found[ed] to
remain fighting Jihad. Allah says, ‘And [remember;
sic] when you, [O Muhammad; sic] left your family
in the morning to post the believers at their stations
(maqaa’ida—a derivation of Qa’idah) for the battle [of
Uhud; sic]—and Allah is All-Hearer and All-Knower.’
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Thus it is military posts with equipments [sic] prepared to fight the enemies of Allah among the combatant kuffar and their allies wherever they are by the
Grace of Allah. Allah says about the mujahideen who
fight His enemies, ‘You [believers; sic] are more terrorizing within their breasts than Allah.’ We ask Allah to
make us among those who terrorize the infidels.
Al-Qaeda is not a separated [sic] party as many think,
we do not believe in any party but one—The Glorious Party of Allah. And this group is made up of [the]
Ummah (nation) of Muhammad. We are against the
concept of partisanship which lays down certain special program [sic] and obliges the members to abide by
their understandings. And whoever differs with them
is counted [i.e., considered] to be on batil (the wrong
path). There are many Islamic movements founded on
these policies, and this opposes the principle of ‘It is
He (Allah) who has named you Muslims’ and ‘Truly!
This, your Ummah . . . is one religion.’ Therefore, we
are Muslims of the vanguard of the Muslim Ummah
who call not to partisanship.
Al-Qaeda’s main goal in this stage—at least—is to aid
every oppressed Muslim in the world regardless of his
madhhab [i.e., his jurisprudential orientation, whether
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, or Hanbali] and race. As for
its long-term goal, [it] is to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate through Jihad in cause of Allah and to implement the Shari’a of Allah in the whole land of Allah,
Bi’idhnillah. [sic; i.e., ‘God willing’]
We are proud that every Muslim believes in Islamic
unity and waging jihad against kuffar who occupy our
lands. And every Muslim has the same ideology as
that of Al-Qaeda’s.
Alhamdulillah [i.e., ‘Praise Allah’] we have conveyed
the ideology to the people. It is up to them to stand
and strive for the Islamic caliphate through different
ways, and to implement the pure law of Allah.47

In a recently published extensive interview in the
new online magazine Resurgence, Gadahn provides
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an excellent precis of AQO’s doctrine.48 As the reader will soon detect, Gadahn’s account incorporates,
though spun to magnify AQO’s truth and greatness,
every key dimension examined earlier. According to
Gadahn, AQO is distinguished by five key doctrines:
First, its global/international reach and membership,
as opposed to some other groups which focused almost
exclusively on particular countries or regions . . . [A]lQa’eda from its inception has always been an ‘Islamic
Internationale’ and has never limited itself to a particular country or region. Rather, it has always had a global
outlook and a presence in dozens of countries around
the region, and has [leadership and rank-and-file from]
many different countries and origins: Hijazis, Najdis,
Yemenis, Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese, Libyans,
Maghrebis, Tunisians, Europeans, Pakistanis, Indians,
Bengalis, Balochis: you name it [emphasis in original].
The second thing which distinquishes al-Qa’eda—and
still does is its focus on fighting America, the Crusader
West, and the Jews (the far enemy/original unbelievers)
[emphasis in original].49

It is worth pausing to focus on this second point
for a moment as Gadahn feels it is necessary to defend
it in a way that he does not the others. In this defense,
he quotes from an actual captured Abbottabad letter
written by bin Laden that employs the “base of the
tree trunk” simile, and acknowledges that this “Far
Enemy” doctrine is still resisted by many. Gadahn’s
excerpt is taken from a letter from Qa’idat al-Jihad’s
Emir Osama bin Laden to the AQAP emir and former
bin Laden personal secretary, Shaykh Abu Baseer
al-Wuhayshi:
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I would like to remind you of the general policy of al-Qaida
in the military and media spheres. Al Qaida has been distinguished by its concentration on the larger external enemy
before the internal enemy, because while the internal enemy
is greater in terms of unbelief, the external enemy’s unbelief
is clearer, and is also more dangerous at the present time.
[Today,] America is the head of unbelief. If Allah cuts it
off, the wings will be weakened. . . . [T]he enemies of the
Ummah are like a malignant tree, and America is its trunk
with a diameter of 50cm . . . We want to topple this tree
by sawing it down, but our power and energy is limited.
Therefore the safest and most effective way to bring down
the tree is for us to focus on the sawing at the American
base of the tree . . . You have a practical example of that,
which is how the Mujahideen in Afghanistan were able to
cut the root of the Russian tree, after which all its branches
fell one after the other, from South Yemen to Eastern Europe, without us expending any effort on these branches at
that time. Therefore, any arrow and landmine which can be
used to target Americans while other enemies are present
should be spent on Americans instead of on other members
of the NATO pact, to say nothing of lesser enemies. . . . The
one who keeps abreast of events can see that it is our operations and messages which have really exhausted and
strained Americans, especially after September 11th. So we
should increase pressure on them until the balance of terror
is achieved and the cost of war, occupation, domination of
our countries becomes more than its benefits for them and
they reach a state of exhaustion which will motivate them to
submit, withdraw from our countries and stop supporting
the Jews [italics in original].50

Gadahn, admitting that this is a controversial position, then attempts its defense:
Regrettably, this strategic policy choice was—and still
is—viewed by some other groups and movements as
amounting to deviation from the path of Jihad and
the ‘true methodology,’ and is used as a gateway for
criticism and condemnation of al-Qa’eda, even though
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the issue is essentially one of strategy, tactics, and priorities and not a dispute over the obligatory nature of
fighting the apostate regimes. In this regard, Shaykh
Usama says in the recently released video entitled
Bushriyaat (Glad Tidings), in reply to a question concerning the groups which prefer to focus on the near
enemy: “As I said, strike the head, and the legs, arms and
everything else will come down. It’s an octopus, and its
head is Crusader/Zionist America and Israel. Some people
are of the opinion that it is beneficial to strike the tentacles
of the octopus . . . [B]ut . . . as long as the number of [Mujahid] youth is few and our capabilities are limited, we should
condense matters by striking the head. They [i.e., those who
believe in striking the tentacles] deserve to be rewarded for
their ijtihad [discretionary judgment] and their deeds, but
according to our fiqh, we believe that we should strike the
more important part, the head. This is what we believe, and
in any case, these are matters of ijtihad (discretion); do you
strike America first or Hosni Mubarak first, or second, or
third. These are matters of discretion, and our ijtihad has led
us to take the position that we should first strike the head of
Unbelief and the leaders of Unbelief, in accordance with the
texts [italics in original].51

Gadahn concludes his attempted “Islamic” case by
citing a case from Islamic history where the first two
caliphs succeeding Prophet Muhammad (Umar and
Abu Bakr) launched attacks against the Byzantines,
despite the fact that they were fighting internal wars
against rebels and early seceders, and cites Quran 9:12,
“Then fight the leaders of disbelief—for they have no
binding oaths—in order that they may desist.”52
A third distinctive feature, Gadahn claims, is
Qa’idat al-Jihad’s: “lack of a written ‘aqeedah (doctrine/creed) or manhaj (methodology) which every
prospective member has to agree to before joining
[emphasis in original].”53 He continues that this is:

48

in contrast to some groups which have strict conditions for membership which may lead to many people
being excluded for not being up to the mark, as if Jihad
is the exclusive domain of an elite few. Al Qa’eda, on
the other hand, tends to be much more open in accepting members even if they may not agree with all the
positions of the leadership, so long as they are Muslims who have been vetted security-wise and are not
known for major bid’a, or outright criminality. I for
one think this approach is the best suited for making
use of the capabilities of the Ummah and rallying the
Muslims to fight their enemies, and restore the Islamic
system. On the other hand, when you limit membership of your group to those who agree with you in every minutae of fiqh and ‘aqeedah, I think you may be
guilty of closing doors which Allah has left open and
isolating your self, the Jihad, and the Mujahideen from
the wider Ummah. Allah has not limited Jihad to people
who follow a certain fiqh or madhhab; on the contrary,
Allah has ordained Jihad for the entire Ummah, even
sinful Muslims, so what about those who follow a different madhhab from ours or even the same madhhab
except that they differ with you on a few minor points
of fiqh or ‘aqeedah? How can you turn them away unless they change their views and positions which are
open to debate and discussion and—more often than
not—have little bearing on day-to-day operations? As
long as someone agrees with the practical approach
and policies of your group and is prepared to listen
and obey the ameer except in disobedience to Allah,
then why should they be prevented from joining you?
I would like to point out that I am not talking here in
terms of permissibility or impermissibility, but rather
in terms of appropriateness and what is in the best
interest of the Ummah.54

Fourth, for Gadahn, AQO’s distinctiveness is in:
its recognition of the importance of public relations
for the Mujahideen and of winning and preserving
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popular support of the Muslim masses (while always
relying on Allah alone), as opposed to some groups
which reject or belittle the concept of maintaining a
popular support base and consider it be a ‘sophism’
or even an ‘idol’ (we seek refuge in Allah) [emphasis
in original]. 55

The fifth and final distinct AQO doctrine is “its
particularly close ties with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”56 At this point, Gadahn begins a discussion of various groups that denounced the Taliban on
grounds of party, or:
due to their deviant understanding of Islam and extreme application of the principle of takfeer (excommunication). The irony was that when these Takfeeri
types came to Afghanistan for training—or were
forced to come to Afghanistan after being chased out
of their homes in Peshawar and Khyber . . . they were
warmly welcomed by the Emirate . . . But . . . these
extremists have always been relatively few in this part
of the world and never very well organized.57

Having identified this “takfiri” extremism, the interviewer then asks Gadahn for his own definition of
that phenomenon. Gadahn responds:
A Takfeeri is someone who has gone beyond the limits of the Shari’ah in terms of his application of the
principle of Takfeer and has adopted excessiveness
and extremism as his methodology, thus making it
his defining characteristic. In other words, we’re not
talking about someone who has made a few mistakes
in this regard; we’re talking about a person who lives
and breathes unregulated Takfeer. . . . [W]hat is important for us to know [is] that both Takfeerism and Kharijism are deviant ideologies which we must never tire
of warning against and combating, due to the danger
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they pose to Islam and Muslims in general and the
Jihad and Mujahideen in particular.58

Toward the very end of the interview, Gadahn
again lists what he believes is, in essence, that upon
which Qa’idat al-Jihad as a distinct organization is
founded. Again, we shall see a distinction drawn
between an open church and a closed sect; between
softness, mercy, and leniency, and hardness, brutality,
and severity.
let us . . . make sure our intentions are sound and our
actions correct . . . we are fighting for . . . Allah, not for
[the] sake of ameer, group, temporal power or worldly
gain . . . let us show mercy and kindness toward the
weak and helpless; let us display tolerance of our fellow Muslims and Mujahideen [even if] . . . they have
let us down; let us beware of the deviant Takfeeri methodology which continues to rear its ugly head every
now and again in some of the theatres of jihad; let us
beware of making Takfeer of Muslims or Mujahideen
or deeming their blood, wealth and honor to be permissible without right; let us beware of turning into
‘Jihadi supremacists’ (if you get my drift); let us show
respect for our ‘Ulama, leaders and elders and let us
abide by their rulings, advice and instructions except
in clear disobedience to Allah; let us adhere to and
comply with the principles of Shari’ah and justice in all
of our actions and dealings; and let us work towards
unity on a sound basis of taqwa and Islamic precepts,
because if we can’t unify our own ranks, how can we
expect the Ummah to unify itself [italicis in original].59

Having examined AQO’s worldview and doctrines
from its origins to the present, Gadahn provides us
with the perfect segue for transitioning from Qa’idat
al-Jihad’s worldview, beliefs, and doctrine to that
about which he warned, posed the greatest of dangers
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to “Islam and Muslims in general and the Jihad and
Mujahideen in particular”60—a second species of deviant Sunni terrorist organization, Tanzim al-Dawla alIslamiyya, the ISO. It is to that terrorist entity that we
now turn.
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III. ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION
(TANZIM AL-DAWLA AL-ISLAMIYYA)
To understand the uniqueness of ISO vis-à-vis
AQO, we must first return to the place where their
common ancestry diverges: the Salafi-Muwahhidun
(Wahhabi) Call. We shall then more fully understand
why the ISO and AQO, although Sunni and jihadist,
are and have always been distinctly different at the
level of core beliefs, worldview, and doctrine. It is a
profound error to view AQO and ISO as disagreeing
only about the path or strategy to the Caliphate. No,
these organizations disagree on genuine religious fundamentals. ISO and AQO differ, for example, on such
core questions as: What does it actually mean to be a
“Muslim”? Who is a Muslim? What constitutes proof
of one’s faith (Iman)? What constitutes proof of one’s
lack of faith (Kufr)? What are the necessary legal requisites for proof of another’s apostasy (ridda)?
While these disagreements are vital, four key
creedal differences are perhaps the most distinctive
and consequential, and most fully distinguish ISO
from AQO. These, considered collectively, explain
why ISO has engaged in a level of brutality, cruelty,
and inhumane conduct so extreme that it has led Muslims and non-Muslims alike to proclaim that “these
are not men of religion” and that “no religion on
Earth,” no matter how militant, engages in this type
of “barbaric, cruel, and evil” behavior.61 These most
distinguishing elements include: (1) an apocalyptic
and eschatological belief in the “Imminence of the End
Times”; (2) a belief in the necessity of immediately
reestablishing the Islamic Caliphate; (3) a belief that
the Shia represent an existential threat to Sunni Islam
and must be completely exterminated; and, (4) that it
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is the “Nearest Enemy” and not the “Far Enemy” that
is the Ummah’s truest existential foe. Considered collectively, these four core beliefs transform what was in
the beginning, an extremely sectarian variant of SalafiWahhabism into a kind of monstrous killing machine
that seems devoid of a moral compass except for that
required to secure absolute authority and absolute
loyalty, through consent or coercion, through power
and conquest, over those poor souls unlucky enough
to be in their way, and which ISO truly believes is
the only salvific path to be followed as precursor to
Allah’s imminent “Divine Judgment” of souls.
The ISO’s present status as a seemingly merciless
killing machine now ensconced in a type of protostate did not occur in a vacuum, of course. The ISO
would not exist, or at this level of severity at least, had
the ruling Shia elements in Iraq following the USG occupation made the essential, painful choices required
to pursue a new social compact with the nation’s Sunni population. Or, had the USG not operationalized
Ahmad Chalabi’s long-dreamt of goal of imposing
a punitive de-Ba`athification.62 Or, had the USG not
imposed the disastrous policy of dissolving the Iraqi
armed forces and security forces, numbering in the
hundreds of thousands;63 or had been prepared for a
Sunni insurgency; or had developed a realistic postoccupation, longer-term stabilization policy based in
a keen and learned awareness that the USG’s decapitation, occupation, and empowerment of Iraq’s Shia
would profoundly destabilize an existing equilibrium
in Iraq;64 or understood that the decapitation of the
Iraqi regime would profoundly alter the terms of the
broader Sunni-Shia rivalry inaugurated by the emergence of a Shia revolutionary State in 1979, and thereby further energizing proponents and antagonists
who view this schism as a difference so wide as that
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between God and the Devil; or, finally, had the USG
not first gone into Iraq the wrong way, and later repeated the error by disengaging from Iraq the wrong
way. The pretext for decapitation was proved wrong,
and the consequences of a premature exit, though understandable owing to Iraqi intransigence, bad faith,
and an Iranian-backed political agenda, have proved
enormously costly.
Another way to understand what the United States
is now dealing with is the following: when the ISO’s
previous incarnation as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
was hunted to practical extinction, the United States
failed to completely douse the fire. It left a burning
ember. It did not understand at the time the profound
and unique nature of this distinct terrorist organization. It had much too casually and erroneously viewed
the ISI as AQO on steroids. And despite AQO’s genuine concerns, they did not publicly denounce this organization’s penchant for extreme brutality and alienating its Sunni base, though they did so in private.
The USG possessed captured letters between senior AQO and the Emir al-Zarqawi of what was then
known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI; “The Base of Jihad in
the Land of the Two Rivers [Tigris and Euphrates]”;
Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn). It knew of
a captured letter sent in January 2004, 10 months before al-Zarqawi’s official October 14, 2004, pledge of
loyalty (bay’ah) to AQO Emir Osama bin Laden; one
that strongly intimated the distinctly different priorities of each organization.65 More recently we learned
through captured documents that, by 2006, a profound
disconnect had emerged between the former ISI and
AQO, to the extent that senior spokesman and communications operative Adam Yahiye Gadahn would
request that AQO openly denounce and disavow any
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relation to ISI; this, in late-2010, a full 4 years before
this was finally consummated by AQO’s current Emir
al-Zawahiri on February 3, 2014.66 But since 9/11, and
perhaps understandably, the world understood the
words “al-Qaeda terrorism” and through ignorance,
error, and good intentions, no public distinctions were
made between what was obviously a level of unprecedented savagery and cruelty being meted out by the
al-Zarqawi organization in Iraq, and AQO’s various
plots directed primarily at the American homeland
and American interests and embassies overseas.
Through a combination of re-learned counterinsurgency, U.S. Special Forces, working with and empowering the newly-emergent Anbar tribal resistance, as
well as ultra-lethal counter-terrorism operations conducted by the U.S. CIA, the Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC), and Iraqi Special Forces, nearly
eviscerated high-value leadership targets of the former
ISI by 2008-2009, through killing and imprisonment.
But, and this cannot be stressed too strongly, absence
of evidence is not evidence of absence. Unbeknownst
to the USG at the time, and only truly understood over
the past few years, a hidden, smoldering, white-hot
ember had been left behind. Its glow and smoke and
other signs carefully hidden from view, in safe houses,
sanctuary in cities and remote regions, or in plain sight
in a major prison—Camp Bucca—later turned out to
have been a virtual hatchery, incubator, and launching
pad for the latest mutation of the original al-Zarqawi
organization.
A systematic campaign that began with carefully
orchestrated prison breaks, a talented and vicious
leadership cadre, and the kindling, tinder, gasoline,
and oxygen provided by those contextual factors cited
previously—now also include the Syrian rebellion
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and civil war, and the emergence of an unanticipated
Syrian sanctuary beginning especially after March
2011—transformed this ISI remnant into one that
would explode on the world stage as a type of exotic
and unexpected state-building killing machine which
seemed, and to some still seems, unstoppable. Still
thinking only in terms of Qa’idat al-Jihad, the ISO was
misnamed, misrecognized, and its unique sameness,
but also critical differences as a unique species—ultrasectarian, former Ba’athist-led, Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi,
apocalyptic global jihadism—remained, and still remains, misunderstood. Let us now retrace the steps
that must be understood to discover how this divergent path from their last commonly shared ancestor
within a renascent Sunni global jihadism occurred;
and its consequences for creed, strategy, and intrajihadi civil war. It is to that journey we now turn.
“ZARQAWISM” VS. AQO: ABU MUSAB
AL-ZARQAWI’S WORLDVIEW AND DOCTRINE:
1989-JUNE 7, 2006
The phenomenon represents a series of continuities and discontinuities commencing with the rise
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the latter 1990s—original progenitor of the doctrine and modus operandi
now under investigation—to the June 29, 2014, selfproclamation of a so-called Islamic State (al-Dawlat alIslamiyya, or al-Khalifa al-Islamiyya) of the Caliphate, to
which the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah) are
now obligated to pledge obedience (bay’ah).
History and doctrine intertwine, and we will discover that al-Zarqawi’s original notions are never
negated, but are extended from “Zarqawism” to
“Neo-Zarqawism,” to what might now be termed
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“Baghdadism.” Because of our ignorance of certain
details of this highly secretive terrorist entity, it is not
yet possible to fully paint the differences between the
original progenitor and his successors.
As described previously, sectarian bloodbaths are
always fierce—whether based in Islam, Communism,
or Christianity, to take three faiths proclaiming a
universal mission and followership. Everything is at
stake in that smallest of smallest differences. It is as if
a millimeter separates two men standing on the edge
of a cliff, and the one just a thousandth of a millimeter
closer to its edge must now, owing to an unpardonable error, face eternal death. In addition, this splintering of splinters leads to ever more severe acid tests
of what it means to be “true” to the genuine “Truth.”
Who is a loyal adherent? Who, an enemy within? Who
is the greater enemy to be fought? For splintered splinters, it is invariably the one closest in creed that commits the greatest of travesties endangering the path to
Salvation. They took the road before the true road, or
a left fork and not a right fork, and it is they who took
the wrong path to eternal perdition and damnation.
But this is not merely a matter for the damned. It is
one that also, and especially for these ultra-sectarians,
threatens to carry all others (including themselves)
in their path. Obliterating the followers of the wrong
path, then, translates into an obsessive demand to create the “Truest Sect of the Pure,” all of this of course as
a self-proclaimed vanguard speaking in the name of
the entire multitude to be saved. For communism, the
vanguard represents the proletariat. For the adherents
of the ISO, the true Mujahidin professedly represents
the worldwide Muslim Ummah.
For these ultra-sectarians, the Muslim Ummah must
first be cleansed of its greatest internal enemies—the
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Shia—and nearly as close, of Sunnism’s own false
and heretical, and even apostate elements. Then, and
only then, should the final battles commence against
the ultimate and final Enemy, the original Kufr or
Worshippers of the Cross, and all other forms of supposedly modern idolatry—nationalism, secularism,
and democracy, the most often mentioned. And for
these ultra-sectarians, Islam is to be understood not
as an ethic of all times—proclaiming the necessity of
righteous intention, praiseworthy deeds, mercy, and
forgiveness—but as an ethic of the “End Times,” demanding a virtually unlimited relaxing of moral strictures and unleashing of unprecedented vicious brutality, against Allah’s most determined final antagonists.
ISO is not Qa’idat al-Jihad, the Church for all Sunnis, whose principal and immediate arch-enemy is
the original external “Far Enemy” Kufr, demonically
presented in AQO’s terrorist messaging as the CrossWorshipping, Muslim-hating “Crusader” America
and the Cross-Worshippers’ true behind-the-scenes
demonic master, “Zionism.” ISO is not Qa’idat al-Jihad,
the Base for a Sunni Islamic International Organization or for a “World Front for Jihad Against the Jews
and Crusaders.” As a conglomerate organization, it is
designed to welcome the maximum number of Sunnis
willing to go to war with these original Kufr who have
usurped Muslim lands, honor, power, and the right
to rule; to maximize and synchronize the combined
power of its parts; accommodate Salafis and nonSalafis, Salafi-Wahhabis and non-Salafi-Wahhabis,
Salafi-Jihadis and non-Salafi-Jihadis, and all Sunnis—
saints and sinners; and shall all remain, for all times,
sinners that must constantly pray for Allah’s Divine
mercy and compassion—who profess an intention to
adhere to the empowerment of Ahl-us Sunnah, and
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work for the elimination of the “Crusader-Zionist” occupation of “Muslim” lands.
A remarkable example of the AQO ecumenical
conception of “Sunniness” and “Muslimness” is evidenced in two separate documents by Qa’idat al-Jihad
senior spokesmen and senior communication representative Adam Gadahn. First, Gadahn’s truly broad
conception of Sunnism is evident in his biting criticism
of the ultra-sectarian, exclusivist, and self-righteous
nature of certain so-called jihadist online forums.67
A second example is provided in that posthumously
published interview earlier referenced, in which Gadahn discusses his own conversion to Islam, and also
his reflections on the essential requirements of faith.68
Lumping not splitting, Church not sect, openness
not closedness, patience not impatience; these are
AQO’s signature attributes, declared by one at the
apex of AQO since his bay’ah in the latter 1990s, and
one trusted and actually charged with presentations
of AQO’s creed and methods. It is important to understand how powerful this path emphasizing intraSunni solidarity, unity, community, brotherhood, and
the tolerance of differences may become if, as is possible, the AQO is in transition from its “Far Enemy”
exclusive “Bin Ladenism,” to a revised “Qa’idat alJihad” focused far more on becoming fully embedded
as force multipliers and allies within broader alliances
in a now-fermenting Arab Muslim world. Further reflections on strategy must wait; however, and will be
taken up in subsequent chapters of this book.
Having introduced the ISO by way of a broader
reflection on the genus to which it belongs—ultrasectarianism—and having drawn preliminary contrasts between a Churchly AQO and Sectarian ISO, we
shall now begin with Zarqawism and end with selfdeclared Caliph Ibrahim’s Caliphate of the End Times,
60

tracing the rise of this other markedly sectarian, and
in other highly consequential ways unique, species of
Sunni global jihadism.
FROM NON-RELIGIOUS VIOLENT STREET
TOUGH TO ULTRA-SECTARIAN SALAFI-WAHHABI JIHADIST PRISON TOUGH: 1980–1999
If one attempts a composite based on standard
sources and known writings, “Zarqawism” appears to
be a novel synthesis derived from several elements.69
First, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (b. 1966, birth name: Ahmad Fadil Nazal-Khalayah) in his youth and youngest
adulthood appears as a sinner among sinners, born in
and roaming the urban, industrial, gritty Jordanian
city Zarqa’s streets, and sharing a profile that is not
dissimilar from that of a particular demographic now
finding its way into the global jihad: petty thieves and
criminals engaged in violent assault, including sexual
battery, and spending time imprisoned. We may add
to this al-Zarqawi’s loss of his father when he was 17.
The portrait presented is of a street tough, known for
petty criminality and a kind of fearless toughness. He
was known to do drugs, imbibe alcohol, engage in
non-marital sex, and other activities anathema to the
trends to which he would later declare unconditional
fidelity.
Al-Zarqawi at some point “found” or reverted
to Islam, having been drawn in and convinced of its
truth. Again, not unlike others similarly disposed, alZarqawi’s reversion to a variant of Salafist Islam led
him to abandon his criminal activities and commit to
a strict behavioral regimen prohibiting drugs, alcohol,
tobacco, pre- or non-marital sex, and a strict sex–segregation and expectation of female sexual modesty in
demeanor and dress.
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Al-Zarqawi sojourned to Afghanistan to partake
in the jihad against the Soviet occupation, but by the
time he arrived in 1989, the Soviets were in the process
of exiting the theater and the jihad had entered a postSoviet occupation phase characterized by an emerging
civil war among the various armed organizations, and
uncertainty regarding the fate and future of the Arab
Afghan emigrants, and also the many “Near Enemy”
insurgents from Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and
elsewhere now caught between a homeland to which
they could not return, and a jihad with an ill-defined
future. Al-Zarqawi’s role was that of an amateur journalist writing for the periodical Al-Bonian al Marsous,
but more fateful for his future was his introduction
and later discipleship to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi
(b. 1959, Asim Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi).70
Al-Maqdisi is deemed one of the most influential
and consequential major scholarly authorities to which
AQO and others refer.71 His creedal orientation is based
in a specific strand of Salafi-Wahhabism originating in
a particular ultra-conservative 19th-century Wahhabi
movement of scholars from the Najd region of Saudi
Arabia (the Najd Scholars Movement [NSM]).72 Its
form is a variant of “Rejectionist” Salafi-Wahhabism
represented by Juhayman al-Otaybi and those of his
circle, who, building their case on the NSM and the
authority of an earlier incarnation known as the Ikhwan73 (Brotherhood),—a fierce, uncompromising jihadist army deployed against perceived adversaries
including what was deemed Ottoman usurpation of
Salafi-Wahhabism—called into question the Islamic
nature of the existing Saudi State.74 Unlike al-Otaybi,
who did not call for the actual overthrow of the Saudi
State, despite its demonstrable infidelity on important
matters, al-Maqdisi, in a series of key works, did.
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Despite al-Maqdisi’s critique of the Saudi state,
however, it was Jordan, Jerusalem, and the more immediate Levantine environs that provided the basis of
his focus. Organizing semi-underground, and preaching and recruiting for their secretive ultra-conservative
Salafi-Wahhabi Call, an organization informally called
Jama’at al-Muwahhidin (Society for the Upholders of
Absolute Monotheism) would capture this mission.75
The group’s activities consisted of vigilante-style activities, a kind of privatized hisbah or policing of prohibited or reprehensible conduct, and was directed at
what they considered secular debauchery: bars, redlight districts, and co-mingling of the sexes. It was alMaqdisi’s decision to smuggle in hand grenades, and
their mutual decision to oppose the recently conducted Oslo accords and Jordanian treaty-in-the-making
with the Israeli state, declared in 1994, that led later
to their imprisonment on terrorism-related charges.
Al-Zarqawi’s transition from street tough to Salafist
to Maqdisian-inspired ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism was on display in his trial as he denied
the legitimacy of the court and its laws. Sentenced to
15 years in prison, a decisive phase had begun.
Al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi were imprisoned from
1994 to 1999, their sentences cut short by the accession
and royal pardon of Jordanian King Abdullah II. Accounts of this period agree that the al-Zarqawi and alMaqdisi relationship underwent a fundamental transformation. Initially, his student-disciple al-Zarqawi
proved to be a determined, fearless, loyal enforcer.
He developed a reputation as a tough, charismatic,
dominating leader, imposing exacting demands from
inmates regarding their Islam and decorum. He was
also noted for a type of fearless loyalty, and known
for unusually overt displays of emotion, for example,
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while memorizing the Quran, one of the achievements
of this period. With regard to the latter, al-Zarqawi
was also known for a juvenile-like effusive and almost
romantic affection directed toward his mother and
sisters.
The net result of these prison years together (19941999) was a transformation in the authority relations
between emir-scholar-teacher al-Maqdisi and pupildisciple al-Zarqawi. Al-Maqdisi eventually conceded
emirship to al-Zarqawi, and continued in his studies
and fastidious commitment to produce an exacting
scholarship using classical sources to support a maximalist position calling for the overthrow of existing
Arab states that did not rule by the Sharia. Al-Zarqawi,
transforming himself into a muscular and tough person through daily routines of bench-lifting rock-laden
buckets, developed a reputation as a fearless leader,
defender of inmates, and was no longer in a subordinate relation to the man who had taught him the ultimate meaning of “The Community of Abraham,” as
al-Maqdisi professed it.
AL-ZARQAWI’S PRIVATE JIHADIST ARMIES
OF THE LEVANT: 1999-2004
Al-Zarqawi’s second and most consequential journey to Afghanistan occurred upon his release. Two
years before 9/11, and equipped with a basically
Maqdisian ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism, al-Zarqawi traveled to the land ruled by thenemir of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Muhammad bin
Omar, to build an army designed to overthrow the
Jordanian state, and more broadly, to target regimes
throughout the Levant. Though supplied a letter of
introduction vouching for his character, the senior
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leadership of AQO was not impressed. Bin Laden and
others expressed disdain and genuine concern over
his brashness, arrogance, and extremist and sectarian
tendencies. Senior AQO operative Sayf al-Adl indicates in an important recollection how AQO initially
placed al-Zarqawi under surveillance not only to ensure his trustworthiness, but also to determine his
character and creed. Evidence is cited of a genuine distance between Osama bin Laden and al-Zarqawi, and
al-Zarqawi’s repeated refusals to pledge allegiance/
obedience (bay’ah) to bin Laden, the undisputed emir
of AQO.
Though al-Maqdisi was a key mentor from the
latter 1980s through their mutual imprisonment, and
during this second Afghan sojourn, he does not furnish al-Zarqawi’s Nazi-like anti-Shi’ism. Another key
influence, Sheikh Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir (born,
Abdul Rahman al-Ali), appears to provide the key to
al-Zarqawi’s signature vitriolic, ultra-sectarian antiShi’ism, and his doctrine calling for the mass annihilation of the Shia, laypersons included.76 Without this,
al-Zarqawi would have been another Salafi-Jihadist
waging war on “apostate” Arab regimes, Jordan especially; with this, Zarqawism was unleashed in a
manner the jihadi currents had neither witnessed, nor
condoned. Let us examine this more closely.
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ABDALLAH AL-MUHAJIR’S ULTRAEXTREMISM IN TAKFIR, AND TAKFIR
OF THE SHIA
An Egyptian national, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir
graduated from the Islamic University in Islamabad,
participated in jihad in Afghanistan, and taught at
jihadi camps in Kabul. He was later recruited by alZarqawi to become the senior Sharia instructor for his
camp in Herat.77 Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s extremism in takfir was well known. According to al-Khateeb, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s “book on the dogma
of jihad greatly influenced al-Zarqawi, who actually
studied the book under [Abu Abdallah al-] Muhajir.”78
Al-Khateeb summarizes Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s
book in the following manner:
More a book about the dogma of blood, [Abu Abdallah al-] Muhajir posits that any country deferring to
the rule of positive law is a land of infidelity that Muslims are obligated to leave. He also wrote that there
is absolute consensus on the unconditional bloodshed
of an infidel unless he or she is under the protection
of circumstances stipulated by Shariah. He adds that
siding with apostates against Muslims is the greatest
infidelity of all, and that Islam does not differentiate
between military and civilians. He wrote that ‘the brutality of beheading is intended, even delightful to God
and His Prophet.’79

A document posted anonymously online in 2012,
supposing it is accurate, offers far greater detail on
Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s pivotal role in Afghanistan, and also his unique influences on al-Zarqawi’s
doctrine, than any others of which the present author
is aware. The following claims are made therein. First,
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a shorthand summation of Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s
doctrine is made: extremes in takfir, sectarianism, and
anti-Shi’ism, and with reference to the latter, legalizing the categorical annihilation of the Shia laity; and
finally, on these takfiri grounds, he opposed both the
Afghan Taliban’s and Osama bin Laden’s doctrines.
Second, that other analysts have overestimated Abu
Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s influence on al-Zarqawi and
that in fact his mentorship was restricted to a specific
time of al-Zarqawi’s life, and was only one of several
potential influences. Third, despite a fairly lackluster
online presence, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s influence at the camps in Afghanistan was very significant. Fourth, he was an Egyptian who traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s, received his master’s degree in
Sharia from the Islamic University of Islamabad, and
remained in Afghanistan. Fifth, he was a major figure
whose primary mission was to recruit and indoctrinate
those takfiri factions, mostly Arabs from the Maghreb,
to return home to overthrow their respective regimes.
Sixth, within this capacity, he held court in Khalden
camp in Khost, Afghanistan, becoming its senior Sharia official (mas’ul shara’i), thus overseeing Sharia matters, and theological sessions dealing with governance
and creed. He further institutionalized his takfirism
through the creation of an Institute for Faith Brigades
(ma’had kata’ib al iman). This Institute was an annex to
Khalden camp, and consisted of a dormitory, lecture
hall, and a small room for Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s
workspace and library. It was there that he delivered
a series of seven lectures, whose primary focus was to
provide the Sharia foundations of takfirist operations
and create groups of various nationalities to fight
their respective “apostate” governments. In sum, an
anonymous blog entry concludes that Abu Abdallah
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al-Muhajir essentially represented the takfiri faction in
Afghanistan, and embodied a hardline, doctrinaire,
and extremely inflexible takfiri line, one that led him
to accuse bin Laden of deviance; and to actually takfir
the Taliban, owing to their willingness to permit traditional prohibited intercessory practices among the
populace.80
ABU MUSA’B AL-ZARQAWI’S EMBRACE OF
ABU ABDALLAH AL-MUHAJIR’S EXTREMISM
IN TAKFIR
The anonymous blog entry provides essential
insight into al-Zarqawi’s transformation from one
who, though a Salafi-Jihadi committed to overthrowing “apostate” regimes, did not engage in actions for
which he would later be widely condemned throughout his own Salafi-Jihadi community.
[H]e [Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir] passed on his doctrinal legs in Herat [al-Zarqawi’s own training camp]
to al Zarqawi and his Levantine group [Jund al-Sham;
Soldiers of the Levant]. It is here worthwhile remembering that before getting along [i.e., agreeing] with
[Abu Abdallah] al-Muhajir, al Zarqawi had always
been against suicide operations. That was his position
both during his first stay in Afghanistan and when he
went back to Jordan. Given how later al Qa’ida in Iraq
heavily reflected this method, it is safe to say that this
encounter has been a major step in his radicalization
trajectory. Al Zarqawi explained that he changed his
mind after having ‘discussed the matter of martyrdom’
and listened to several tapes of the Shaykh (he also
said that he read what he deemed ‘an excellent paper’
by Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir on the issue). He further
remembered that ‘Allah has expanded my breast to accept his position on martyrdom operations. Not only
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did I see that they (martyrdom operations) are permitted but I was convinced that they were desirable. I
proceeded then to arrange for Sheikh [Abu Abdallah]
Al-Muhajir to give a 10-days [sic] work shop in Hirat
[sic] Camp to explain the legality of these operations
to the brothers there—this had a very positive impact
on the brothers.’ According to a takfiri militant, the
suicide operations issue was one of the various topics
which have been dealt with during the Institute heyday, during a course on jihad.81

The anonymous blog entry further reveals that
Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s Pioneers of Spreading the
Sunnah and the Landmarks of the Victorious Sect, and The
Jurisprudence of Jihad, were the works most extensively
taught in the camps. In addition, it was Abu Abdallah
al-Muhajir who provided to al-Zarqawi the justifications he would use in his refutations of al-Maqdisi’s
refusals to legitimate the blood, honor, and wealth of
the Shia in jihad. Finally, the anonymous blog entry
reports that al-Zarqawi reportedly said, according to a
senior Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn figure
(the late Abu Azzam al-Iraqi):
I was not influenced by anyone I met among the seekers of knowledge in my whole life like (as I was by)
Shaykh Abu Anas al-Shami (may Allah accept him)
and Shaykh Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir (may Allah protect him).82

Nibras Kazimi also offers critical insight into alZarqawi’s embrace of Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s
extremeness in takfir.83 Kazimi here reproduces an excerpt from a speech in which al-Zarqawi upbraids his
former mentor al-Maqdisi, and in so doing, identifies
Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s doctrinal significance for
the takfir of all Shia. Al-Zarqawi asserts to al-Maqdisi:
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He who knows their [the Shia] situation in Iraq would
surely realize that they are no longer laypeople in the sense
you [al-Maqdisi] put, for they have become soldiers for
the unbeliever occupiers, and the eyes that watch the true
mujahedeen, and would Ja’afari and Hakim and other
reprobates have come into power had it not been for the
votes of these laypeople?! And it is unjust to cite a fatwa
from Ibn Taymiyyeh’s era and have it apply to the reprobates today without judging the differences between the
two eras, and then there are scholars who have spoken
of lay Shias as unbelievers like Sheikh Hmoud Al-‘Aqla’
may he rest in peace, and Sheikh Suleiman Al-‘Alwan
and Sheikh Ali Al-Khudhair (may God set them free) and
Sheikh Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir and Sheikh Al-Rashoud
may he rest in peace, and others [emphasis added].84

Despite al-Zarqawi’s penchant for extremism,
AQO ultimately decided that its dearth of Levantine
connections and al-Zarqawi’s success as an inspirational leader warranted the expenditure of “$5,000
or so in ‘seed money’” to establish his own training
camp outside the western Afghan city of Herat, near
the Iranian border. Then-Qa’idat al-Jihad chief of security Saif al-Adl—a former Egyptian Army colonel who
had trained in special operations—perceived merit in
al-Zarqawi’s focus on “apostate” Arab regimes, and
was designated the middleman.85
His newly named group, Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of
the Levant), starting with a few dozen recruits from
Jordan, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon would eventually grow to hundreds, and then to the low thousands.86
Soon Jund al-Sham, under the influence of another key
Salafi-Jihadi religious influence and his chief spiritual
advisor, Abu Anas al-Shami (killed September 17,
2004), would take on its new name Jama’at al-Tawhid
wal-Jihad (Group for Monotheism and Jihad), one it
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would only abandon upon finally making bay’ah to
Osama bin Laden 5 years later, on October 17, 2004.
Al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad operated
on two distinct fronts. One privileged the overthrow of
the Jordanian monarchy and focused on terrorist operations in the Levant.87 This included the attempted
1999 Millennium bombing, 2002 assassination of the
U.S. Diplomat Lawrence Foley, a disrupted massive
bombing plot in 2004 targeting the headquarters of the
Jordanian intelligence services, and the November 9,
2005, hotel bombing in Amman, Jordan.88
The second front is the one that would soon open
up in Iraq. The American attack on the Afghan Taliban
and AQO following 9/11 led to al-Zarqawi’s departure, first into Iran along with many AQO senior level
operatives, and soon thereafter into a region a few
miles from the Iranian border in northern Kurdistan,
then controlled by a virtual mini-statelet run by the
ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Sunni Kurdish organization, Ansar al-Islam. It was from this camp that
al-Zarqawi departed in the run-up to the U.S. invasion—something becoming increasingly imminent—
following 9/11 and the disastrously inaccurate argument linking weapons of mass destruction (flawed
premise no. 1), and an al-Qaeda terrorist presence
(flawed premise no. 2), with a rogue regime (correct
premise no. 3). Al-Zarqawi began carefully preparing
for a future assault by building networks, establishing
safe houses, and storing weapons and munitions.
The American invasion, occupation, and failed
stabilization of Iraq, commencing in March 2003, provided the context in which al-Zarqawi’s ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Jama’at al-Tawhid walJihad would soon introduce the world to a particularly
brutal and savage type of jihad, one that owing to the
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utter dominance of AQO and wildly inaccurate official
claims that directly linked 9/11 and bin Laden to Saddam Hussein, and also to al-Zarqawi, failed to do justice to the phenomenon that in fact existed. What was
occurring in Iraq under al-Zarqawi was not Qa’idat
al-Jihad 2.0, or Qa’idat al-Jihad’s “Second Generation.”
It was not Qa’idat al-Jihad at all. In an important sense,
it was everything Qa’idat al-Jihad was not. This was
al-Zarqawi’s ultra-sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi
Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad launching its own war, in
its own name, for its own goals. It is the very type of
Islam silenced or expelled from Qa’idat al-Jihad’s fold,
owing to its penchant for intra-Sunni division, extremism, and takfiri nature.
ZARQAWISM UNVEILED AS DOCTRINE AND
STRATEGY: AL-ZARQAWI’S NEGOTIATION
AND BAY’AH TO OSAMA BIN LADEN
Al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism is on full display in its
earliest documents, particularly those involved in
the negotiations that unfolded over the course of 10
months as al-Zarqawi considered Qa’idat al-Jihad’s
offer to become an official AQO affiliate.89
The January 2004 Letter to Osama bin Laden.
[T]he only solution is for us to strike the religious,
military, and other cadres among the Shi`a with blow
after blow until they bend to the Sunnis. Someone may
say that, in this matter, we are being hasty and rash
and leading the [Islamic] nation into a battle for which
it is not ready, [a battle] that will be revolting and in
which blood will be spilled. This is exactly what we
want, since right and wrong no longer have any place
in our current situation. The Shi`a have destroyed all
those balances. God’s religion is more precious than
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lives and souls. When the overwhelming [Sunni] majority stands in the ranks of truth, there has to be sacrifice for this religion. Let blood be spilled, and we will
soothe and speed those who are good to their paradise. [As for] those who, unlike them, are evil, we will
be delivered from them, since, by God, God’s religion
is more precious than anything and has priority over
lives, wealth, and children.90

This letter from al-Zarqawi to al-Qaeda’s most
senior leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman alZawahiri, discloses his theory of victory, including
discussion of key target audiences and groups, and
valuable insight into potentially fatal strategic challenges. It also offers a window into the mind of a
fanatically self-righteous killer. Al-Zarqawi reveals
himself as “Sheikh of the slaughterers,” whose conscience is clear, owing to the satanization of various
“others” dehumanized beyond the pale of empathy or
sympathy.
In this letter, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are presented with an offer: either to endorse al-Zarqawi’s
doctrine and strategy, and thereby earn al-Zarqawi’s
oath of fealty (bay’ah), or to stand aside offering their
“brotherly” advice and support. Al-Qaeda Emir bin
Laden and second-in-command al-Zawahiri are referred to as “gracious brothers, . . . the leaders, guides,
and symbolic figures of jihad and battle,” and al-Zarqawi stated that he does not see himself as one that is
“fit to challenge you,” but only to be “the spearhead,
the enabling vanguard, and the bridge on which the
[Islamic] nation crosses over to the victory that is
promised and the tomorrow to which we aspire.”91
Al-Zarqawi, having taken the time to explain his “vision” and “path,” then issued what amounted to be an
ultimatum.
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If you agree with us on it, if you adopt it as a program
and road, and if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, [then] we will be your readied
soldiers, working under your banner, complying with
your orders, and indeed swearing fealty to you publicly and in the news media . . . If things appear otherwise to
you, [then] we are brothers, and the disagreement will
not spoil [our] friendship. [This is] a cause [in which]
we are cooperating for the good and supporting jihad.
Awaiting your response . . . [emphasis added].92

Zarqawi’s primary political objective is sectarian:
to empower Sunni Islam and violently attack, suppress, and uproot Shia Islam. While anti-Shi’ism is a
long-standing orthodox Sunnite policy, one enhanced
since the 1979 Iranian Khomeinist revolutionary Shia
revival and self-conscious Salafist and Wahhabi-Salafi
Sunni-led opposition to this revival,93 Al-Zarqawi’s
anti-Shi’ism is fanatical, obsessive, and characterized
by satanization/demonization.94 The language he
uses to describe the Shia is identical to that used in
precursors to mass atrocities committed by a variety
of violent hate-based movements,95 and represents the
furthest extremes of dehumanization required to morally disengage and justify wholesale slaughter. Consider for example, the terms used to characterize, in
toto, the Shia of Iraq and the Levant:
[T]he Shi`a, have declared a secret war against the
people of Islam. They are the proximate, dangerous
enemy of the Sunnis, even if the Americans are also
an archenemy. The danger from the Shi`a, however, is
greater and their damage is worse and more destructive to the [Islamic] nation than the Americans, on
whom you find a quasi-consensus about killing them
as an assailing enemy.
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[They are] the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking
snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying
enemy, and the penetrating venom.
[They are] a crafty enemy who wears the garb of a
friend, manifests agreement, and calls for comradeship, but harbors ill will.
Shi`ism is the looming danger and the true challenge.
They are the enemy. Beware of them. Fight them. By
God, they lie.
These [have been] a sect of treachery and betrayal
throughout history and throughout the ages. It is a
creed that aims to combat the Sunnis.
They are infiltrating like snakes to reign over the army
and police apparatus, which is the strike force and iron
fist in our Third World, and to take complete control
over the economy like their tutors the Jews.
The Qur’an has told us that the machinations of the
hypocrites, the deceit of the fifth column, and the cunning of those of our fellow countrymen whose tongues
speak honeyed words but whose hearts are those of
devils in the bodies of men-these are where the disease
lies, these are the secret of our distress, these are the
rat of the dike. They are the enemy.
[T]hey are a bone in the throats of the mujahidin and
a dagger in [the backs of] their leading personalities.
People without exception know that most of the mujahidin who have fallen in war have done so at the hands
of these people. The wounds are still spreading, and
they are working the daggers of hatred and cunning
in them assiduously, Night or day, they do not let up.
I mean that targeting and hitting them in [their] religious, political, and military depth will provoke them
to show the Sunnis their rabies . . . and bare the teeth of
the hidden rancor working in their breasts.96
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The October 17, 2004, Bay’ah by Emir al-Zarqawi
(Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) to Emir Osama bin
Laden (Qa’idat al-Jihad).97
Al-Zarqawi’s bay’ah to bin Laden does not substantially compromise in any recognizable way the path
he charts in this letter. First, it indicates that it is bin
Laden who has “seen the light” and come to accept
al-Zarqawi’s vision for Iraq. Consider al-Zarqawi’s account of these “past 8 months,” roughly the date separating the previous letter from this one.
Numerous messages were passed between ‘Abu Musab’ (God protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood
over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue
between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off
than God chose to restore them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the strategy of
the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the
two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed
to its methods and overall mission [emphasis added].98

It is on this basis, then, that al-Zarqawi’s organization Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad assumes a name
change—but neither a doctrinal nor a strategic change.
The new name, Tanzim Qai’dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, which would in public commentary almost always be signified by the shorthand, al-Qaeda in Iraq
or AQI, appeared to indicate a subordinate franchise
in a superordinate conglomerate. Moreover, in public, al-Zarqawi seemed to have fully subordinated his
organization and placed its entire machinery at bin
Laden’s disposal. Al-Zarqawi declared here that:
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[A]l-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its
soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh “Osama
bin Laden” (in word and in deed) and to jihad for the
sake of God until there is no more discord (Fitnah) and
all of the religion turns toward God. . . . By God, O
sheikh of the mujahideen [bin Laden], if you bid us
plunge into the ocean, we would follow you. If you
ordered it so, we would obey. If you forbade us something, we would abide by your wishes. For what a fine
commander you are to the armies of Islam, against the
inveterate infidels and apostates! . . . Now then, people of Islam, come rally to the flag of the leader of the
mujahideen, which we raise together, and let us cry
[‘there is no God but the one God’], as the flag waves,
raised by our newest heroes. Let us cleanse all Muslim
lands of every infidel and wicked apostate until Islam
enters the home of every city-dweller and nomad.99

ZARQAWISM: ITS THREE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS
Zarqawism is defined through its ultra-sectarianism, uncompromising ultra-violence, and focus on the
immediate creation of an Islamic State as a base for the
prophesied return of the Caliphate.100 Let us consider
its three signature elements.
First, al-Zarqawi declared that the Shia were the
single greatest threat to the very existence of Ahl-us
Sunnah. As an existential threat, the language he employed is calculated to inoculate persons from any
form of empathy or recognition that the Shia are even
human beings. As stated previously, it is virtually
identical to that used by persons, groups, and organizations who have committed mass murder, widespread atrocities, and even genocide against a categorical enemy declared the archenemy. For Hitler, for
example, the singular greatest divide among humans
was that between “the Aryan” and “the Jew”; the lat77

ter was not only subhuman, but also the pernicious,
treacherous parasite that was the exclusive cause of
Germany’s then-present humiliation, powerlessness,
and subversion of its destined rulership of the Earth’s
natural resources and inhabitants. For al-Zarqawi, the
great world division was that between the “Ahl-us
Sunnah,” and the “Shia.” This ultra-sectarian, genocidal “Final Solution” doctrine toward the Shia, as we
shall see, remains a fundamental ISO premise maintained to this day.101
Second, Zarqawism expressed its will to power in
a theretofore-unprecedented combination, in global
jihadist circles of the commission of barbaric ultra-violence, and just as important, its transformation into
a media-borne grotesque spectacle and weapon of
terror-inducing coercion. Here, it was not the mass annihilation of the Shia, declared as a fundamental first
principle of policy, but the carefully-staged, carefullyfilmed, carefully-calculated horror inducing spectacle
of a hooded executioner standing above a helpless,
terrified, non-combatant captive, berating and blaming the United States for the horror soon to unfold,
climaxing as the executioner’s knife saws off this hapless victim’s head and then, in macabre fashion, later
dropped into place and displayed on its lifeless torso.
Unpublicized and unprecedented brutality in the
name of Ahl-us Sunnah was also being committed as
al-Zarqawi’s campaign pursued the systematic, coldblooded assassination of all opponents from all parties
deemed apostate, owing to their capacity and willingness to partake in a non-sectarian, non-Salafi-Wahhabi
Jihadi Sunni political organization.102 These enemies
were Sunni Muslims, but in al-Zarqawi’s eyes, they
could be at best hypocrites, but more likely heretics,
or apostates only worthy of death.
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Finally, al-Zarqawi focused on the necessity of immediately establishing the foundations of an Islamic
State as a necessary precursor for the liberation of
the entire Levant, and ultimately the future restoration and final triumph of the historic Sunni Caliphate.
This policy was originally pursued under the banner
of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Following al-Zarqawi’s
bay’ah to bin Laden on October 17, 2004, and under the
banner of this new AQO “affiliate,” Tanzim Qa’idat alJihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn (The Base of Jihad in the Land
of the Two Rivers; AQI)—beginning on October 17,
2004, until his demise June 7, 2006, since al-Zarqawi’s
organization’s name was almost always translated as
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—these actions would appear
to the world to be those sanctioned and perpetrated
by AQO itself. And despite internal pleas to overtly
distance AQO from these acts, in principle and owing to their damage to the AQO brand, AQO’s advice
and counsel to al-Zarqawi occurred only in secret
correspondence, while officially the AQO continued
publicly to endorse the overall goal of mercilessly attacking the Iraqi state and preventing the emergence
of a democratic transition. This urgency to create an
ultra-sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi state when manifest in
its severest, most punitive, and least flexible forms,
spawned Sunni resistance based in tribes and personages attacked and disprivileged in Iraq’s western
Al-Anbar province. Later assisted by a USG unconventional warfare strategy and organized into a USGassisted full-blown tribal revolt, this was a proximate
cause of the organization’s future marginalization,
implosion, short-term defeat, and near-extinction.103
It is important to note that though apocalypticism can be found in al-Zarqawi’s speeches and writings, compared to their elevated status in current ISO
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media operations, it appears far less pronounced. For
example, the quote appearing at the top of the contents page in each issue of the ISO’s flagship online
English-language magazine Dabiq, is excerpted from a
single sentence from a single speech, in which al-Zarqawi states: “Behold, the spark has been lit in Iraq and
its flames will blaze, Allah willing, until they consume
the Armies of the Cross in Dabiq.”104 Other instances
have been noted, but they are relatively few.105 It is
unlikely, then, that the apocalypticism animating the
present ISO represents continuity from al-Zarqawi’s
Zarqawism. Its existence, or at the very least its amplification and prominence, likely originates in the
beliefs of other ISO progenitors.
In the end, al-Zarqawi failed to foment a SunniShia civil war, prevent democratic participation in
the new Iraqi government-in-the-making, establish
abiding alliances with other insurgent groups, or defeat the tribal “Awakening” councils (Sahwat). In a
despairing, semi-delusional letter written 5 months
before his June 7, 2006, targeted killing, he speculated
that possibly a new strategy might be required: fomenting a major war between the United States and
Iran. He opined that a calculated deception campaign
could be orchestrated to induce an offensive attack
by the USG on Iran. Secretively manipulating these
adversaries into the presumption that Iran possessed
and was prepared to attack the United States with
weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s), a war between
these adversaries would neutralize each in the Iraqi
theater, thus enabling his organization the possibility
of regaining its positioning in this theater of war. Resigned to defeat, he would invoke the inevitability of
fate that awaited those true bearers of the Prophet’s
Religion, “Al-Ghuraba” (The Stranger): an often-cited
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trope based in the Quran that basically states that Islam entered the world as a stranger, and as a stranger,
it shall depart. This truth shall be and remain in the
end, unrecognized as Truth.106
Had al-Zarqawi’s death ended his terrorist enterprise, a very different history would have been written. That was not to be. Waiting in the wings were
others ready and willing to continue Zarqawism as
doctrine, and as strategy. It is to them we now turn.
“NEO-ZARQAWISM”: THE BIRTH AND
DECLARATION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF
IRAQ (DAWLAT AL ‘IRAQ AL-ISLAMIYYAH),
AND RISE OF THE NEW EMIRS
“Neo-Zarqawism” refers to a phase following
the killing of al-Zarqawi on June 7, 2006, characterized not only by definite doctrinal continuity, but also
by the actual declaration and creation of an Islamic
State, which remained in al-Zarqawi’s lifetime as a yet
unrealized goal. Let us now consider some of its historical landmarks, and then examine its key doctrinal
elements.
History.
The process concluding in the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq occurred over a 10-month period in
2006. To this point, al-Zarqawi’s original Army of the
Levant had gone through several phases, from Jund alSham, to Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al Jihad, to AQO-affiliated Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Three key
phases awaited. First, on January 15, 2006, 6 months
before al-Zarqawi’s death, his Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi
Bilad al Rafidayn was folded into a newly formed larger
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group of like-minded insurgent factions, the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC; Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin).
Al-Zarqawi remained emir of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad
fi Bilad al Rafidayn, but was also a key member of MSC
leadership. While putting on an “Iraqi face” and partially heeding AQO’s advice from afar may partially
explain this emergent organization, for al-Zarqawi it
was a key milestone on the way to the Islamic State.
In an April 21, 2006, video posted to the Internet,
he states:
[W]e bring good tidings to the nation: The establishment
of the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Iraq, which, Allah
willing, will be the nucleus for the establishment of an Islamic state in which the word of Allah will reign supreme
. . . Allah willing, this council will serve as an umbrella
for every loyal mujahid. I have the honor to be one
of the members of this blessed council which has a
blessed leadership. At the same time, I am the emir of
Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, the servant
of jihad and the mujihadeen, who derives his strength
from Allah [emphasis added].107

Al-Zarqawi did not live to see the birth of his
proto-caliphal Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Zarqawi was
killed June 7, 2006, and during the next 6 months, an
additional series of milestones were passed. First, a
new emir, former Egyptian Islamic Jihad member Abu
Hamza al-Muhajir (b. 1968, aka Abu Ayyub al-Masri),
was selected 6 days later on June 13, 2006. Second, 4
months later, for 3 days (October 12, 2006, to October
15, 2006), an oath-bound group was formed. Their culminating oath, known as the Hilf al-Mutayyabin (“Oath
of Scented Ones”), spearheaded by the MSC, symbolically re-enacts a ritual originating in the pre-Islamic era
among several of the clans in the Prophet’s Quraysh
tribe, later adopted into Islam by the Prophet. The
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re-enacted ritual has each party to the pact—in this
case, five white-robed representatives—assemble and
dip their hands in a perfumed mix and later, placing
their hands upon each other, and uttering an oath
concluding a permanent pact of solidarity on “behalf
of the oppressed and wronged.”108 The organizations
committing to this oath reportedly include: the MSC
itself, consisting of the Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad
al Rafidayn and its seven other allied groups, including among them four jihad groups in Iraq, the Shura
Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq; Jaysh Al-Fatihin
(“The Army of the Conquerors”); Jund Al-Sahaba
(“The Army of the Companions”); and Kataib Ansar
Al-Tawhid wal-Sunna (“The Monotheism and Sunna
Brigades”), as well as tribal elements.
On October 15, 2006, the long-awaited Islamic State
of Iraq (ISI; Dawlat al ‘Iraq al-Islamiyyah) was officially
declared. Owing to this pivotal moment in clarifying
the fundamental distinction between ISO “stateness”
and AQO “baseness” as paths to the resurrected Sunni
global caliphate, and also signifying what in retrospect
was the formal emergence of a formal independence
from AQO, the complete announcement is reprinted
below:109
The Mutayibeen Alliance [Hilf al-Mutayibeen]
Brings You Good News of the Establishment of The
Islamic State of Iraq [emphasis added].
After the Kurds turned to the State of the North, and
the Rafidah [Shiites] were granted the federation of the
South and Central Province, and with aid from the Jews
in the North and the Saffavids in the South, protected by
black-minded, black-hearted and black-acting military
militias, they turned to our brothers from Ahl-us-Sunnah
and went far in spilling their blood and desecrating their
honor, making them suffer the most ugly forms of killing, torture and explusion, until Ahl-As-Sunnah became
like the orphans in the banquet of the wicked. It therefore
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became necessary for the honorable and the free among
Ahl-As-Sunnah, the Mujahideen, the working Ulema and
the dignitaries to offer something to their brothers, their
sons and families, especially under this façade called the
State of Maliki, who regretfully carried out acts of [the]
traitors of [better: ‘from’] Ahl-As-Sunnah, obscuring the
religion of the people and willingly forfeiting the nation’s rights.
Therefore, your brothers in the Mutayibeen Alliance
(Hilf al-Mutyibeen) bring you good news of the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq, in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahadeen, Naynawa [Ninawah]
and parts of Babel and Waset province [emphasis added], in order to protect our religion and our people so
that there is no Fitnah (Disbelief; [better: Strife, Disunity])
and so that the blood and sacrifices of your Mujahideen
sons are not lost in vain.
And why not since we are blessed with Allah’s
Power and Assistance that is spread widely, our arms
reaching farther, and our bases more secure than the
government of Palestine whose legitimacy was accepted
by many despite the fact that the occupying Zionist kills
and captures whoever they will and frees whoever they
will at any time and place, as is clear from the capture of
more than 60 of their ministers and statesmen, while the
American occupier doesn’t even reach one of our soldiers
without us spilling their blood, and Allah is a witness to
that many times over.
And we, as we announce the establishment of this
state [emphasis added], relying on the Sunnah of the
Prophet . . . when he went from Mecca to Medina and
established the State of Islam there, despite the fact that
a coalition of polytheists and the people of the book were
against him. Since the Jews had their separate areas and
were at the very high levels [i.e., highly competent and
organized] of administration, military training and organization and while the hypocrites and the polytheists
who joined them headed by Ibn Sulul who craved to rule
over Medina, challenged the young state, the Prophet
. . . was ready to give a third of Medina’s harvest [to those
enemies]. Despite their limited numbers and equipment,
it was necessary so that the state became a refuge to the
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Muslims, where their rights were protected against those
who sought to hurt them. And we, with Allah’s Might
and Power, [now] have control over many parts (of Iraq)
that [are] equal to the area of the first Medina state; a
state where the enemies had no presence and the Mujahideen established the Sharia Hudud (Punishments) at the
earnest request of Ahl-us-Sunnah themselves.
Let the invader aggressors [USG] and the spiteful
Rafidah (Shiites) know that the blood of Ahl-As-Sunnah
is dear and valuable and they will not be spilt apparently
in vain after today. We will face any transgression from
them with Allah’s Strength, with a harsher and more severe retaliation that has no limits. And let them know
that the Baghdad of Rasheed, the Land of the Khilafah,
was built by our ancestors and it will not leave our hands
except over our dead bodies and skulls, and we will continue to plant in it anew the Flag of Tawhid, the Flag of
the State.
And we call upon all the Mujahideen, the Scholars of
Iraq, the Tribal Chiefs, and the masses among Ahl-usSunnah to pledge allegiance [bay’ah] to the Emir of the
Mu’mineem, [“Leader/Ruler of the Faithful”] the honorable Sheikh Abu Umar al-Baghdadi today, to listen and
obey his orders whether favorable or not, and to work
hard to strengthen the pillars of this state; to sacrifice for
it our lives and what we hold valuable, and we promise
you that we will be sincere and loyal, dealing with you in
justice and kindness, pro[viding] you us[e] . . .the Book
of Allah, and the Sunnah of the Prophet . . . not deviating from it a single inch. We will drive away invaders,
and establish peace and security, an honorable life, not
depriving you of your goods of your land, for it is yours,
and we will extend our hands to our Muslim brothers
around the world, especially, around our dear country,
providing them our good[s] and experience, while we
benefit from what they have that is good and knowledge.
In addition, we call upon all Muslims from Ahlus-Sunnah around the world, to aid us in starting with
words and ending with blood for you are the source of
power and it is in you we extend our hope after Allah, so
do not fail us, and stand with us. Defend us and burn the
land under the one who wants to harm us.
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And we extend a special appeal to the learned, the people
of Knowledge, asking them to fear Allah in us, and be a
support for us, and incite the people to defend us and
pray for us.
Honor, power and glory belong to Allah, to his messenger, and to the believers, but the hypocrites know not.

—Spokesman, Ministry of Information, The Islamic
State of Iraq, 22 Ramadan 1427, October 15, 2006.110

As a formal public declaration, this document
contains not only elements of deliberate agitational,
motivational, and incitement propaganda, but also
key evidence for ISI’s worldview. The latter is our primary interest. Two sets of observations are significant.
First, two of three key elements deemed core to Zarqawism, and in opposition to AQO, are present—an
ultra-conservative, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism manifest
in ultra-sectarian, genocidal anti-Shi’ism; and a focus
on founding without delay an Islamic State. The third
element—ultra-violence—is implicit in the dehumanizing language used to place the Shia not only beyond
the pale of humanity, but also in several other categories of intolerable being—hypocrites, traitors, betrayers, back-stabbers—not possessed of the Truth of the
Islamic State. Also implicit is not only the creation of
a brand-new obligation for all persons now inhabiting this self-declared Islamic State’s self-claimed geographic boundaries—the predominantly and partially
Sunni provinces listed above—but also the predicament now placed on the worldwide Ahl-us Sunnah
to defend a state conceived on the model of Prophet
Muhammad’s very own, with an analogy drawn to
Prophet Muhammad’s Medinan phase (c. A.D. 622632), with the apparent intention of recreating Prophet Muhammad’s, and the later Sunni Caliphate’s, very
own state in the heart of the earlier Abbasid empire
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(c. 750-1258), Baghdad. It is not just that an Islamic
State of Iraq has been proclaimed, but a state to which
all occupants of its territory are either loyal or in rebellion, and an Islamic State, to which Iraq’s and the
world’s Ahl-us Sunnah should now look to for leadership of the renaissance of global Sunni supremacy.
The second set of observations concerns the stillunresolved question of whether, and if so how, the
ISI-AQO relationship was altered by ISI’s formal declaration of statehood. Upon al-Zarqawi’s death, Abu
Hamza al-Muhajir was selected as emir of Tanzim
Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Documents indicate that AQO was not involved in this leadership
choice, expressed deep reservations, and requested
a detailed response to several questions. AQO states
that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir pledged bay’ah to AQO,
though this was kept secret. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir
denied any formal bay’ah, though openly expressed a
willingness to make available to AQO the forces at his
disposal. Once the formal dissolution of AQO’s “affiliate” Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn was
accomplished, and the ISI was declared, it appears
that any formal connections between these two entities was dissolved. Al-Zarqawi’s October 17, 2004,
bay’ah to bin Laden needed to be renewed, as it does
not transfer as a hereditary artifact. Soon thereafter,
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir stepped aside and pledged allegiance to the new Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. It
clearly appears that it is Omar al-Baghdadi (not to be
confused with the present Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and
not AQO that receives the disposition of Abu Hamza
al-Muhajir’s forces. As Kazimi states:
[Abu Hamza] Al-Muhajir pledges allegiance to the
hitherto unheard of ‘Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.’ The
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glaring hint that he is indeed Al Qaeda’s [read: ISI’s]
candidate for the job of caliph is [Abu Hamza] al-Muhajir’s insistence on highlighting [Abu Omar] al-Baghdadi’s Hashemite pedigree—a traditional must-have
for any would-be caliph . . . [Abu Hamza] Al-Muhajir
also pledges the allegedly 12,000-strong ‘Army of
Al Qaeda’ and their 10,000 reservists to fight under
[Abu Omar] al-Baghdadi’s banner to the death. Oddly
enough, there is no mention of Osama bin Laden, who
is not a Hashemite. But probably [Abu Hamza] alMuhajir sees bin Laden as a relic of the past . . . and
consequently he really doesn’t have a role to play in
this current phase of the jihad.111

Beyond AQO being left out of the leadership loop,
which would involve a fundamental breach of the
terms of any binding bay’ah, we also learn through captured documents that AQO was not consulted in any
way before the formal declaration of the ISI; and according to Gadahn, relations between the two entities
had been practically non-existent for several years.112
AQO’s al-Zawahiri claimed that the new Emir Abu
Omar al-Baghdadi did in fact give bay’ah to AQO, but
that by mutual agreement and for strategic reasons,
this would remain unpublicized.113 Let us now examine the sources of continuity and discontinuity in key
elements of the Zarqawist worldview and doctrine.
Key Doctrinal/Creedal Elements.
Senior military commander Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (born, Hamid
Dawud Mohamed Khalil al-Zawi) were at the helm of
the ISI from late-2006 until their April 18, 2010, killing in a joint U.S.-Iraqi military attack on their safe
house, about 6 miles southwest of the Iraqi city of Tikrit. Abu Omar would, during that period, assume the
caliphal-originated title “Commander of the Faithful”
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(Emir al-Mu’minin), and his earlier pseudonym suitably expanded to “Abu Omar al-Husseini al-Qurayshi
al-Baghdadi,” signifying his Qurayshite and therefore
caliph-in-waiting genealogical pedigree.
Known facts about Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s specific path to the ISI are few. A former Iraqi officer, after
dismissal from the army he began actively preaching
in mosques an extreme variant of Salafi-Jihadism. He
first reportedly joined Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad
al Rafidayn under al-Zarqawi, and later, the MSC and
ISI.114
Fortunately, a sufficient number of available
speeches and writings exist, clarifying the essential core beliefs and doctrines of ISI’s first leaders.115
What is essential is the ability to discern ISI’s relation
to AQO on doctrinal grounds, seeking both common
ground and that which marks each off as unique species. It is both the sameness and difference within the
Sunni global jihadist forces that is at issue. This is key
for doctrine, but as we shall discover later, also for
strategy.
Fundamentals of an Ultra-Conservative,
Salafi-Wahhabi, Jihadi, and Anti-Shia Sectarianism.
An excellent starting-point is provided in Abu
Omar’s third speech as ISI emir/“Emir al-Muminim”/proto-caliph.116 By March 13, 2007, the date of
this speech, the combined forces of the USG’s counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, and unconventional
warfare strategies; and the self-defeating policies of
the ISI had clearly reversed the ISI’s short-term fortunes. Kazimi asserts that this speech’s content addresses that context, and in it, Abu Omar has determined he must “clearly spell out the doctrine of his
faction.” Determined to counter what he believed to
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be an orchestrated smear campaign by venomous
enemies, and also the need to reassure potential recruits and donors that ISI’s path to the Caliphate remained viable, he provided a summation of ISI doctrinal essentials. Abu Omar declares:
The people have libeled us with countless and unfounded lies about our doctrine, saying that we have
cast the accusation of ‘infidels’ against lay Muslims,
and that we legitimize [the shedding of] their blood
and [the looting of] their money, and that we force
the people to enter into our State by the sword, and as
such, here are a few of our tenets to answer those lies
so that the liar would have no more excuse [to continue lying] and so that bewilderment is lifted from he
who loves us.117

Of the 19 doctrinal elements soon to be listed, according to Kazimi only two are “notable innovations,”
namely:
judging that Jews and Christians who live among
Muslims are no longer protected as Dhimmis [see #12
below], and that the Sunnis who participated in the
political process, specifically Tariq al-Hashemi’s [Sunni] Islamic Party, are apostates and infidels, who are
marked for death [#7 below].118

We have taken the liberty of providing subheadings,
rearranging, and more succinctly stating these 19
doctrinal points in order to facilitate a comparison of
ISI and AQO. The original numbering is retained in
square brackets. If we accept Abu Omar’s assertions
at face value, 9 points of convergence and 10 points
of divergence seem to exist. It is critical to remember,
however, that AQO should not be understood as a
compulsory ultra-conservative Wahhabi-Salafi Jihadi
ultra-sectarian organization, though in principle all
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who accepted its overall doctrine and modus operandi, no matter how conservative, were welcomed. AQO
provides a large tent and seeks maximal force to attack the original Kufr. The very opposite is illustrated
below, particularly in the 10 or so points of clearest
divergence.
CREEDAL/DOCTRINAL/POLICY COMPARISION
OF ISO AND AQO
Most Likely Points of Divergence from AQO—
Extremism in the Application of Takfir.
Extreme Salafi-Wahhabi Anti-Shia Eliminationism/
Magic-Sorcery Eliminationism.
[1] Annihilate all manifestations of shirk (idolatry), including statues and raised graves;
[2] 
All Shia are idolatrous, apostates, inhibit
Sunni rites, and must be eliminated;
[3] Execute sorcerers and magicians.
Extreme Salafi-Wahhabism Jihadism Applied to
Fight Against Nearest Enemies.
[8] Any support of any type, including medicine
and food [provided by contractors], to American occupiers is unbelief and apostasy;
[10] The unbelief of all rulers and armies in all the
lands of Islam require that they first be fought,
and not the Crusader; unbelief does not apply to all inhabitants of the lands ruled by the
Taghut:
We see that the lands where the laws of the infidel
are prevalent over the laws of Islam as lands of
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unbelief and this does not necessitate counting a
resident of this land an infidel, but since the laws
of the tyrant prevail over the laws of Islam in all
the lands of Islam, then we see the apostasy and
heresy of all the rulers of these lands [as well as]
their armies, and fighting them is more pressing
than fighting the crusading occupier [emphasis
in original]. Thus we want to call to attention that
we will fight any armies invading the State of Islam in Iraq whether they be under any Arab or
Islamic name, and we advise and warn them that
this army should not be the scapegoat for the occupier, as is being suggested to end the crisis of
the crusading occupier in Iraq.119

Extreme Salafi-Wahhabism Applied to “People of the
Book” (Ahl al-Kitab).
[12] People of the Book must renew their dhimmi
contracts owing to treacherous violations they
have committed:
We find that the sects of the people of the book
[Jews, Christians] and other from the Sabians
and so in the State of Islam today are people of
war who qualify for no protection, for they have
transgressed against whatever they agreed to in
many countless ways, and if they want peace and
security then they must start a new era with the
State of Islam according to [the Caliph] Omar’s
stipulations that they have annulled.120

Islamic State of Iraq is Exclusive Leader of Ahl-us
Sunnah and the Mujahidin of Iraq.
[13] 
All jihadis from other groups that do not
subordinate to the ISI are neither infidels nor
heretics, but they are rebels (bughat) and must
unite behind the ISI banner;
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[14] All agreements between the occupier and other groups other than the Islamic State are null
and void;
[15] Defend “active and truthful ulama,” and oppose all who oppose us.
Extreme Salafi-Wahhabi Sexual Conservativism.
[19] Mandatory veiling of female face, and censoring of media to prevent female public displays
or any activities that violate strict sex segregation and mate-guarding.
Most Likely Points of Convergence with AQO.
Basic Privileging of the “Ahl-us-Sunnah” in Jihad.
[4] Do not hereticize/takfir Sunnis who pray, believe, and observe Sunni rites; Sunni sinners
are not heretics or apostates, and sins may vary
in their severity; only the greatest of sins nullify one’s Islam. Judgments of apostasy must
be established in each individual case, and all
conditions and factors considered; claim to
represent the “middle way” between those
who equate sin with infidelity (the Kharijites),
and those who are negligent in judging even
major sins (Murji’ites).121
[6] Necessity of revering and protecting the
Prophet;
[9] Jihad to free all Muslim lands from the fall of
Andalus [Spain] to the liberation of [all] Muslim lands is an individual obligation second
only to Belief;
[16] Honor predecessors in jihad;
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[17] Take care of prisoners and martyrs’ families;
[18] We engage in da’wa; encourage worldly knowledge, as long as does not violate Tawhid.
Takfir of Existing “Apostate” Governments.
[5] Only Allah’s Sharia is valid and Sharia courts
shall rule.
[7] Every leader of every political party that participates in the democratic process, and every other form of secularism or nationalism,
is apostate, though this does not apply as a
general rule to all who enter the process, i.e.,
individual voters:
 We believe that secularism, in all its different banners and varied sects such as nationalism or patriotism or Communism or Ba’athism, is clearly
faithless and in contradiction to Islam and it takes
[one] outside the [bounds] of religion. We also see
the apostasy and heresy of whoever participates
in the political process like the party of Mutleg
and Duleimi and Hashemi and others. Because
this process seeks to replace the law of Allah and
pave the way for the enemies of Allah such as
the Crusaders and the rawafidh [Shia] and all the
apostates to lean upon the necks of the believers. . .
We also see that the program of the Islamic Party
is one of apostasy and heresy that is no different
from all the other infidel and apostate programs
such as the parties of Ja’afari and Allawi. And
as such, their leaders are apostates and there is
no difference between a party branch head or an
official in the government, but we do not see the
heresy of all its members unless a judicial opinion is reached [in individual cases].122
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[11] All army, police, and security forces of these
states are apostates.
The previous contrast suffices to illustrate key
points of convergence and divergence between Abu
Omar al-Baghdadi’s ISI and AQO. The convergences belong to their genus—global Sunni jihadism in
defense of Ahl-us Sunnah—and are most evident in
those doctrines subsumed under “Basic Privileging
of the Ahl-us-Sunnah in Jihad.” Next, we find a basic
convergence arising in Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism for
pronouncing “Takfir on Existing ‘Apostate’ Governments.” However, AQO would be more discriminant
and determine whether those supporting the state
were in positions of power or weakness, plenty or necessity, cooperating or coerced, and whether neutrality
was also an option. Yet serious doctrinal divergences
mark each organization off as a competitor rather than
complementary global jihadist species.
AQO’s focus on a “Crusader-Zionist” enemy is
conspicuous by its complete neglect, or its repudiation
and reversal (see, number 10 above). For Abu Omar
al-Baghdadi and the ISI, it is all about the internal purification of Nearest and Near Enemies that threaten
the self-understanding of salvation provided in the
narrowest passages of an ultra-conservative SalafiWahhabi ultra-sectarianism. Internal enemies are targeted ferociously, Sunnis who accede to the prescribed
orthodoxy receive a warm and inviting welcome, and
the Far Enemy that stays far away will be spared for
now, as a relentless war is waged against their supposed idolatrous lackeys. The pact with Jews and
Christians, and many other religious minorities who
adhere to a variant of monotheist worship, is considered abrogated and must therefore be renegotiated.
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For AQO, the execution of magicians and sorcerers,
blowing up of Shia graves and shrines, and the condemnation of all Shia, leaders and led, scholars and
lay, is barred by the authority of a still-valid ruling
by medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyyah, and in more proximate range, the very influential Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi
Jihadi Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.
Yet, the species of Sunni global jihadist exemplified in Abu Omar al-Baghdadi has placed these very
Shia laity, whose blood is forbidden, at the very top of
its hit list of Ahl-us Sunnah’s chief idolatrous enemies,
and therefore of Allah’s chief enemies. Finally, the new
ISI demand that all existing Mujahidin in Iraq must
be subordinate, or be declared rebels, contrasts with
AQO’s vision of political authority as a more distant
aspirational objective, and supposes a broader process
of affirmation and consultation. For ISI, however, the
debate has ended, the Emir is chosen, the Jihad on the
model of the Prophet’s Sunnah is in process, and all
not ready to commit to this State, and this leadership,
are forewarned that they stand as rebels and must repent, or will be fought into submission or death.
APOCALYPTICISM AND MAHDISM IN ABU
HAMZA AL-MUHAJIR AND ABU OMAR
AL-BAGHDADI
The previous speech provides an excellent means
for drawing key contrasts between ISI and AQO. Absent from that list of 19 elements, however, was mention of a critical doctrinal belief maintained by both
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi:
belief in an End Times apocalypticism, and also in the
imminent appearance of a Redeemer Messianic figure,
the Mahdi. An element appearing only occasionally in
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Zarqawism, it is manifest here to a far greater degree.123
For example, William McCants reports that Abu
Hamza al-Muhajir speedily dissolved Tanzim Qa’idat
al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn and the MSC and “rushed to
establish the State because he believed the Mahdi, the
Muslim savior, would come within a year.”124 Further,
both Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi maintained beliefs in the imminence of the End
Times, leading them to privilege the Iraqi locus for the
re-emergence of the historic Baghdad-based Abbasid
Caliphate, and the northern Syrian town of Dabiq—
earlier mentioned by al-Zarqawi—as the prophesized
theater for End Times battles involving the anti-Christ
and eventually the Mahdi’s final return.125 McCants
further notes that despite continuity in beliefs in the
End Times and apocalyptic worldviews, the Mahdist
focus of these earliest progenitors is later replaced by
the ISO’s emphasis on the great battles, signs, and
events prophesied before that culminating event.126
THE HISTORY, DOCTRINES, AND WORLDVIEW
OF ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI’S “CALIPHATE”:
MAY 2010-PRESENT
On April 18, 2010, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and ISI
Emir and proto-Caliph Emir al-Muminin ‘Umar alHusseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi, lie dead. A long
manhunt had finally culminated in a joint Iraq-U.S.
operation in the Tharthar area near Tikrit in Salahuddin province. Subsequently, the USG and its Iraqi allies exploited intelligence and captured documents
to quickly decimate 34 of 42 known high value ISI
targets.127 Despite profound doctrinal and strategic
differences between AQO and ISI, then deputy-Emir
Ayman al-Zawahiri would issue a public eulogy
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praising these leaders’ efforts in jihad and against the
Crusader-Zionist visions for the new Iraq.128
The ISI was not decimated, however. Its “idea”
was kept alive. Seasoned military intelligence analysts
have described it as a deliberate, highly organized,
brutally-executed systematic campaign—from prison
breaks, to annihilating Iraqi security forces, to taking
and holding ground.129 Evidence now also confirms
that during imprisonment at Camp Bucca in Iraq, several persons who would later fill the highest leadership ranks of the organization were busily creating
strategic blueprints, rebuilding its secret network,
reconstituting its leadership, and forging new alliances between highly competent Sunni-Salafist former
Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, and those
already possessed of the Zarqawist and neo-Zarqawist doctrine and worldview.130 Indeed, this actually
continues a policy begun under Abu Omar al-Baghdadi who reached out to those officers whose lives
were likely shattered by the USG’s de-Ba`athification
policies. He states in his inaugural address from
December 22, 2006:
Initially, we call upon officers of the former Iraqi Army
and that is from the rank of lieutenant to major to join
the army of the Islamic State on condition that the applicant must know, at a minimum, three sections of
the Holy Koran by rote and must pass an ideological
examination by a clerical commission, that exists in every region, to make sure that he is not beholden to the
idolatry of the Ba’ath and its tyrant [Saddam]. And we
will, Allah willing, provide him with transportation,
housing and the appropriate salary that guarantees an
honorable life for him as is provided to the mujaheddin who fight under the banner of the Islamic State of
Iraq. 131
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Any effort to accurately characterize this period
must presume humility, and in former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s coinage, admit to varying
degrees of knowledge from known knowns, some of
which shall be discussed shortly; known unknowns,
many to which we shall refer; unknown knowns,
which the present author will humbly assume afflicts
both his and others’ present accounts; and finally, unknown unknowns, probably the greatest sum of what
truly exists. The full story can only be told in retrospect, on the basis of now-classified data, and only
after the dust finally settles—as hopefully it must—so
that this particular species of terrorist entity can be
fully dissected and understood for “its idea” and “its
strategy.”
Fortunately, enough open source information exists to sketch a reasonably accurate account of some
features of select key landmarks—organizationally,
doctrinally, and strategically—of the ISI’s path to the
self-proclaimed caliphate. We first begin with a very
brief summation of the ISI’s organizational evolution; then we proceed to describe relevant biographical facts about the ISO’s current self-declared caliph,
whose full and proper name has unmistakable parallels to his immediate predecessor is Emir al-Muminin
Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi; and
we conclude with an analysis of the ISO’s worldview,
creed, and doctrines.
FROM ISI TO THE CALIPHATE: BRIEF
ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY
The ISO is the latest organizational incarnation
of the “idea” that originated in al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism: transitioning into its embodiment as State, and
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unequivocally and unambiguously declaring itself as
the Caliphate of the world’s Sunni Muslims. Let us
now retrace these steps.
Zarqawi lived to create and bequeath four distinct
organizational forms before his death on June 7, 2006.
During his second Afghan sojourn (c. 1999–2001),
he founded and was undisputed emir of an organization called Soldiers of the Levant (Jund al-Sham).
Later changed to Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, this latter organization existed until al-Zarqawi’s October 14,
2004, official bay’ah to Osama bin Laden. A few days
later, the new organization, Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi
Bilad al Rafidayn (The Base of Jihad in the Land of the
Two Rivers), was declared. Careful examination of
the 10-month “negotiation” between al-Zarqawi and
AQO preceding his bay’ah, and the terms of the bay’ah
itself, furnish evidence that this new organization
retained full-throttle the Zarqawist “idea.” Its shorthand media tag, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the failure of
AQO to openly and publicly denounce and disavow
this organization, and a more general ignorance about
how fundamentally distinct these organizations were,
led to a general misrecognizing of Zarqawism. It was
viewed by many as merely a more brash, unrelenting,
inflexible, and violent version of AQO. Except for an
expert and largely unknown scholarly trickle continuing to note this fact, most would rediscover this difference only in this most recent era (c. 2013-present)
of a renascent organization whose brutal conquest of
Sunni lands and re-introduction of unconscionable
slaughter and advertised genocide as spectacle, has
caused the world to again take notice.
Al-Zarqawi’s Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn was later dissolved. This occurred in two stages.
The first was in January 2006 when it was folded into
a broader coalition of its own making, the MSC on
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whose leadership council al-Zarqawi would serve.
The next two organizational incarnations followed
al-Zarqawi’s death. If McCants is correct, the prime
mover behind the expedited timing for dissolving the
MSC was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and he did so based
on his belief that the long-prophesied Mahdi would
imminently return. Whatever the motive for timing,
however, the logic of the Zarqawist “idea” was to create a separate entity—an actual State of Islam. To this
end, the Hilf al-Mutayyibin or “Oath of Scented Ones,”
was concluded on October 12, 2006, and 3 short days
later, the organizational realization of the Zarqawist idea—the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat al-‘Iraq
al-Islamiyya)—was proclaimed.132
The ISI existed from October 15, 2006, to April 7,
2013. Upon that latter date, then Emir Abu Bakr alBaghdadi transformed its nomenclature to reflect a
dramatic expansion in its intended sovereign reign.133
Its new name, Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam (The
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham), signified its newly
extended self-proclaimed domain in both Iraq and
al-Sham (i.e., the Levant, or Levantine states of Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine). The English acronym
ISIS and ISIL reflect this alternation in referring to either Syria (ISIS) or the Levant (ISIL); ISIL is the more
accurate term. The word “Daesh” is an acronym fashioned from its fuller Arabic name but is itself not an
Arabic word, and its use among the opposition and
USG officials—civilian and military—deliberately intends to counter any associations to legitimate Islamic
statehood when discussing this terrorist entity.134
Despite AQO’s formal rejection of its April 7, 2013,
expansion from the ISI to Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa
al-Shaam,135 only further extensions and no reversal
in scope have occurred. The final extension, and logically its last, is from Emirship of Ahl-us Sunnah in the
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“apostate ruled” lands of Iraq and the Levant, to Caliph, sovereign and supreme religio-political rulership
of the Ahl-us Sunnah throughout the “apostate ruled
lands” of the Earth. This was formally proclaimed
June 28, 2014, by formerly incarcerated Camp Bucca
inmate and now deceased chief spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani. On that day, for those self-proclaiming this event, the Islamic State (al-Dawla al Islamiya) or Islamic Caliphate (al-Khilafa al-Islamiya) was
born. The final symbolic moment was yet to come: the
newly installed Caliph Ibrahim’s first speech on July
2, 2014, a Friday sermon in Ramadan proclaiming the
Caliphate from the grand mosque of newly conquered
Mosul, to his worldwide flock, and to the infidels and
apostates of the Earth.136
SELF-PROCLAIMED EMIR AL-MUMININ ABU
BAKR AL-HUSSAINI AL-QURAYSHI
AL-BAGHDADI: A BRIEF HISTORY
“The journey was complete, and Ibrahim Awwad
Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai [sic]—the local imam,
academic, US-held prisoner and al-Qaeda officer—had
become Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.”137

Contained in the previous quote from Hashem is
the journey we shall now briefly trace. We are provided his birth name—Ibrahim bin Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai—indicating his kinship to
the Al-Bu’Badri tribe, and his location, the Sunni Anbar province containing the Iraqi city of Samarra. We
learn that he was an imam and an academic, and as
we shall soon learn, extremely devout and devoted to
pursuing religious scholarship. We will also examine
his time at Camp Bucca, and its consequences. Finally,
we learn he was “an al-Qaeda officer”—soon to be
specified with more detail—and that in the end, this
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person is the same who is now the self-proclaimed
Caliph of the world’s Sunni Muslims. His mission is
to engage on multiple fronts those various agents of
infidelity he and his organization perceive as warring
against and subverting Allah’s chosen instrument
for a final consummation of world history. For convenience, a few select sub-headings are employed to
assist in navigating this journey.138
Biography, Temperament, Early Primary Religious
Influences, and Education.
Self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim was born near the
city of Samarra in 1971; his name of birth: Ibrahim bin
Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Badri al-Radawi al-Husseini
al-Samarrai.139 He was raised in a deeply, or even
ultra-conservative Sunni (possibly) Salafi religious
family with some of these to include preachers and
professors of Arabic language, rhetoric, and logic.
His father, Sheikh Awwad, is among the elders of the
Al-Bu’Badri tribe, and his grandfather, Haj Ibrahim,
passed on at nearly 95 years of age. Ibrahim bin Awwad focused intensely, even in his youth, on religious
studies. In the mosque where his father taught, he was
wholly committed to mastering techniques of Quranic
recitation, and he engaged in a “fastidious devotion
to master the subtleties of the art.”140 This fastidiousness was accompanied by other temperamental traits,
for example, a tendency to be withdrawn, taciturn,
of glowering intensity, quick to admonish, strict, and
uncompromising, and barely audible in his personal
interactions.141
At 18, he moved with his family to Tobji, in northwest Baghdad, where he later was a Sunni mosque
imam.142 At the mosque, besides the call to prayer
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over the mosque loudspeakers, Ibrahim bin Awwad
taught Quranic recitation to the neighborhood’s children. He also exhibited a deep sexual conservatism.
His two wives were sequestered from public view as
they shared a small apartment in a poor neighborhood
near the mosque, and he openly forbade any public
mixing of sexes, including dancing at weddings.143
An exception to what otherwise appears to be a
strict, ultra-conservative Salafi Sunnism was Ibrahim bin Awwad’s passion for soccer (football). As a
youth and young adult, he was widely regarded as an
outstanding player and was the star of his mosque’s
football club. However, he was also known for his
competitiveness, obsession with scoring goals, and
for getting extremely upset at losing. Other inmates
also later noted his soccer expertise during his stint at
Camp Bucca.
Ibrahim bin Awwad earned both an M.A. (1999)
and a Ph.D. (2007) from the College of Islamic Sciences, University of Baghdad. His specialization across
both was phonetics and recitation of the Quran. He
produced for his Ph.D. project in Quranic Sciences a
commentary on a medieval poem on Quran recitation.
It was defended March 13, 2007, receiving the grade of
“Very Good.”144
Ibrahim bin Awwad’s Path to Ultra-Conservative
Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism: Before the U.S. March
2003 Overthrow of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein
and Occupation of Iraq.
To this point, the “known knowns” of Ibrahim bin
Awwad’s journey are relatively unambiguous. Documents, interviews, transcripts, and good investigative journalism turn up an archival trail that seems
reasonably sound. We now enter a zone of greater
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uncertainty and attempt to reconstruct the broad lines
of what may be deemed his behavioral evolution from
an ultra-conservative Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi, and a life
characterized by a rigidly-maintained sexual conservatism, intense immersion in religious scholarship,
a vocational dedication to the mosque, and teaching
the young Quran recitation, to that of a member and
eventual leader in armed, violent Salafi-Jihadi organizations. This journey of theological politics, or “theopolitical”145 engagement, is murkier, less defined, and
by design, enveloped by that secrecy characterizing
underground organizations. Nevertheless, some important facts have been reported and are useful as a
starting point for the detailed history yet to be written.
Ibrahim bin Awwad’s transition began well before
the March 2003 U.S. decision to overthrow the regime
of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. McCants’ conclusion here seems well in line with other observations
when he states:
Although the American invasion fed the fire and enabled it to spread, in fact, his radicalization began
much earlier, ignited by an unlikely but highly volatile mixture of fundamentalism, Saddam Hussein’s
secular totalitarianism, and his own need to control
others.146

McCants dates this to a period after 1999-2000, 3 years
before the U.S. occupation, as Ibrahim bin Awwad
“moved rapidly to the right” and went from being an
ultra-conservative Salafist flirting with a Qutbi wing
of the Muslim Brotherhood, to “embracing revolutionary jihadist Salafism.”147
One may begin with Ibrahim bin Awwad’s brother
‘Jomaa. According to reports, ‘Jomaa, unlike Ibrahim
bin Awwad at the time, was an “extreme Salafist”
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well before the U.S. invasion and occupation. It is
further reported that “[Abu Bakr] Baghdadi was not
yet part of that circle, [and that it ended up] causing
many problems between them.”148 ‘Jomaa is now his
brother’s body guard and one of his closest aids. The
period McCants describes as a transition (1999-2000)
is characterized by a very significant shift in Ibrahim
bin Awwad’s theo-political orientation. It was a Dr.
Ismail al-Badri who directed him to membership in a
“Qutbist” or “jihadist Ikhwan” (Brotherhood) tendency.
However, at that point he was seeking what must be
considered a violent alternative to that being offered,
and concluded that action, and not mere talking, was
required.
Ibrahim bin Awwad’s Path to Ultra-Conservative
Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism: After the U.S. March 2003
Overthrow of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein and
Occupation of Iraq.
The U.S. overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and subsequent occupation, inaugurated a
new phase of Ibraham bin Awwad’s involvement in
violent insurgent activities. Abu Muhammed al-Mufti
al-Aali, a major “ideologue” on the Iraqi Salafi-Jihadi
scene, seems to have been instrumental in Ibrahim bin
Awwad’s transition into an actual armed insurgent.
Muhammad al-Mufti al-al-Aali’s Salafi-Jihadi Ahlus
Sunna wal-Jama’a movement had members based in
Baghdad and Samarra, and it was only a short period
afterwards that Ibrahim bin Awwad would co-found
and become the head of the Sharia committee for a
new Salafi-Jihadi insurgent organization, Jaysh Ahl alSunnah wa’al-Gama’ah (Army of the Sunni Creed and
Community), that would establish an active presence
in Diyala province, Samarra, and Baghdad.149
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Contrary to several published accounts, Ibrahim
bin Awwad did not spend 5 years in Camp Bucca;
he was arrested on January 31, 2004, and released on
December 6, 2004, just under 1 year.150 His time there
proved highly consequential, however, for what he
himself became and the future operational linkages
he would form, and as a virtual hatchery for elements
that would, when freed through prison breaks, help
reconstitute and repopulate in an even more brutal
fashion the then-decimated ISI leadership cadre.151
Accounts of his Bucca incarceration indicate that he
led religious prayers and on many occasions Friday
sermons; asserted himself as an intermediary and
mediator in various disputes; and continued his soccer stardom; but of greatest consequence, he acquired
key ingredients essential to his future path.
It was in Bucca that Ibrahim bin Awwad developed a “Rolodex” of contacts for future operational
pursuits. There, he also developed a symbiotic relationship with former Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, including: Haji Bakr (birth name: Samir
Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi), Abu Mumammad
al-Suedawi, and Abu Ahmed al-Alwani. They were
impressed with his extensive religious background,
especially Quranic expertise, and he was impressed
with their military knowledge. It was at Bucca that he
secretly pledged bay’ah to al-Zarqawi, and increasingly absorbed Salafi-Jihadism. Though his sermons were
noted for their lack of power and charisma, notice was
taken by others deemed major heavy weights in the
Salafi-Jihadi movement—for example, Abu Mutaz,
Abu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, and IS spokesman Abu
Muhammed al-Adnani.152
Ibrahim bin Awwad exited Camp Bucca on December 6, 2004. Immediately assuming the alias “Abu
Dua,” he would begin a methodical climb beginning
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with the lowest rungs established in Camp Bucca to
eventually occupy the very highest rung of the ISI. It
is probably apt to conclude—as McCants has—that
Ibrahim bin Awwad is “a cunning bureaucrat that
rose through the cutthroat ranks of the Islamic State
by building alliances among its factions and eliminating his rivals once he got to the top spot.” 153 Data is
sparse for Abu Dua’s activities after his release, but
facts are now known about several key developments
in his organizational relationships. It is known that
his organization Jaysh Ahl-us Sunnah wa’al Al-Gama’a
pledged bay’ah and joined the Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (MSC) 1 week after its January 15, 2006, declaration. Abu Dua, through the influence of an important
Shaykh Fawzi al-Jobouri, was granted permission by
Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn’s Minister of
Information Muharaib Abdul Latif al-Jubouri to travel
to Syria in order to complete his doctoral studies. This
permission was granted pending Abu Dua’s willingness to assist in media-related functions if requested.
Having completed his doctoral work after June 2006,
Abu Dua traveled back to Syria as a key facilitator for
foreign fighters entering Iraq. An airstrike killed his
assistant Abu Ghadiya, and following this near miss
on his own life, Abu Dua returned to Baghdad where
his quick ascent began.
Abu Dua’s former prison mate, Haji Samir, introduced him to Abu Hamza al-Muhajir—second-incommand and military chief of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad
fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s highly
favorable impressions led him to introduce Abu Dua
to the Emir of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir
as well as others within the organization were very
impressed and greatly assisted his vertical ascension,
particularly on matters related to Sharia, but also in a
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senior advisory capacity. Abu Dua was charged with
such high-level tasks as drafting letters on behalf of
Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi to AQO Emir Osama bin
Laden; and, the highly selective and secretive task of
ensuring coordinated communication among leaders
and the Wilayat (provinces).
Abu Dua first joined the Sharia Committee of the
MSC, and then became a member of its more restricted
Majlis Al-Shura (Senior Advisory Council). After the
October 15, 2006, declaration of Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyya (ISI), as supervisor of the ISI Sharia Committee,
he was given a general supervisory role over all Sharia
committees operating in the ISI’s provinces (Wilayahs).
He also became a member of the ISI’s 11-member Majlis Al-Shura. Abu Dua rose further and, it is strongly
suggested, that he was appointed chief of the Islamic
State’s powerful three-person Coordination Committee, a position reserved for persons deemed most
worthy and trusted, whose task involved coordinating between ISI Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the
governors of the ISI’s Wilayat (provinces).154
From Abu Dua, to Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of
ISI (Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyya) and ISIS/ISIL
(Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam), to Emir
al-Muminin Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Qurayshi
al-Baghdadi of The Islamic State (al-Dawla al
Islamiyya) of the Islamic Caliphate (al-Khilafa
al-Islamiyya).
The April 18, 2010, targeted killing of ISI secondin-command Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and the ISI
Emir and self-declared Emir al-Muminin Abu Umar
al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi (Abu Omar
al-Baghdadi) proved to be a momentous event. Within
the next 2 years, an organization that had appeared
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beaten into dormancy would re-emerge and begin a
carefully calculated strategy, later taking full advantage of dramatic changes inaugurated by an “Arab
Spring” and later Syrian civil war, and utterly transforming the Sunni Salafi-Jihadi organizational landscape. The first steps lay, however, in selecting a new
emir; and owing to the USG eliminating 34 out of 42
key ISI leadership targets, that began in early January
2006, replacing these leaders with a new, very distinct
cadre as well.155
Osama bin Laden’s choice for emir, Haji Iman, was
not to be. Rather, a heretofore unknown shadowy individual Haji Bakr156—a former colonel, weapons development expert, and military intelligence operative
in Saddam Hussein’s Air Force—would lobby and
manipulate the existing Shura to secure a 9-2 vote in
favor of the 39-year old Abu Dua. The Sharia Council reportedly abstained. The new emir, formerly Abu
Dua, took on the new alias Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and
his chief mission was revitalizing the ISI and reconstituting its leadership. Two scholarly accounts provide
information on this phase. McCants claims:
According to insiders, the first order of business [as
the new senior Military Emir] for the prince of shadows [Haji Bakr] was to purge the Islamic State of leaders he suspected of disloyalty; those who didn’t leave
their posts willingly were killed. He and his boss [Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi] replaced them with their Iraqi allies, many of whom had served as officers in Saddam’s
military and intelligence services.157

Hasan Haniyeh, in a highly detailed and illuminating analysis of the ISI’s organizational structure,
adds additional clarity.158 First, though the post-Mosul
(June 2014) conquest has led to a greater number of
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non-native Arab and foreign-born leaders, “Iraqis still
dominate the highest, most sensitive positions in IS’
upper echelons.”159 Second, a profound reorganization and professionalization of the military and security forces was carried out.160 He claims:
Under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the [ISI] organisation
[sic] entered a phase of extreme secrecy and paranoia.
Once he took over, he restructured the organisation
[sic], putting Salafis and former Iraqi Army officers
in charge of the military, such as Haji Bakr and Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, turning the military corps into
a more professional, cohesive entity . . . [Abu Bakr]
Baghdadi put Turkmen from Tal Afar into key security positions, most prominently Abu Ali al-Anbari [a
former Iraqi Major General]; and put Arabs and foreigners in charge of his media machine, led by Abu
Mohammed al-Adnani, the Syrian spokesman for IS.161

The final organizational metamorphoses occurred
as described earlier: the August 7, 2013, official declaration of the expansion from the ISI to Dawla Islamiya fi
al-Iraq wa al-Shaam (ISIS/ISIL; The Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham). On June 28, 2014, based on Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi’s appointment as Caliph by only four
persons—Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, Abu Ibrahim
al-Masri, Turki al-Binali, and Abu Suleiman al-Utaybi—the declaration of a self-proclaimed Islamic State
(al-Dawla al Islamiya) or Islamic Caliphate (al-Khilafa
al-Islamiya) had finally arrived. Claiming descent from
Prophet Muhammad through the tenth Shia Imam,162
and secretly declaring bay’ah to both Osama bin Laden,
and later Ayman al-Zawahiri,163 this new entity would
soon overtly clash with AQO on matters of doctrine
and strategy.
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CURRENT ISO WORLDVIEW, BELIEFS, CREED,
AND DOCTRINE
Despite their common genus as Sunni global jihadist terrorist organizations, ISO and AQO profoundly
differ in doctrine, creed, jurisprudence, and strategy.
AQO’s has already been laid bare and, in the earlier
discussion, key contrasts were drawn between the
“AQO Sunni Jihadist Church” and the “ISO UltraConservative, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Sect.”
The historical journey we just examined began
in the birth of al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism in the latter
1980s, and continued through neo-Zarqawism and
and its various metamorphoses, marking the rise of
the self-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate. ISO doctrine
has been described, but not yet exclusively focused
on. In this concluding section, we offer a succinct summary of ISO doctrine as we earlier did for AQO. These
key doctrinal elements are “DNA-like” in that they
practically define the precise mutation ISO represents.
ISO’S DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA: FOUR
ESSENTIAL CATEGORICAL DIVERGENCES
FROM AQO
Four key beliefs account for the greatest source
of ISO’s divergence from AQO: (1) the imminence
of the End Times (apocalypticism and eschatology),
(2) the immediate demand to re-establish the Islamic
Caliphate, (3) the takfir and policy of extermination of
all Shia, and (4) an absolute priority of jihad against
the nearest enemies. These four, considered together,
constitute the “essential ISO difference” from AQO.
There is here no overlap with AQO as it is a matter of
presence or absence, and not one of degree.
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THE IMMINENCE OF THE END TIMES
(APOCALYPTICISM AND ESCHATOLOGY)
ISO believes that humankind is approaching the
End Times, and as the True Saved Sect, they must
wage a series of prophesized battles that will soon
lead to the final and greatest of battles (Al-Malahim).
There is a voluminous, systematic, and persistent focus within ISO’s publicly available media production
in support of this belief. These battles are essential
before the truly culminating events involving the return of Jesus (Isa) to fight the anti-Christ (Dajjal), the
return of the Redeemer (Mahdi), and the Final Day of
Judgment (Yawm al-Qiyamah, literally, “Day of Resurrection”), when Allah shall, on the basis of true belief
and righteous deeds, determine the eternal abode of
all human souls.164
The quantitative divergence in the attention given
to this theme by the ISO versus that given by the AQO
is dramatic. Consider these results arising from a comprehensive content analysis of their respective flagship
publications.165 The total of articles or lift-out paragraphs/graphics devoted to specifically apocalyptic
(i.e., writings devoted to revealing the secret meanings of the past, present, and future) and eschatological End Times (i.e., writings concerned with the final
culmination of all existence and its portents and signs)
themes appearing in Inspire, Resurgence, and Al-Risala
include the following: Over a period of 5 years—from
summer 2010 to summer 2015—across 14 separate
issues of Inspire, a single reference appears in Issue
13 by Abu Saleh. However, in this single reference to
the “fitnah of Masih Ad-Dajjal” (Anti-Christ), it is recontextualized as an anti-American diatribe. He asks:
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“If you are weak and deceived by the fitnah of America, how will you be safe from the Dajjal?”166 Within
the new AQIS online magazine, Resurgence, across its
two issues, a single article appears—by Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti (aka: Abu Dujana
al Pasha)—referring to the prophesied “End Times”
battles.167 This is described in stock fashion in a long
paragraph. Overall, however, the article emphasizes
the need to privilege Syria for several reasons at this
moment as a key field of jihad.168 Finally, AQO’s formal Syrian affiliate’s new magazine, Al-Risala, contains
not a single reference to any apocalyptic themes in its
first two issues.169 In sum, three flagship AQO-based
online magazines over the course of 5 years contain
no more than one actual apocalyptic quote—and that
along with several other reasons for jihad in Syria—
and one reference to the future Dajjal or anti-Christ.
Now let us consider a comprehensive content
analysis of the ISO’s flagship English-language online publication, Dabiq, Issues 1-14, from July 5, 2014,
to April 14, 2016.170 Apocalyptic and eschatological
themes are evidenced in the following. First, each issue is sandwiched by apocalypticism on its contents
page and back cover. The contents page in every issue, except Issue 7, brands the publication with a
quote from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: “The spark has
been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify—by Allah’s permission—until it burns the
crusader armies in Dabiq.” This quote is excised from
a September 11, 2004, audiotape issued 2 months before the historic and tactically decisive “second battle
for Fallujah,” (November-December 2004); the first
was April 2004—Operation al-Fajr (“The Dawn”) and
“Operation Phantom Fury”—where he issues the following call:
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This is a call for help from the depths to the lions in
Baghdad and Al-Anbar, and to the heroes in Diyala
and Samarra, and to the tigers in Mosul and the north:
prepare for battle . . . be alert to what is going on
around you. . . . You are facing fierce civil strife, but
then victory shall be yours, Allah willing. . . . Behold,
the spark has been lit in Iraq and its flames will blaze,
Allah willing, until they consume the Armies of the
Cross in Dabiq.171

Second, the back page of 10 out of 14 issues explicitly addresses apocalyptic themes. One quote in particular, a locus classicus for ISO apocalypticism, but by
no means the only one, is found in one highly-cited
apocalyptic tradition in particular (No. 6924), found
in one of the most authoritative collections of ahadith
in Sunni Islam, Sahih-Muslim.172 It appears on the back
page of the first issue, and is frequently encountered
in ISO writings. The full quote is:
Abu Hurayrah [Prophet Muhammad’s companion]
reported that Allah’s Messenger [Prophet Muhammad] . . . said: “The hour will not be established until
the Romans land at al-‘A’maq or Dabiq (two places
near each other in the northern countryside of Halab).
Then an army from al-Madinah of the best people on
the earth at that time will leave for them. When they
line up in ranks, the Romans will say, ‘Leave us and
those who were taken as prisoners among us so we
can fight them.’ The Muslims will say, ‘Nay, by Allah,
we will not abandon our brothers to you.’ [So] they
will fight them. Then one third of them will flee; Allah
will never forgive them. One third will be killed; they
will be the best martyrs with Allah. And one third will
conquer them; they will never be afflicted with fitnah
[internal strife]. They will conquer Constantinople.
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While they are dividing the war booty, having hung
their swords on olive trees, Shaytan [Satan] will shout,
‘The [false; sic] Messiah has followed after your families [who were left behind.; sic] So they will leave [for
their families; sic], but Shaytan’s claim is false. When
they arrive to Sham he comes out. Then while they are
preparing for battle and filing their ranks, the prayer
is called. So ‘Isa Ibn Maryam [Jesus, son of Mary], will
descend and lead them. When the enemy of Allah sees
him, he will melt as salt melts in water. If he were to
leave him, he would melt until he perished, but he
[Jesus] kills him with his own hand, and then shows
them his blood upon his spear.173

A consistent drumbeat of apocalypticism also appears between the contents and final page.174 These establish beyond any reasonable doubt that, at the very
least, those charged with the production, distribution,
and publication of this flagship online English language magazine have determined that apocalypticism
is an essential feature of ISO branding. This profound
divergence between AQO and ISO, i.e., its virtual
non-existence for the former versus its centrality as a
foundational, doctrinal, and core belief for the latter
is remarkable and highly consequential. Furthermore,
the ISO or at least some elements in the ISO have
published an enormous amount of online material beyond Dabiq, focusing on “End Times” prophetic materials celebrating, elaborating upon, and amplifying
apocalypticism.175
Why is it important to establish whether apocalyptic and eschatological themes are present in Sunni
global jihadist publications and writings, and why,
one must assume, genuine beliefs and worldviews?
First, to confirm, in fact, that a divergence exists between AQO and ISO. However, more important is to
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establish the likelihood that a fundamentally different
conception of historical time is operative for each organization. A highly instructive scholarly literature on
apocalypticism exists.176 Apocalypticism is by no means
an invention of Islam, and with respect to the specific
traditions of greatest relevance to us—those ancient
Near Eastern civilizations that gave birth to the Abrahamic salvation religions—apocalypticism has its earliest known origins in Zoroastrianism and Judaism,
and is later developed by Christianity and Islam.
The greatest practical consequences arising from
these beliefs are in the realm of human morality and
practical action. If one believes one is actually and
undoubtedly living in a time of imminent and catastrophic battles; an active, essential agent in catalyzing these battles; fighting the final enemies of the
One True God and the destination of one’s soul is
critically—as in no other time before or after—in the
balance; that the enemies of the Truth are presenting
themselves deceptively as Friends of the Truth; that
within one’s own lifetime events of a scale heretofore
unimaginable will happen—these thoughts, these beliefs, must have consequences. What they create is an
“Ethic of the End Times,” rather than an “Ethic for All
Times.” They affect life choices. Acting as if one will
not be living tomorrow is radically unlike believing
that one’s life and circumstances will unfold similarly
over the course of one’s natural life with no dramatic
ruptures destined to occur in any near-term at the very
least. Whether one believes tomorrow is the last day,
or tomorrow is another day with thousands more to
follow, is of profound consequence for how one will
choose to act. It is conceivable then, if this apocalypticism is something other than a bizarre side note with
a tiny number of proponents within ISO, that some

117

portion of ISO’s impatience, brutality, and will to absolute power finds explanation here.177 It is now time
to turn to other themes that may also have dramatic
consequences for ISO’s ways of thinking, being, and
acting.
THE CALIPHATE NOW!
AQO and ISO also fundamentally differ not on
whether the Sunni Caliphate should be re-instituted,
but on how this is to be realized. This is not just a matter of strategy, prudence, and timing, but of fundamental divergences in worldview. AQO’s conception
of the Caliphate is inspirational, aspirational, and a
longer-term achievement that presumes several necessary stages of building popular support, transforming states, acquiring the necessary prerequisites for
sustaining defense, education, welfare, and upholding the essential legal requisites of an Islamic State.
It is conceived as resting in the Ummah’s ultimate
consent to its legitimacy, not through unbridled force,
but through legal means; it is an Islam that belongs to
the Ummah, but is won and led by its “Mujahid vanguard,” Qa’idat al-Jihad, charged with the long-term
strategy for its culmination. For AQO, “right makes
might” when it comes to Ahl-us Sunnah’s ultimate
dream realized in the restored Caliphate.
ISO’s “Caliphate Now!” is likely based first and
foremost on its eschatological worldview. The Caliphate is a necessary milestone that must be attained before the destined End Times battles consummate human history and all shall be judged. Its organizational
imperative is therefore rooted in the same “Ethic of
End Times” driving a variety of other—if viewed from
the standpoint of normal, historical time—extremely
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deviant behaviors: in particular, a heightened sense
of a finalized cosmic duality of Good and Evil, Allah,
and Shaytan (Satan). In Dabiq, though a few key articles lay the doctrinal foundations of the necessity of
the Khilafa Now,178 the Caliphate is treated far more
as a practical fact, i.e., legitimized as delivering security, services, and enforcing the Sharia of a state
to which it is now time to declare allegiance.179 The
Caliphate’s fuller eschatological sense can be found
in a series of “Black Flag” publications specific to the
Caliphate;180 in self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim’s July
2, 2014, Caliphal inaugural address;181 and in ISO’s
now-deceased former senior spokesman al-Adnani’s
Caliphate announcement.182
A second basis for the ISO’s Caliphate declaration
is its sense of election: that the ISO, and no other, is
the destined sect—the Victorious Sect—chosen to establish Allah’s Khalifa, thereby accelerating momentum toward End Times. A chief consequence of this
self-proclaimed status as the Victorious Sect—of this
arrogance regarding sovereign leadership—was that
from that moment forward, all existing groups, organizations, and individuals not bound by bay’ah to
the new sovereign were presented a stark choice: between bay’ah to Caliph Ibrahim, or being regarded as
a rebel (bughat) at best or apostate (murtadd) at worst.
This demand that all existing organizations, including Qa’idat al-Jihad’s affiliate Al-Nusrah, dissolve and
declare bay’ah to their new Caliph Ibrahim was at first
met with confusion and consternation, but after advice, mediation, and legal remedies were categorically
or surreptitiously refused by ISO, a state of outright
rebellion and civil war recommenced.

119

THE “FINAL SOLUTION” TO THE
“SHIA PROBLEM”
There is little novelty in the current ISO’s approach to the Shia. ISO continues the policies of its
founding father Abu Musab al-Zarqawi vis-à-vis the
“Shia Question”: the Shia are considered unredeemable apostates, treacherous subverters of Allah’s Ahlus Sunnah, and must be decimated. Throughout ISO
speeches and publications, the Shia are referred to pejoratively as Rafidah (rejectors, those who reject, those
who refuse), based on the Shia doctrine that Prophet
Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali was illegitimately denied
his right to succeed the Prophet as Khalifa and lead the
nascent Muslim community, and thus all successors
after Muhammad except for Ali are denied (rejected).
Within militant Shi’ism, indeed, there is a systematic
disparagement and delegitimization of the first three
successors after Muhammad (Abu Bakr, Umar ibn
al-Khattab, and Uthman ibn ‘Affan). This also finds
expression in Shia rituals of cursing those first successors, and all of those who illegitimately usurped the
Prophet’s own family. Moreover, owing to the depth
of this schism, Shi’ism and Sunnism (those claiming successorship through the first three successors,
but also Ali, for them, the fourth legitimate Caliph)
have developed distinctly different theological, juridical, ritual, and canonical traditions. Disregarding
Shi’ism’s further splintering—quite numerous—this
primordial split has distinct parallels in the Christian
faith to the bitter, bloody battles pitting defenders
of the True Universal Church (Roman Catholicism)
against Protestants, who from the point of view of
Catholic orthodoxy were deemed heretics and apostates to be converted or killed. For Protestants who
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consider themselves the “True Universal Church,” it
is Catholics who are accused of Romanism, Papism,
and being agents of the Anti-Christ or Satan. We earlier described, when examining Zarqawism and neoZarqawism, the nature of this sectarianism. What is
key here is to contextualize it within a broader revival
of Sunni Salafi orthodoxy, the 1979 Iranian revolution,
and finally, the cataclysmic effects for Sunnis in general and Sunni Salafis in particular of the U.S. decision
to decapitate the Saddam Hussein regime and thus by
default, empower their greatest earthly foes, the Shia
and Iran.
The ISO’s uniqueness, again earlier described, is
not their demonization of Shi’ism as heresy or their
doctrine calling for the conversion or killing of their
leadership. It is ISO’s extension of that charge and the
actions it sanctions against the Shia laity itself. Every
Shi’ite is to be killed, regardless of how learned, powerful, or likely to be responsible for systematic policies
dis-privileging Sunnism that they may be. The reasons
are two-fold. First, they are accused of an unpardonable idolatry and are therefore guilty of the greatest
sin a Muslim can commit: shirk, i.e., associating others worthy of worship, with Allah. This is manifest,
ISO and many militant Sunni Salafis would claim, in
various rituals of veneration and adoration directed
toward persons deemed in possession of intercessory
spiritual powers, and has its most common ritual expression in the visitation of tombs and shrines; therefore, for ISO, there was the necessity of destroying
them.183 This destruction of Shia tombs, shrines, and
attack on all forms of ritual associated with intercessory means is not an ISO invention, but rather a SalafiWahhabi trademark, as earlier described. Yet, even
Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), the esteemed neo-Hanbali
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scholar-mujahid and Salafi-Wahhabi exemplar for orthodoxy and orthopraxy, did not takfir the Shia laity.
Their ignorance, lack of proximate responsibility, and
their proximity to Allah led to a policy of immunity
from those punishments required for genuine idolatry
and shirk. Al-Zarqawi’s rejection of Ibn Taymiyya’s
fatwa legalizing Shia lay immunity has been continued by the ISO. Recall also Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s
clarification, in 19 principles of the ISI’s core creed,
and the priority placed on the Shia as the first two of
these. Its more brutal execution lay not in the intent
but in ISO’s dramatically increased means for realizing their intended “final solution.”
Despite their common ancestry in Sunnism and
Salafism, and to a lesser extent Salafi-Wahhabism,
AQO’s divergence from ISO on the “Shia question”
is enormous. A comprehensive examination of Inspire,
Resurgence, and Al-Risala turns up merely two articles
that discuss the “Rafida.” The first is by former founder
and editor Samir Khan, though even here, he excludes
a particular Shia offshoot, the Zaydi, from criticism
altogether.184 The second is in the earlier-mentioned
single instance of an apocalypticism in the article by
Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti.185 His
comment does not takfir the Shia, but he accuses them
in the context of the Syrian civil war and their support
of the regime of Bashar Assad, and of revealing their
“true colors” as hypocrites. He states: “[T]he war in
Syria has uncovered the true nature of the Rawafid
[i.e., “Rafidah”] and their deep loathing for Islam
and the Muslims. The hollow slogans with which the
Rawafid have tried to deceive the Ummah for so long
have now lost their efficacy. The veneer they had coated their hypocrisy with has finally worn out.” Hardly
a call to arms, and certainly a vast distance from the
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policy of systematic extermination currently being
prosecuted by the ISO.186
THE NEAREST ENEMY IS THE UMMAH’S
TRUEST ENEMY!
The prioritizing of the “Nearest Enemy” rather
than the “Far Enemy” is a final point of furthest divergence. This is not strategic but instead a fundamental
disagreement rooted in creed and ultimate beliefs.
AQO’s “Far Enemy” focus is derived from its orienting principle: “The Sunni Church of the United
Ummah and Its Mujahidin versus The Craven Original Kufr and Their Apostate Lackeys Who Oppress
and Exploit the Muslim World.” For ISO, the world
is quite different. The original sin is not the original
Kufr, but the nearest of my former Muslim brothers
who treacherously left Allah for shirk, and in so doing, split Allah’s true faith and true warriors with
the ultimate consequence that the original Kufr now
dominate the Ummah. Internal treason, subversion,
and treachery must first be exorcised; then, Allah’s
true army is organized from those remnants who survive these battles; and finally assembled on the fields
of Dabiq, they fight the final battles of the End Times.
The ISI’s first proto-caliph, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi,
clarifies this worldview in a form that only the blind
could fail to recognize:
And know this well: the malicious rafidah [Shiites] and
the infidel occupiers will never forget that only yesterday you were their enemies, and they have begun to
stab you already, so return to us and we will not forget
that yesterday you were our friends. . . . If you refuse
to repent before we get a hold of you then, by Allah,
to kill an apostate is more preferable to me than a hundred
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Crusader heads, and you know all about our vigor and
our reach, and the mantle of the [Shias] and the wood
of the Crusader occupiers will do you no good [italics
supplied].187

This speech was delivered in the midst of the ISI’s
precipitous decline and the fundamental threat now
posed to its Caliphal ambitions by the “apostate” Sunni
elements that had “abandoned” the ISI. Three primary
enemies are identified—“the malicious rafidah,” “the
infidel occupiers,” and “unrepentant apostate[s].” “If
you refuse to repent before we get hold of you then,
by Allah, to kill an apostate is more preferable than
a hundred Crusader heads” refers to the Sunni “Sahwat” or “Tribal Awakening,” as well as other insurgent Sunni formations that ultimately doomed any
pretense that the ISI represented the heart and soul of
Ahl-us Sunnah. Note, takfir has been declared against
Sunnis who refuse ISI rule. Since ISI is Allah’s chosen
instrument for the realization of the End Time, they
are guilty of shirk. Second in priority is “the malicious
rafidah,” and a distant third, “the infidel occupiers.”
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s ISI, which has alienated the
Ahl-us Sunnah beyond any possible reconciliation, attempts to persuade these Ahl-us Sunnah that they are
not your friends or your future—“never forget that
only yesterday you were their enemies, and they have
begun [again] to stab you already, so return to us
and we will not forget that yesterday you were our
friends.”188
ISO RELATIVE DIVERGENCES FROM AQO
ISO’s less definitive divergences from AQO,
though highly consequential, are more finely nuanced, require extensive elaboration, and suppose a
specialized knowledge of Islamic theology and juris124

prudence (Fiqh) exceeding that possessed by the present author.189 These debates concern such fundamental
concepts as faith and its opposite, infidelity (Iman versus Kufr); and based on one’s answer to the questions,
“What is faith? What is infidelity?” How one determines, in fact, whether one has veered too far from the
“middle path”—claimed to be Prophet Muhammad’s
true path—and instead has become either negligent
and guilty of postponing (irja) essential acts of faith
and thereby accused of belonging to the negligent
postponers (Murj’ites); or on the other extreme, judge
sinning itself as Kufr, and thereby exhibit an extremist
ultra-radicalism like the early sect of Kharijites (Khawarij).190 Still other debates deal with key theological
and theopolitical concepts such as: the doctrine of al
Wala wa’l bara—the notion that a true Muslim must
openly disavow, disassociate from, and hate idolaters—and on the other hand, exclusively avow, associate with, and love the advocates of monotheism; the
doctrine of tawhid, or the absolute Oneness of Allah
as Creator, Lord, and in His Names, and its opposite,
shirk or idolatry, and what in fact counts as idolatry
particularly in the modern world; the doctrine of Hakimiyyah, and the notion that a state can only be governed by the “Rulings that Allah Sent Down,” i.e., the
Sharia, and how that is to be operationalized; and, the
question of when and how the obligatory prescribed
criminal punishments (Hudud) of lashing, permanent
dismemberment, and stoning are to be enforced for
the crimes of fornication, theft, adultery, and intentional homicide.
The point of greatest convergence and with which
we conclude this section, is the genus “global Sunni
jihadism” to which each of these deviant species subscribe. The definitive quality that marks these orga-
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nizations off from every other form of Islamic activism is their claim that jihad fi sabil Allah—fighting and
striving in the path of Allah to Raise Allah’s Word—is
until the Day of Final Judgment, an immediate and
unconditional obligation that is at the same time,
the superlative means of worshipping Allah, expiating one’s sins, and purchasing (through sacrifices of
blood and treasure) those superlative privileges only
attained by those killing and being killed on this path
(Shuhada) (re: Quran 9:111).191
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CHAPTER 2
TERRORIST MODUS OPERANDI
I. INTRODUCTION
Having systematically examined AQO’s and ISO’s
core beliefs, worldviews, doctrine, and creed, let us
now examine the governing dynamics of their terrorist strategies: their terrorist modus operandi. The
author’s Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA), a heuristic for modeling the dynamics of terrorist organizations, is employed to facilitate this task. This heuristic
is first briefly described, and subsequently applied to
AQO (part one) and ISO (part two).
TERRORIST QUADRANGLE ANALYSIS (TQA)
The Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA) is a tool
created by the present author for conceptualizing the
four key intrinsically-related dynamic elements of a
terrorist organization—(1) religio-political objectives,
(2) media warfare, (3) terrorist operations (other than
media), and (4) proximate strategic objectives.192 A
brief discussion of each element and their interrelation follows (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The Terrorist Quadrangle: Relations of
Religio-Political Objectives, Media Operations,
Terror Operations (Non-Media) and Strategic
Objectives.
“Religio-Political Objectives” refers to the proximate
and ultimate “end state” sought by the terrorist entity:
its declared ideal ultimate objective and those proximate to it. “Media Operations” refers to the deliberate use of all available media to facilitate the achievement of terrorist organizational objectives. “Terrorist
Operations (Non-Media)” are all actions, operations,
and campaigns designed and executed for attaining
proximate and ultimate religio-political objectives.
“Strategic Objectives” are key proximate end states
necessary for the full realization of the terrorist entity’s ultimate religio-political objectives. They maintain a direct causal relation to proximate and ultimate
religio-political objectives. For example, if an ultimate
religio-political objective were the creation of a state
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ruled exclusively by Sharia, a key strategic objective
would be the successful elimination of a non-Shariabased legal system, and the successful creation of an
alternative juridical system.
Terrorism as strategy is motive-independent. It is
in its essence, reducible to a stick of dynamite, a film
crew, an immediate target that serves as a sign vehicle, and a broader indirect target audience whose will,
resolve, and psychological state is deemed essential
to the realization of the terrorist’s ultimate objectives.
Though ultimate objectives, means of destruction, media, direct targets, and indirect targets are variables,
terrorism as strategy remains identical to what it has
always been: the deliberate use of terrorism directed
at direct and indirect targets (the way), using media and non-media instruments of power/influence
(the means), to achieve ends (in this case, religiopolitical ends).193 Let us now examine the terrorist
modus operandi of AQO and ISO.
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II. THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION
(TANZIM QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD)
Despite the previous chapter’s focus on core
beliefs, worldviews, creed, and doctrine, we also
learned about AQO’s basic terrorist modus operandi.
The AQO doctrine as we observed sought to galvanize and mobilize Sunni Muslims to deploy as part of
bin Ladenism’s “Sunni Internationale,” to systematically attrite the “Crusader-Zionist” alliance through
persistent, economically damaging attacks on “Far
Enemy” targets. Let us now briefly describe the TQA
of the “classical” AQO “Far Enemy” bin Ladenism
strategy.194
TQA, I: THE “CLASSICAL” BASE FIRST BIN
LADENIST “FAR ENEMY” STRATEGY
Proximate and Ultimate Religio-Political
Objectives.
AQO’s ongoing transnational terrorist campaign is
directed at attaining an ultimate religio-political object: Islamic supremacy, global worship of Allah, and
the reign of an Islamic super-state. This objective is
to be attained in stages.195 First, the United States and
its principal allies are to be territorially and militarily
removed from the Arab Muslim world, thus undermining U.S. military presence, power projection, and
access to energy reserves. Second, is the overthrowing
of so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and replacing these with orthodox Sunni Muslim governments,
which are adherent to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy.
Third, is uniting Muslim states into a supra-state
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caliphate that shall serve as a religio-political base for
further amassing Muslim power and conducting offensive jihad to confront the remaining world of infidelity (dar al-Kufr). This supra-state caliphal Sovereign
is envisioned as an alternative international order that
eschews, denies, and is at war with the present United
Nations-based system of territorially independent,
equal, sovereign nation-states. Fourth, mobilized
within this caliphal block of militant Muslim states,
a sustained, permanent offensive jihad is to be fought
until all other forms of worship and polity are overthrown. It is at that point that Allah’s worship will be
universal throughout the Earth and the reign of justice,
peace, and Allah’s absolute sovereignty fully realized.
The Instrumental Role of Media Warfare, Terrorist
Attacks, and the Strategic Object.
Media warfare is viewed by AQO as an essential
dimension of their strategy.196 Media warfare, terrorist attacks, and strategic objectives are conceived by
AQO as strictly subordinate to AQO’s religio-political
objectives. Phases one and two of the religio-political
object are paramount at the present time, i.e., removal
of the United States and its principal allies territorially
and militarily from the Arab Muslim world, and overthrowing so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and
replacing these with Sunni Muslim governments that
adhere to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy.
A central task of media warfare during these initial phases is to reinforce an essential Manichaean
dichotomy between the “Crusader” United States
of America and the “Defender” AQO. The Crusader
must be portrayed as the Satanic other: a mortal foe
of Godly forces mobilized to vanquish evil personi-

132

fied. Designed to galvanize, incite, and morally outrage, this process of “satanization” has, since Harold
D. Lasswell’s early study,197 been well-documented
as a key strategic dimension of wartime propaganda.
This first key strategic media warfare task—mobilize
animosity/hatred by the Muslim Nation (Ummah) of
the enemy—is complemented by three other strategic media warfare tasks that correlate with key target
audiences: securing and preserving the friendship of
allies; preserving and if possible, securing, the cooperation of neutrals or even arousing neutrals‘ opposition to one’s own enemies; and, demoralizing and
disintegrating the enemy’s will to persevere.198
The terrorist attacks AQO conceptualized, organized, executed, and endorsed are strictly subordinate
to the attainment of the proximate religio-political
object; and, the rationale and subsequent justification
for these terrorist attacks is provided in AQO media
warfare. They aim, again, at specific target audiences
whose function is deemed essential at this stage of
the campaign. The enemy’s determination, resolve,
and willingness to pay the price of military power
projection and support of regional allies must be undermined. Potential AQO allies and neutrals are excluded from these carefully selected, highly symbolic
terrorist targets and thus, appealed and recruited to
the AQO cause. Inciting, catalyzing, and galvanizing
the Ummah is also key.
Finally, AQO’s key strategic objectives directly
correlate with its strategic media warfare and terrorist
attacks. Given this present phase focused on removing the U.S. presence in the Arab Muslim world and
installing strictly adherent Sunni Muslim states, these
four objectives are realized if AQO is successfully undermining “Crusader” enemy motivation, means, and
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opportunity to remain militarily, economically, and
politically engaged in the Arab Middle East; expanding AQO’s terrorist enterprise, base of support, and
unity among potential allies; securing neutrality or
even cooperation among neutrals; and further galvanizing AQO’s fighting forces and broader base within
the Muslim Ummah. In Figure 2, we present AQO’s
five-stage theory of realizing the Khilafa, along with
the TQA model used to analyze each stage.
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Figure 2. From Qa’idat al-Jihad to Khilafah:
A TQA Analysis of AQO.
However, a calculated USG policy during nearly
15 years following 9/11 to degrade, disrupt, and ultimately defeat AQO has successfully accomplished
two of three key strategic objectives: relentlessly attacking AQO’s leadership and network, and success135

fully protecting the U.S. homeland from mass casualty
terrorist attacks. The third objective—countering radicalization and recruitment to AQO—remains a work
in progress.199 Fortunately, AQO’s marginalization
from the vast majority of Ahl-us Sunnah, and Sunni rejection of AQO’s terrorist modus operandi, has assisted where less successful counter-radicalization efforts
have not.200 We shall return in Chapter 3 to examine
USG efforts along that line of effort.
It is possible, as suggested in Chapter 1, that AQO
is now reorienting in the direction of a type of unconventional warfare strategy—embedding, training, and
acting as force multipliers among an auxiliary training
to overthrow an existing state, as well as establishing
essentially political fronts—Ansar al-Sharia organizations (i.e., supporters/helpers of the Sharia)—as was
noted in relation to its present Syrian affiliate Jabhat
al-Nusrah li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat
al-Jihad (“Protection Front for the People of the Levant
by the Mujahadin of the Levant in the Battlefields of
Jihad”; hereafter, Jabhat al-Nusrah), and the broader
Islamist coalitions within which it operates.201 This is
actually closer to the original al-Qaeda idea—a mobile
Islamic foreign legion assisting embattled Brothers
on various fronts—before it morphed via bin Laden’s
post-1990s obsession with anti-American mass casualty terrorism.202
“Classical” AQO still requires USG attention.
However, it is widely acknowledged that AQO’s
Yemeni-based affiliate AQAP now poses the greatest present threat to the U.S. homeland. This is particularly true of its external operations branch. AQAP
has practically amended the “classical” AQO model
of top-down, long-range, high-quality, mass casualty,
anti-American terrorism to pioneer a very different
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terrorist modus operandi centered on an individualized “lone mujahid” model of decentralized direct
terrorist action. The emergence of homegrown and
home-based terrorism as a direct result of this “lone
mujahid” strategy represents a fundamental strategic shift. Let us now examine this most lethal AQO
affiliate of greatest concern to the West and USG in
particular.
TQA, II: THE AQAP “LONE MUJAHID”
“FAR ENEMY” STRATEGY
AQAP’s “lone mujahid” strategy represents a major development in AQO’s strategic evolution.203 It has
recently been suggested that because bin Laden often
questioned AQAP’s strategic acumen and registered
criticisms of its target selection, that it should not really be characterized as the “real” AQO, at least not
as bin Laden’s “classical,” “Far Enemy” strategy is
concerned.204 Futhermore, bin Laden maintained “a
seeming distrust of AQAP’s competence as a jihadi
entity, not least its lack of a sound understanding of
politics.”205 This observation is accurate, but practically irrelevant. For one, it is possible to lodge the
same criticism of bin Laden whose knowledge of reality, politics included, was based in a profound ignorance, conspiracism, delusion, and hubris, enough
so that key members of his own inner circle accused
him of destroying in months what it had taken years,
even decades, to build. Second, classical bin Ladenism has been hammered into oblivion by a sustained
U.S. campaign that has attrited its leadership, gutted
its finances, and overcome initial sanctuary-based
AQO advantages through a lethal and relentless policy of drone-based targeting206 of high value targets.207
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Third, AQAP remains a clear and present danger to
the U.S. homeland, and its “lone mujahid” strategy
currently poses the single greatest ongoing threat to
law enforcement, the intelligence community, and all
who are charged with preventing lone-wolf-style terrorist attacks on American soil. We believe it is highly
likely that this phase of AQAP’s evolution represents
not just a strategic evolution but also a strategic dead
end. One way terrorist groups finally end, Audrey
Cronin points out, is by reorienting into pure criminality.208 As we will soon see, AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi appears not only to promote this kind of
conduct, but also to elevate those who engage in this
truly reprehensible and forbidden (haram) conduct to
the highest levels of Paradise as Shuhada.
It is highly unlikely that Ahl-us Sunnah will recognize this conduct as anything other than what it actually is: sinful, ghastly, evil, and wrong; and more to
the point, not the Islam that embodies those ideals and
religious principles upon which the world’s 1.6 billion
Muslims—Sunni and Shia—stand. These objections
will be more fully discussed in our final chapter. For
now, let us take a brief and telling tour of AQAP’s selfprofessed path to the highest of seven levels of Jannah
(Paradise).
The online magazine Inspire provides the master
key to AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi. The objective of our earlier tour through each of its fourteen
issues published between summer 2010 and summer
2015 (see Chapter 1) was to document certain sources
of major divergence from ISO. We discovered that
ISO’s four signature creedal/doctrinal themes most
divergent from AQO—apocalypticism, ultra-sectarian anti-Shi’ism, Caliphate Now! and Nearest Enemy
Now!—were virtually non-existent in AQAP’s Inspire.
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Doctrinally, a comprehensive analysis reveals that
AQAP embraces AQO’s “party line” privileging, attacking the “Far Enemy” and, importantly, a longerterm, stage-theory for eventually restoring the rightful
Caliphate.209 What we seek to document in this second
tour of Inspire is not doctrine, but its “lone mujahid”
strategy for attaining its declared proximate and ultimate religio-political objectives. To do so, we will
again attempt to use the TQA to capture the dynamics
of a terrorist modus operandi which links religio-political objectives with its media operations, non-media
terrorist operations, and strategic objectives.
AQAP Media Operations.
AQAP’s media operations are single-mindedly
and unabashedly devoted to promoting the strategy of “lone mujahid” terrorism. First, the works and
speeches of key strategists, advocates, and theorists
of individualized jihad, such as Abu Musab al-Suri’s
Global Islamic Resistance Call210 and Anwar al-Awlaki’s
Why Did I Choose Al Qaeda?211 extolling individualized jihadi terrorism, are made accessible in serialized
form. Second, Sharia scholars produce a legal rationale in defense of individualized jihadi terrorism.212
Third, knowledge of terror craft tactics, techniques,
and procedures is made available through publication of the “Open Source Jihad” section in Inspire.213
Fourth, major “special operations,” particularly those
envisioning the “lone mujahid” or lone wolf type terrorist attack are celebrated.214 Fifth, encrypted communication links are routinely advertised that permit
anonymized, individualized terrorist communication
links with AQAP.215
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Finally, the lion’s share of AQAP’s focus, if measured by sheer column inches, is its obsessive advocacy of “martyrdom” (Shuhada). 216 This involves extolling, celebrating, honoring, inspiring, inciting, and
lionizing martyrdom in general, and individualized
“lone mujahid,” “martyrdom operations,” and “martyrs” in particular.
“Jihadism” by its very nature has reduced Islam
to fighting and dying in the process of killing others.
As the singular path advanced for the raising of Allah’s Word, empowering individuals to sacrifice all
that is dear on this Earth, and in this life, is essential.
Individualized jihadism (the “lone mujahid”) is the
true “center of gravity” for AQAP’s media operations,
because it focuses directly on the critical requirement
and the potential critical vulnerability of this terrorist modus operandi: generating, motivating, and deploying an ample supply of persons willing to kill
fellow human beings and citizens in the process of
killing themselves. Such an unnatural, aberrant, truly
reprehensible, and morally condemnable act requires
the most careful attention—to emotive manipulation,
addressing fears and doubts, providing assurances
for loved ones left behind, sowing doubt about one’s
manliness and courage, exacerbating alienation and
identity crises—should Shahada not be pursued to the
end.
Non-Media Terrorist Operations and Strategic
Objectives.
A comprehensive analysis of Inspire’s media operations also discloses the types of non-media terrorist operations pursued, and their relation to strategic objectives. First and foremost are “Far Enemy”
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operations designed to attack predominantly economic targets—institutions, infrastructure, energy
corridors, global shipping, commercial aviation—and
personalities, including world-renowned entrepreneurs, scholars, intellectuals, and philanthropists.
Second, is the emergent focus on a type of radically
individualistic violence comprised of a hybridization
of ultra-anarchism and gangsterism.217 Possessed of
the knowledge, motivation, opportunities, and tools,
every Muslim is urged to murder any non-Muslim,
destroy their honor, steal their wealth, and wreak
havoc on their lives. The ideal Muslim is portrayed as
a treacherous, murderous, criminal psychopath who
spills oil on highways to ambush and later murder his
hapless victims; sets fire to forests and burns every life
form and residence that would lie in its path; and who
would assassinate the creators, inventors, and intellects responsible for pioneering institutions and running global enterprises. This appears to be AQAP’s
most considered answer to the question, “What would
Prophet Muhammad Do?” It does not take much
imagination to predict the probable trajectory of an
entity whose highest ideals for contemporary Islam
are the greatest sins after apostasy: homicide, suicide,
treachery, deceit, and attacking the lives, honor, posterity, and wealth, of Allah’s creation.
AQAP’s primary strategic objective is captured in
its simplified formula: If we Remove the United States
from Muslim Lands + If we Preach the Call (Da’wa) +
If we Defend the Ummah’s State and Lands = Then we
will realize Caliphate.218 The first (If we Remove the
United States from Muslim Lands) of this Caliphate
syllogism presumes knowledge of the United States.
However, like Osama bin Laden, AQAP appears profoundly and dangerously ignorant and maintains
delusions about its chief “Crusader” nemesis. It has
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mistaken its hollowed out, demonized, conspiracyriddled, anti-semitic caricature for the real thing. Based
on its own published record, along with the virtual
decimation of its first-tier leadership cadre, one might
conclude that AQAP lacks knowledge of the adversary it insists on terrorizing. This includes its apparent
ignorance of U.S. values, institutions, motivations, and
the sustained commitment of its residents and citizens
who identify with America’s promise, opportunities,
and freedoms—including genuine religious freedoms
cherished and celebrated by its Muslim citizens and
residents.
It is likely, as suggested earlier, that AQAP is
transforming from an AQO-based “Far Enemy” terrorist organization possessed of a leadership, resources, sanctuary, finances, logistics, and recruits, to little
more than an inspirer of anarchistic-like individualized terrorism, parasitizing the electromagnetic and
cyber dimensions to promote what has become nothing more—to persons less ignorant and deluded—
than sinful and criminal conduct. The strategic implications for USG efforts to counter this organization
are straightforward, and shall be taken up in our final
chapter. It is now time to take up our second terrorist
entity: the ISO (Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya).
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III. ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION
(TANZIM AL-DAWLA AL-ISLAMIYYA)
Let us now examine the ISO’s strategy and terrorist modus operandi. We anchor our analysis in
the ISO’s own selective, apologetic history of its own
beginnings in al-Zarqawi and Zarqawism, the pithiest formulation of which is ISO’s proposed five-stage
strategy for realizing the Caliphate in Dabiq’s inaugural issue.219 We will learn in ISO’s re-telling of its
self-understanding of Zarqawism’s distinct differences from every other jihadist tendency, and why it
is deemed the exclusive “bridge” to Khilafa. However,
instead of parroting ISO’s self-presentation, where
necessary and practicable, we supply known facts in
place of ISO distortions and myths. We shall also further substantiate ISO’s self-presentation by drawing
on the fuller range of materials made available across
11 issues of Dabiq. As we shall soon see, the ISO has in
practice significantly departed from its idealized fivestage strategy. The reasons for this shall be obvious in
the course of our presentation.
TQA: THE ISO “STATE/CALIPHATE-FIRST”
STRATEGY
ISO declares five necessary stages (see Figure
3) marking the path to the restoration of the Sunni
Islamic Caliphate:
1. Emigrating to an ideal locale (Hijrah);
2. Establishing the jihadist state-building nuclei
(Jama’ah);
3. Using terrorist “vexation and exhaustion” operations to attack, collapse, and destroy existing
state authority (Nikayah), to create mayhem/
chaos (Tawahhush);
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4. Controlling territory, persons, resources, and
consolidating an alternative Islamic State structure (Tamkin); and finally,
5. Declaring, consolidating, and expanding the
Islamic State/Caliphate (Khilafa). These may be
visually represented using the TQA heuristic.

Figure 3. From Hijra to Khilafah: A TQA
Analysis.220
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ISO Proximate and Ultimate Religio-Political
Objectives.
ISO declares very clearly its ultimate religiopolitical objective. It is stated thrice: “[e]stablishing
Khilafah”; “reviving the Khilafah”; and “The goal of
Khilafah without hesitation.”221 What ISO meant precisely by “without hesitation” is unclear, since this
could mean: “We must begin now to work toward the
Caliphate” or “We must now without hesitation declare The Islamic State of the Caliphate.” In practice,
it appears the latter course was taken, and if so, this
contradicts ISO’s own self-declared stage strategy by
placing the Caliphate far ahead of the other necessary
stages it posits are essential to its effective “remaining
and expanding.” We shall leave this for now, as it will
soon reappear as an essential ingredient of ongoing
Fitnah and ISO’s civil war with other Islamic, Salafi,
and Salafi-Jihadist organizations.
ISO Terrorist Operations (Non-Media), and
Accompanying Media Operations.
The ISO lays out a very brief and telling summary
of its grand strategy. It clarifies for us exactly how it
envisions strategy, and the essential phases for realizing its end state. This description is based on its recapitulation of the stages it claims al-Zarqawi’s initial
organization followed:
In short, these phases consist of [1] immigrating [hijra] to a land with a weak central authority to use as a
base where a [2] jama’ah can form, recruit members,
and train them. (If such a land does not exist or hijrah is not possible, the place can be formed through
long campaigns of nikayah [vexation and exhaustion]
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attacks carried out by underground mujahid cells . . .
These attacks will compel apostate forces to partially
withdraw from rural territory and regroup in major
urban regions.) The jama’ah would then take advantage of the situation by [3] increasing the chaos to
the point of leading to the complete collapse of the
taghut regime in entire areas, a situation some refer
to as ‘tawahhush’ (‘mayhem’). The next step would
be to fill the vaccuum by managing the state of affairs
to the point of [4] developing into a full-fledged state
[tamkin], and continuing expansion into territory still
under control of the taghut [emphasis added].222

A concluding sentence, in boldface type and a larger
font size, supplies our final stage. “This has always
been the roadmap towards [stage 5] Khilafah for the
mujahidin.”223 Let us now attempt to follow this path.
Phase 1: Emigration (Hijra).
In the beginning is Emigration (Hijra). Conceived
on the model of Prophet Muhammad, ISO envisions
its origins in emigration from a land of persecution to
one where the rudiments of a new organization may
be planted and defended. For al-Zarqawi, this new
land is “a place where they could operate without
the threat of a powerful police state,” and ISO asserts
that this led him from Afghanistan (recall his Jund
al-Sham based in Herat), to Kurdistan, “as a base to
form Jama’atut-Tawhidi wal-Jihad [italics added].”224
Phase 2: Group Formation (Jama’ah).
Interestingly, Dabiq asserts that the creedal core of
Zarqawism is the way of moderation, or the middle
way, and that the ISO is based on Quran, Sunnah, and
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a Salafism “free from the extremities,” i.e., neither negligent (murji’ite) nor equating sin with disbelief (khawarij). Further, it is based in the doctrines of tawhid,
al-wala wa’l bara, and the demand that all governance
be based in Sharia. It views “jihad as its fundamental
means for change” (citing, Quran 8:39), and that jihad
be based upon “hijrah [emigration], bay’ah [an oath
of loyalty to the emir], sam’ [listening], ta’ah [obedience], and i’dad [training], leading to ribat [manning
frontiers] and qital [fighting], then Khilafah or shahadah [martyrdom], [italics added].”225 Having claimed
to adhere to what seems like a mainline Salafi-Jihadi
creed, however, we soon learn otherwise. Zarqawism
is presented instead as the exclusive “bridge” to the
Caliphate, with all others accused of varying degrees
of intolerable deviance.
The story begins in the Afghanistan camps, the era
of united fronts, anti-Communist coalitions, and Azzamist defensive jihad. Because of the overwhelming
emphasis placed on fighting a “common enemy,” it
is claimed this led to “ignoring all matters that distinguished them from each other, even if those matters were an obstacle in the pursuit of Khilafah,” with
the most significant of these being “nationalism” and
other “serious innovations that destroyed the creed
and healthy body of the Muslim jama’ah required for
reviving the Khalifah.”226 Note here ISO’s declared
opposition to Azzamism and AQO-based Church-like
“lumping” strategies. Those ecumenical conceptions
of “Muslimness” were vehemently opposed to sectarian splitting and internecine warfare at the expense of
the “apostate” government installed by the “original
Kufr,” in this case the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). For al-Zarqawi and the ISO,
however, what is decisive is “all matters that distin-
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guished them [each fighting group] from each other.”
In other words, it is only the purity of the Pure Sect
that ensures the True Muslimness of the Muslim, and
therefore it is in the process of winnowing wheat from
chaff and True Believers from hypocrites, negligence,
heresy, and outright apostasy, that Khilafa can and
should be restored. The Caliphate can only be built
from steel. It is “the creed and healthy body of the
Jama’ah” cleansed of “serious innovations” that will
be the instrument for the restoration. Moreover, many
“would become the bridges upon which jihad would
pass over toward the awaited Khilafah,” the one of
greatest consequence “was that of the mujaddid (reviver) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”227
It is essential to pause for a moment to see that this
second stage of—Jama’ah—Zarqawism, by its very nature, views itself as operating on two key battle fronts.
The least important is the front that fights “the occupier” in the wake of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and
involves a number of Islamic, nationalist, Ba’athist,
and other opponents;228 the most important was the alZarqawi-incited civil war against other Islamic groups
for their alleged failure to rigidly adhere to his particular variant of ultra-conservative, ultra-sectarian
Wahhabi-Salafi jihadism. This second front is the front
against the nearer (Shia) and nearest enemies (insufficiently Muslim Sunnis); and as we have already
learned, is the essential, obsessive front that sectarians
must first—and forever—fight. It is only in this purging, cleansing, and destruction of opponents (i.e., the
tribulations that are the oven that separates the pure
and impure) that Allah opens the way for Allah’s True
Soldiers and exposes and destroys hypocrites, sinners,
heretics, and apostates, to create the State of the Caliphate. The moment al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid
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wal-Jihad is born (Jama’ah), Fitnah is also born. We shall
treat this more extensively in the following section,
but for now “Fitnah,” defined as intra-Muslim “tribulation,” “trial,” or “conflict,” refers to a state of civil
war or conflict among jihadist groups based on a state
of enmity, fundamental disagreement, and is characterized by the outbreak of overt hostilities. Its deeper
meaning for ISO is that it is Allah’s method for refining and distilling through trials, tribulations, conflict,
and fighting, that steel from which the true bridge to
Khalifa shall be built.
Phase 3: Injury, Vexation, Exhaustion (Nikayah), and
Collapse, Chaos, Mayhem (Tawahhush).
By using methods that led to maximum chaos and targeting apostates of all different backgrounds, the mujahidin were able to keep Iraq in constant instability
and war, never allowing any apostate group to enjoy a
moment of security [emphasis added].229

Phase 3 commences as al-Zarqawi’s organization Jund
al-Sham, and later Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, destroy
all that is not him, and leaves chaos in his wake: “In
short,” Dabiq claims:
he strived to create as much chaos as possible with the
means permitted by the Shari’ah using attacks sometimes referred to as operations of ‘nikayah’ (injury)
that focus on causing the enemy death, injury, and
damage . . . [And] [w]ith chaos, he intended to prevent
any taghut [idolatrous] regime from ever achieving a
degree of stability that would enable it to reach a status quo similar to that existing in the Muslim lands
ruled for decades by tawaghit. . . . To achieve maximum chaos, the Shaykh focused on the most effective
weapons in the arsenal of the mujahidin for creat-
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ing chaos—vehicle bombs, IEDs, and istishhadiyyin
[specialized suicide ops brigades].230

What truly distinguished al-Zarqawi’s organization, however—and not adequately captured in the
previous quote—was not his attacks on regime targets
or American forces, or even on those in the highest
levels of leadership who could be reasonably accused
of voluntarily aiding and abetting the occupation. Instead, virtually all Islamic insurgents could agree on
the objective of launching “daily operations against
the crusader forces in Iraq whose main goal was to
set up an apostate puppet regime loyal to them.”231
Zarqawism as Zarqawism was defined rather by its
legitimation of targets deemed by the vast majority of
these insurgents as forbidden on Islamic grounds or
detrimental to the insurgency on practical grounds. It
is through al-Zarqawi’s use of ultra-takfiri epithets and
euphemistic language that this dramatic expansion of
theretofore forbidden targets is condoned.
For example, it is stated that: “He [al-Zarqawi]
would order [persons] to carry out nikayah operations dozens of times in a dozen areas daily, targeting
and killing sometimes hundreds of apostates from the
police forces and Rafidah.”232 However, “hundreds
of apostates from the police forces” refer not just to
leadership and collaborators, but everyday persons,
Sunni and Shia, who are far from a chain of command
and are the sons of the Iraqi masses. “The Rafidah,” of
course, refers to al-Zarqawi’s wholesale slaughter of
the Shia, leaders and led; this is deemed reprehensible
and indeed forbidden (haram), even among deeply
conservative Sunni Salafi-Wahhabis. This panoply of
prohibited targets and forbidden conduct is further
celebrated as Zarqawism’s fodder in this phase whose
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proximate objectives are maximum injury, chaos, and
collapse. But the list of al-Zarqawi’s permissible targets is further clarified, and extended. “In addition,”
Dabiq declares:
he tried to force every apostate group present in Iraq
into an all-out war with Ahlus-Sunnah. So he targeted the Iraqi apostate forces (army, police, and intelligence), the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and
militias), and the Kurdish secularists (Barzani and
Talabani partisans). . . . In his speech titled ‘Hadha
Bayanullin-Nasi wa li Yundharu Bih’ (This is a Declaration for the People That They May Be Warned by It),
he threatened war on any Sunni tribe, party, or assembly that would support the crusaders. . . . Then when
some so-called ‘Islamists’ entered into the democratic
political process—ignoring what it entails of clear-cut
major shirk—he officially declared war on them in his
speech titled ‘Wa li Tastabina Sabilul-Mujrimin’ (And
Thus the Way of the Criminals Becomes Evident).233

Let us consider these now licit targets, i.e., Iraqi “apostate” forces, the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and
militias, Kurdish secularists, any Sunni tribe, party,
or assembly that would support the Crusaders, and
so-called Islamists [that] entered into the democratic
political process. Count the bodies, count the souls.
Recall that these were the days (2004-2006) of dozens of bombs and bombers, in dozens of cities, leading to hundreds and hundreds of dead, mangled,
wounded, shocked, displaced, and horrified. This is
the precise moment (see Chapter 1) that al-Zawahiri,
al-Maqdisi, and Atiyatullah al-Libi, among others,
privately registered their deep reservations on legalmoral and prudential grounds. Moreover, following
the October 17, 2004, bay’ah to bin Laden, this would
all be publicly attributed to AQO’s Tanzim Qa’idat
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al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Those darkest days marked
by violence, injury, chaos, and mayhem were precisely the days sought during this third phase, supposedly marking the path to the Caliphate. Moreover, in
Dabiq’s telling, no sacred blood had ever been targeted
or spilled in this strategic phase. “Obviously,” Dabiq
asserts:
their operations never targeted Sunni public places
and gatherings—contrary to the claims of the crusader
and apostate media. Those crimes were carried out by
rafidi militia seeking revenge against Ahlus-Sunnah,
and by crusader mercenaries trying to blemish the
true image of the mujahidin.234

Supposing facts do matter, this is a blatant falsehood. Based on a detailed study of open source
data on reported terrorist incidents in Iraq—using
exclusively the Arabic language press to enhance
credibility—from 2004-2008 a very different conclusion is revealed:
The results show that non-Westerners are much more
likely to be killed in an al-Qa’ida [in Iraq] attack. From
2004 to 2008, only 15% of the 3,010 victims were Western. During the most recent period studied the numbers skewed even further. From 2006-2008, only 2%
(12 of 661 victims) are from the West, and the remaining 98% are inhabitants of countries with Muslim majorities. During this period, a person of non-Western
origin was 54 times more likely to die in an al-Qa’ida
[in Iraq] attack than an individual from the West. The
overwhelming majority of al-Qa’ida [in Iraq’s] victims
are Muslims living in Muslim countries, and many are
citizens of Iraq, which suffered more al-Qa’ida attacks
than any other country courtesy of the al-Qa’ida in
Iraq (AQI) affiliate.235
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Of course, al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
could easily retort on the basis of their creed, which
essentially states: We do not distinguish between
Westerners and non-Westerners, but only between believers and apostates, and we have killed only those,
regardless of residence or nationality, who have forsaken Allah for idolatry.
That claim though, in the end, did not prove very
persuasive to Ahl-us Sunnah. The fact that the greatest fear an Iraqi would face—whether man, woman,
child, elderly, Sunni, Shia, secular, religious, sinner,
or pious—was from a fanatical, blood-thirsty, violent,
ultra-sectarian organization committed to inflicting
massive injury, chaos, and mayhem on persons who
worship Allah, and not on the “Crusader” occupier,
did not require circuitous reasoning, dubitable assumptions, or questionable facts. The facts, by design
(Nikayah and Tawahhush, Phase 3), were laid bare for
all to see: bodies blown to bits, families torn apart,
worshippers turned into flying body parts, and “martyrdom seekers” turned into human shrapnel. The renewal of these attacks subsequent to ISO’s post-2010
reorganization and reconstitution is well-attested and
fully celebrated in Dabiq’s own pages.236
Phase 4: Consolidation, Remaining, Declaration of the State
of Islam (Tamkin).
“The State” (Tamkin) stage is the next “signature” moment of Zarqawism. So far, all other stages
traversed—Hijra, Jama’ah, and Nikayah/Tawahhush—
are mere preface. Again, this is claimed to be “the
Prophetic methodology,” i.e., a recapitulation of
Prophet Muhammad’s earliest Medinan state, and
later that tiny statelet of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd
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al-Wahhab. Every state has its founding myths, and
those surrounding Dabiq’s portrayal of ISI’s birth are
no exception. In Chapter 1, we carefully traced the
evolution of the ISI from al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism in
the latter 1980s to its official declaration on October
15, 2006. Its chief characteristics are the urgency with
which the State’s declaration was sought, the paltry
number of persons involved in its declaration, and the
complete surprise with which AQO and every other
organization was taken. It was also discovered, if McCants is correct, that a decisive reason for its early
proclamation was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s belief in
the imminent return of the Mahdi.237 We also learned
from al-Zarqawi’s final letter that he despaired, owing
to his failure to foment a Sunni-Shia civil war, turn
back the tide of the emergent “Sahwat,” or successfully obstruct the nascent Iraqi democratic process.
He was reduced to either contriving a war between
the two great Satans, “Rafidi” Iran and the “Crusader”
United States—on the basis of fabricated evidence—or
ending up again al-Ghuraba (a stranger) in a strange
land, pushed to again roam to find a land of possibility for Allah’s Truest Soldiers. The tide had turned by
the time of al-Zarqawi’s death on June 7, 2006. His organization was in disarray. It was losing ground, losing battles, and losing recruits. Myths rarely do full,
if any, justice to facts, yet such founding myths are
presented in Dabiq.
Shaykh Abu Mus’ab planned [before his June 7, 2006,
death] to later execute more complex attacks of a larger
scale sometimes referred to as operations of ‘tamkin’
(consolidation), which were meant to pave the way for
the claiming of territory [for a State]. All this [eventually?] led to the gradual collapse of any authority in
the areas the crusaders would refer to as ‘the Sunni
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Triangle’. . . The collapse was followed by the mujahidin quickly entering the vacuum left, to announce and
establish the Islamic State of Iraq, [October 15, 2006]
under the leadership of Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar
al-Husayni al-Baghdadi [Abu Omar al-Baghdadi]
. . . a monumental event in the history of the Ummah.
It was the first state in ‘modern’ times set up exclusively by the mujahidin—the active participants in the
jihad—in the heart of the Muslim world just a stone’s
throw away from Makkah, al-Madinah, and Bayt alMaqdis.238

The ISO alleges here that the “State” had arisen as a
necessity—now that territory had been cleared in “the
Sunni Triangle.” But there is a problem. If that were
the case, why would it “enter quickly into the vacuum
left” if it had, in fact, actually consolidated anything
like a defended territory, with persons, resources, and
power? An obvious answer recommends itself; the
declaration of the State occurred despite the absence
of these conditions and despite a lack of consultation
beyond the narrowest groups associated with its own
self-created Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), and
later Hilf al-Mutayyibeen.
Moreover, this event is declared a first in the modern history of the Ummah since it was declared and
established “exclusively by the mujahidin—the active
participants in the jihad.” Sunni concepts of state generally regard consultation on a far broader scale—including persons of reputation and authority entrusted
with the power to loosen and bind (ahl al-hall waal’aqd),
as well as Shura or an advisory council. It may be that
these alleged requirements describe the ideal Caliphate more than the real. 239 Nevertheless, the idea that
“The Islamic State” would be declared “exclusively
by the mujahidin” (read: members of the Hilf al-Muy-
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tayybeen) was a startling innovation indeed. It is also
critical to understand that the title then conferred on
its emir—“Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni
al-Baghdadi”240—was one reserved throughout Sunni
history beginning with Sunni Islam’s second caliph
Umar, to refer to the Caliph of all the Muslims. This
“monumental event in the history of the Ummah”
would not, however, be met with anything but perplexity and predictable resistance. Thus, the ongoing
Fitnah recommences with even more ferocity now that
a tiny self-chosen takfiri group regards itself in exclusive possession of the exclusive authority to rule what
it deems “The Islamic State of All Muslims.”
Even presuming ISO’s own strategy of Khilafa, the
following objections can be raised. Does the declaration of the ISI make sense at this phase of consolidation (tamkin)? Was not the ISI, having not established
any recognizable consolidated territory and no means
of defending it, actually hanging by a mere thread?
This questionable and imprudent declaration of
Khilafa is further obfuscated by the ambiguity of the
expression, “The goal of Khilafah without hesitation [emphasis added].” Does this mean: “Once we
announce it, then it will exist, and they will come,
and they will obey!” But should not prudence and
reality have instead led to a contrary conclusion? For
example, “Once we have created and defended the
rudiments of a genuine state, and once others are sufficiently convinced of our right to obedience, then we
may possibly declare a restricted emirate—though
there are definite liabilities even to this, but certainly
not for a very long time should we imagine ourselves
declaring let alone ruling a Caliphate of the worldwide Ummah!”
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A re-sequencing of stages was carried out, in fact
and in defiance, of ISO’s very own blueprint for Khilafa. The final, Caliphate, stage (Stage 5) was announced
simultaneously with the consolidation (Stage 4, tamkin) declaration of the ISI, and as we have noted, was
based in the myth and not reality of territorial consolidation. An emir of an emirate at most, if even this
was to be granted, was instead declared “AmirulMu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi . . . a
monumental event in the history of the Ummah.”
Dabiq’s Missing Phase: The Fitnah.
As earlier stated, Fitnah was born in the very womb
of al-Zarqawi’s conception of Jama’ah. Al-Zarqawi’s
ruthlessness and takfiri terrorism led to his self-declared and self-initiated war on all those whose blood,
honor, property, and security he deemed it lawful to
shed, steal, and destroy. With the birth of “The State,”
a further intensification of fitnah occurred. It was not
now a question of intra-organizational civil war, but
a new “either/or” from the “The State’s/Caliphate’s”
point of view: either repentance, renunciation of all
other loyalty ties and pledging bay’ah to the new Caliph; or, rebellion and capital punishment by beheading, crucifixion, or other murderous means.
Let us now return to Dabiq’s account and pick up
the story immediately after the October 15, 2006, declaration of the ISI. We shall break this up into distinct
milestones: the initial ISI declaration and intensification of Fitnah; the ISI’s exodus following its near defeat; the post-Caliphate Umar regrouping; the Syrian
civil war as opportunity for rebirth; the Caliphate declared; and finally, the present demand that all pledge
bay’ah to their Caliph Ibrahim. The listed statements
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below represent the present author’s sense for ISO’s
declared imperative accompanying each milestone.
1. Curses, Fighting, and Death for Those Who
Reject Allah’s Chosen!
When the Islamic State of Iraq was announced [October 15, 2006]—after going through these phases of
war—it had the effect of exposing all the jihad claimants in Iraq, splitting them into two camps. Every
group and individual with iman [faith] and ikhlas [fidelity, sincerity] quickly pledged allegiance to the Islamic
State’s leader, for none had ever selflessly taken a step in
the direction of jihad except with an Islamic state as their
ultimate goal. Those that resisted the newborn state
[i.e., did not pledge allegiance] did so for two reasons:
deviant methodologies and corrupt desires for fame,
wealth, and power. Consequently, the announcement
caused some of the hidden deviance to surface. The
suppressed corruption waiting irritably to arise finally
did so as well. Some of those carrying corruption in
their hearts quickly allowed their pride and envy to
possess them, pushing them to enter into both hidden
and open alliances with the crusaders, the new apostate regime, and the neighboring tawaghit, against the
newborn Islamic State, thereby forming the ‘sahwah’
(‘awakening’), a term coined by the American pawns
to beautify their apostasy and treachery. The sahwah
received financial, political, and ‘scholarly’ support
from Al-Sa’ud, the Ikhwan, and even America [italics
added].241

An extreme takfiri logic runs through this account,
which explains its expansive enemies list. It occurs in
the phrase “for none had ever selflessly taken a step
in the direction of jihad except with an Islamic state
as their ultimate goal.” It is inarguable that all or
mostly all of the Islamic fighting factions held a commitment to “an Islamic state as their ultimate goal.”
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But ISI made “the Islamic State” an immediately imposed reality; and that, by persons mostly unknown
except to a handful of self-selected insiders. For most,
the creation of an actual Islamic State required a great
deal more preparation, considering it was not to be
imposed by ruthless terrorism from above, but with
significant support from a considerable section of Ahlus Sunnah. But Dabiq views things otherwise. Those
unconvinced and resisting the ISI are not legitimately
disagreeing based on acceptable differences of interpretation (ijtihad); instead, they are accused of moral
turpitude or viciousness. All who opposed the state
are dastardly, not just disagreeable. All who fail to
pledge loyalty shall be killed. One is now not a Sunni
Muslim respected, admired, and consulted on matters as grave as declaring the rulership over all Muslims. No, one is evil with “corruption in their hearts,”
motivated by “pride and envy” and their attempts
“to beautify their apostasy,” and are driven by either
“deviant methodologies” or “corrupt desires for fame,
wealth, and power.”
Is there not a simpler explanation for opposition
and resistance to the ISI’s declaration of the Islamic
State? For example, ISI’s violence, coercion, treachery,
and terror; of its sectarian bloodbath targeting the lay
Shia; of intolerant and arrogant usurping of leadership prerogatives; of committing forbidden acts, and
prohibiting commanded acts; of the killing of sons and
the forced marriage of Sunni daughters; of the killing
of elders, scholars, women, children, worshippers in
mosques, passersby on streets; of the killing of nationalist insurgents, Islamist insurgents; or of slaughtering
innocent hostages like bleating sheep. None of these
reasons is cited in Dabiq for the emergence of revulsion,
and the eventual rejection and ejection of the ISI from
the lands of Ahl-us Sunnah. Instead, a likely projection
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by ISI onto others has occurred. And if one were to
impute this projection back onto the projectors—characterize the ISI itself using all of the pejoratives it has
used to describe others—perhaps one might be closer
to understanding how mythic projection can, in the
minds of the projector, trump self-evident facts.
2. Oh How Allah Tries His True Mujahidin!
The period from approximately late-2006 to 2010
was ISI’s self-created nadir. Marginalized, imploding,
hunted to extinction, evacuated from strongholds owing to its own will to power through terror and violence and ultra-sectarian brutality, this burning ember
would seek refuge from this storm.242 But for mythic
thinking, again, reality is otherwise:
Then Allah . . . tried the mujahidin as He had done
with His slaves before in Makkah (prior to the Hijrah),
Uhud (when the archer disobediently left their posts),
Hunayn (when the new Muslims were amazed by
their own numbers), and the Arabian Peninsula (during the Wars of Apostasy).
This is a test decreed by Allah . . . so He would see the
patient mujahidin and expel the weak-hearted from
their ranks, and thereby solidify the newborn Islamic
State and prepare it for greater responsibilities. As ashShafi’i [i.e., founder of classical Shafi’i school of Sunni
jurisprudence] . . . once said, ‘One’s authority will not
be consolidated except after overcoming tribulation.
[Fitnah]’ . . . During this period, the Islamic State was
forced to withdraw mostly into the desert regions of
al-Anbar, where its soldiers regrouped, planned and
trained. From the desert, they continued to carry out
attacks against the crusaders and the treacherous
apostates in coordination with operations, executed
by the underground units in urban areas.243
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3. Behold How All Pledged Bay’ah to Our New
Khalifa!
In Chapter 1, we learned that following the April
18, 2010, killing of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu
Omar al-Baghdadi (aka: Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar
al-Husayni al-Baghdadi), a secretive cabal led by
former Ba’athist Colonel Haji Bakr lobbied strenuously and also manipulated the vote for Abu Bakr alBaghdadi’s selection as new emir. The vote on the
Shura Council was 9 for, 2 against; and the Sharia
Council abstained. These are the facts. This lack of
consensus is passed over in Dabiq and only the final
result is described:
when Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Baghadadi . . .
gained shahadah alongside Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir
. . . the Islamic State did not waver, rather its leadership
unanimously pledged allegiance to Amirul-Mu’minin
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi . . . continuing upon the path
for a single Khilafah that unites the Ummah.244

4. Behold the Khilafa of Iraq and Al-Sham!
The Syrian opposition inspired by the “Arab
Spring” began peaceful protests against the 40-year
rule of the autocratic Assad dynasty beginning February-March 2011. On March 18, 2011, the regime’s
first shots were fired into crowds of unarmed protesters. Within 5 months, over 2000 had been killed or
wounded; nevertheless, the protests remained peaceful, gaining inspiration from the quickly unraveling
regime of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi.245 By
summer 2011, a then-unknown organization, Jabhat
al-Nusrah li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat
al-Jihad (Protection Front for the People of the Levant
by the Mujahadin of the Levant in the Battlefields of
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Jihad; heretofore, Jabhat al-Nusrah), had been sent to
Syria by ISI’s Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. On April
7, 2013, ISI Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Dawla Islamiya fi
al-Iraq wa al-Shaam (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh). Like the original ISI declaration, this ISIS declaration ferociously
recommenced the long-simmering Fitnah between ISI
and every other group, organization, and tendency.
In Dabiq’s inaugural issue, a very brief account of this
period between entry into Syria and the declaration of
ISIS is offered.
Then the event of Sham began to unfold [c. FebruaryMarch 2011] and the Islamic State quickly got involved,
answering the cries of the weak and oppressed Muslims by sending a mission from Iraq [c. Summer-2011],
to activate its units in Sham and later make the announcement of its official expansion [April 7, 2013].
Again, pride, envy, nationalism, and innovation, led to
events similar to those of Iraq [post-October 15, 2006].
New sahwat were formed with the exact same financial, political, and ‘scholarly’ support. They repeated
the mistakes of their predecessors in Iraq and decided
to enter into war with the Islamic State, but here Allah . . . blessed the mujahidin in a manner unique to
the lands of Sham, so that quickly Sahwah treachery
was exposed and destroyed. Then, by Allah’s grace,
the mujahidin gained control over territory larger than
many states claiming ‘legality’ today, lands formerly
under control of the historical Umawi khulafa’ of
Sham and ‘Abbasi khulafa’ of Iraq.246

Zarqawism again is here on full display. Again, we
are treated to the ISO’s sense of entitlement as Allah’s chosen to monopolize religio-political authority.
Again, it is the near enemy that is the focus of attack:
those Sunni Muslims considered insufficiently loyal
and subordinate to its command.
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Much had transformed that smoldering ember into
a terrorist juggernaut, however. Recall the reconstituting of its cadre by highly professional former Ba’athist
military and intelligence officers now in key leadership roles. Recall its successful suicide operations
freeing hundreds of high value detainees that would
later fill its ranks. Also, recall the opportunities that
were provided by dramatic developments in strategic
context, including the Syrian uprising and then-Iraqi
Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan alMaliki’s Iranian-backed sectarian persecution of Iraq’s
highly marginalized Sunnis.247 Also notable is the generalization of the word “Sahwah,”—initially wholly
referring to the Iraqi Sunni tribal “Awakening” councils—now used to refer to any and all opposition to
ISO, regardless of context.
Vitriolic, hyperbolic, deeply disrespectful denunciations by ISO of these various tendencies—in particular of AQO’s senior leadership and its appointed
emissaries charged with attempting to arbitrate these
differences on the basis of long-established Sunni juridical precedent—is characteristic of this period.248
However, the ISO’s vitriol goes beyond mere words,
as senior-level leaders in AQO-related organizations
were subjected to a murderous assassination campaign. Consider just the most notable examples: the
January 1, 2014, kidnapping and gruesome torture
and murder of Dr. Hussein al-Suleiman, a senior commander under Ahrar al-Sham Emir Hassan Abboud;
the February 23, 2014, assassination of AQO mediator
Abu Khalid al-Suri; the April 15, 2014, murders of alNusrah Sheikh Abu Muhammad Fatih, his wife, brother, and children; and the September 9, 2014, murders
of dozens of Ahrar al-Sham Leaders in a mass suicide
bombing, including Emir Abboud.249 This targeted
assassination was also accompanied by intra-jihadist
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warfare leading to hundreds and eventually thousands killed, and key territorial shifts and displacement.250 This raging fitnah would gather even greater
intensity with ISIS’s declaration of the Khilafa.
5. The Khalifa Has Returned!
We finally arrive at the time when Dabiq’s inaugural issue appears (July 4, 2014). It is on the heels of the
ISO’s blitzkrieg, resulting in its conquest of Iraq’s second most populous city, Mosul. With apparently unstoppable momentum, forces that had been hollowed
out by cronyism and corruption, and completely outgunned, rather than stand and fight, collapsed, cut,
and run. Sunni populations that were overrun had
to determine whether Maliki’s vindictive, revengeful
Shia rule was a lesser or greater evil than these charging fighters apparently committed to defending the
lives, honor, property, and security of Ahl-us Sunnah. It
is upon these victories sealed in blood, power, and terror, which in reality involved a systematic campaign
of subversion, assassination, and counter-intelligence,
i.e., “shaping operations” and “preparation of the battlefield,” that ISIS would proclaim its final phase, the
return of Khilafa:
Thereafter, the hopes of Khilafah became an undeniable reality, one that allowed no room for anyone
claiming any excuse to resist the authority of the
imam except to be dealt with by the decisive law of
Allah. The victories in Ninawa, al-Anbar, Salahuudin,
al-Khayr, al-Barakah, and elsewhere, all aided the
declaration made by the Islamic State on the first of
Ramadan 1435H [June 28, 2014], in which the Khilafah
was officially announced. This new condition opens
the path for the complete unification of all Muslim
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peoples and lands under the single authority of the
Khalifah [emphasis in original].251

Predictably, this would further intensify the fitnah, and
is evidenced by yet another round of ISO’s viciously
acrimonious charges, and those seeking to rebut them
but notably resisting the ISO’s takfiri arsenal and demonization techniques.252 It is also here that Dabiq portrays in its pages the fruits of consolidation (tamkin),
as it chronicles the transition it claims is occurring
from the ashes of terror, injury, chaos, collapse, and
mayhem, to the fruit of its own Islamic State.253
6. Long Live Khalifa Ibrahim! Pledge Bay’ah, or
Death!
There remains only a single act required of every
Muslim on Earth: an oath of loyalty pledged to their
new master. This act is also due from all who consider
themselves fighters in the path of Allah (Mujahidin).
But to give Caliph Ibrahim his moment in the sun, we
shall allow Dabiq to present Islam’s new self-appointed master in all of his glory.
It [This new condition] also emphasizes the necessity
for obeying the Messenger . . . in his order, ‘Whoever
comes to you while your condition is united behind
a single man, and intends to break your solidarity or
disrupt your unity, then kill him.’254 The obligation is
now clearer than ever before for all Muslims to raise
their voices and pledge their allegiance to Imam ulMuslimin and Amirul-Mu’minin—the Khalifah—Abu
Bakr al-Husayni al-Baghdadi (may Allah raise his allies and humiliate his enemies) . . . May Allah protect
this Khalifah state and continue guiding it until its legions fight the crusader armies who will gather near
Dabiq.255
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Appearing beneath this prophecy is a stylized picture of a stupendous army amassed on the plains of
Dabiq—that promised locale for the End Times mother
of all battles (Al-Malahim). And on an accompanying
page, three boys about 12 years old appear wearing
Maoist-type uniforms with IS patches on their sleeves,
with their index fingers pointed skyward in yet another IS media operation designed to inspire the love
of death, martyrdom, and paradise, in defense of
Allah’s chosen Khilafa.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT
POLICY AND STRATEGY
This book concludes by reporting its central findings and discerning their implications for current
USG counterterrorism policy and strategy.256 For the
purposes of clarity and brevity, the focus here shall
be on warranted conclusions based in previously discussed findings, unless deemed necessary or practicable for expository purposes. The present writer’s
central thesis is first reiterated. We then present chief
findings vis-à-vis two core areas of greatest present
interest: doctrine and strategy/terrorist modus operandi. We conclude by deducing their implications for
USG counterterrorism policy and strategy, and leader
development and education.
I. KEY FINDINGS
MACRO-LEVEL CONCLUSION
The present author’s primary thesis presented in
this book’s Introduction section appears supported by
the data presented herein. For convenience, this thesis
is reproduced below:
AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding
interests of the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us-Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons. It is the
argument of this book, however, that grounds exist
for why this need not be the case. AQO and ISO may
be conceived in the theology they themselves profess,
as two deviant organizations guilty of committing
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major sins and besmirching the Islamic Call.257 I believe
a more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction
of each entity is warranted. It will be for the world’s
Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah) to make that determination; to define for themselves where the bounds
of faith, godly fear and piety (taqwa), and righteous
conduct begin and end; and who may or may not legitimately claim to speak in their name [emphasis in
original].258

Our focus here is on substantiating the primary claim
of greatest interest to delegitimizing AQO and ISO in
the eyes of not just Muslims and non-Muslims generally, but also deeply observant Islamist, Salafist, and
Salafi-Jihadi adherents, namely from the previous
quote: “AQO and ISO may be conceived as . . . two deviant organizations guilty of committing major sins
and besmirching the Islamic Call [emphasis added].”
It is essential, we believe, to view AQO and ISO
as deviant organizations, rather than as some have
charged, in relation to ISO in particular for example,
as “non-Muslim” or “having nothing to do with Islam.” That is understandable, but it is an error. It is
like saying that a human being, guilty of committing
reprehensible and truly repugnant acts—say viciously
attacking an innocent bystander, or intentionally murdering or raping or pillaging or violently assaulting
others—is no longer a human being. They are human
and that is not at issue. What is at issue is that they
have egregiously violated basic moral codes that govern human life, society, and interpersonal interaction
to such an extent that we deem them extremely aberrant, deviant individuals. If religiously conceived,
these deviant acts are sins. Within Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and arguably every genuine contemporary faith, acts that intentionally violate the fundamental integrity of innocent human lives and souls
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are deemed the greatest of all sins, excepting idolatry.
If non-religiously conceived, these are deemed egregious moral deviations whose commission justifies
punishment using our harshest methods. No human
society could last long that would not view ISO’s acts
and perpetrators as enemies of a civilized human
existence. Our sensibilities, customs, and laws—religious and secular—regard such deviant behavior as
unacceptable. The only question remaining is in what
proportions justice and mercy shall be applied to their
punishment.
A second reason to avoid the label “non-Muslim,”
no matter how laudable the motive, is that unlike the
ISO, the United States should never equate sinning,
no matter how grave, with disbelief. This is the core
equation underlying virtually every takfiri terrorist
modus operandi. A sinner is not a disbeliever; however, they are believers in violation of their own moral
code.259 Even the greatest of sins, excepting disbelief
itself, does not remove one from a faith community.
Its secular counterpart is the commission of a grave,
felonious, and even heinous act. Certain liberties and
privileges may be revoked; for example, the franchise.
But even the felon remains a citizen, and that is because he did not forfeit citizenship but only those
liberties and privileges a citizens enjoys. On the other
hand, treason is to citizenship what infidelity is to
faith: the ultimate act of disavowal and that single
act of disloyalty for which one cannot, and will not,
be permitted to remain a member of a community—
whether a community of God fearers or of loyal and
patriotic citizens.
AQO and ISO stand condemned of extreme deviance from Ahl-us Sunnah’s own self-understanding
and expectations regarding the rudiments of religiosity, morality, legality, and humanity.260 This is less
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true of the ultimate end state they seek—the Righteous Caliphate—though for the vast majority this remains a distant ideal—than for their terrorist methods
and means. AQO’s and ISO’s most important judge is
ironically, yet predictably, the Sunni creed and community (Ahl-us Sunnah) they now stand of having
warred against, and besmirched. Let us now summarize the chief findings supporting this macro-level
thesis/conclusion.
BELIEF-SYSTEMS, WORLDVIEWS, DOCTRINES,
CREEDS
The Al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim Qa’idat
al-Jihad).
The mature AQO doctrine is exemplified in bin
Ladenism, and is characterized by a unique mixture
of profound ignorance, delusion, resentment, and
hubris, which from the early-1990s innovated an unprecedented “Far Enemy” doctrine manifest in an actual declaration of war against Americans, both military and civilian, calling for their murder wherever
they could be found. Bin Ladenism rests on a deeply
flawed analogy—that of the United States and the
former USSR—leading its followers to believe, without evidence, that sustained direct terrorist attacks
against U.S. citizens and government entities would
generate economic exhaustion leading either to collapse or at least withdraw from the Arab Middle East.
This false analogy was rooted in bin Laden’s deeply
misinformed conception of American society, culture,
economics, government, and most consequentially,
the civil society foundations of enduring American
power.
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The AQO’s signature “Far Enemy” doctrine has no
precedent in Islam. It was never embraced by “Near
Enemy” advocates: the vast majority of existing Islamist insurgent activities. Attacking the “original
Kufr” in this way was roundly criticized even by bonafide unrepentant Salafi-Jihadists as illegal, criminal,
and imprudent. 9/11 was itself AQO’s first and last
great “one-off” based in treachery, criminality, and the
USG’s unpreparedness for that plot’s unprecedented
use of American civil aviation as a weapon of mass
destruction. Bin Laden was deeply criticized from
within his own ranks for having caused the practical
extinction of a decade’s long effort to recruit, train,
deploy, and create a global Sunni jihadist movement.
AQO’s most lethal affiliate, AQAP, has amended
but not ended classical bin Ladenism. There is no discernible difference from classical bin Ladenism as doctrine, and its accompanying “Far Enemy” economic
attrition conception of collapsing the American economy and forcing its withdrawal from Islamic lands.
The Islamic State Organization (Tanzim al-Dawla
al-Islamiyya).
The ISO doctrine is based in an apocalyptic, ultra-conservative, ultra-sectarian, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism. Four doctrines uniquely characterize this
deviance generally and in relation to AQO’s species
of Sunni global jihadism: apocalyptic and eschatological beliefs informing its sense of temporality
and morality; proclaiming the mass annihilation of
all Shia Muslims, including lay Shia; prioritizing the
“Nearest” and “Near Enemies,” and postponement
of jihad against the “original Kufr”; and, its belief
in its right to monopolize and immediately declare
the Islamic State/Caliphate. These key elements of
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ISO’s worldview and doctrine place it on the remote
fringes, not just within Sunni Islam generally, but
also among the vast majority of Sunni global jihadist
organizations.261
STRATEGIES AND TERRORIST MODUS
OPERANDI.
The al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim Qa’idat alJihad).
Bin Ladenism is based in a sequenced strategy that
eventually culminates in the restoration of a Sunni Caliphate over historic Sunni lands. Strategy begins with
the formation of a military base organization (Tanzim
Qa’idat al-Jihad) or “base organization of the jihad.”
With this, AQO carefully orchestrates simultaneous
mass-casualty terrorist attacks directed at “the head of
the snake” or the “base of the tree,” two of bin Laden’s
favorite metaphors. Though earlier attacks presaged
this phase, its spectacular debut was the 1998 mass casualty terrorist attacks on the American embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar as-Salaam, Tanzania. Subsequent attacks, culminating in and subsequent to 9/11,
were also orchestrated.
Before bin Ladenism, the classical Qa’idat al-Jihad
was conceived as an Islamic foreign legion or “Islamic
Internationale,” designed to transform local insurgencies into globalized transnational insurgencies. The
“Crusader-Zionist” enemy had not yet emerged as the
demonized “other,” and AQO viewed itself as a kind
of central command and headquarters for recruiting,
indoctrinating, training, and deploying its own operatives throughout various emergent theaters of jihad. It
is possible that with the practical demise of bin Ladenism, the AQO original conception will be undergoing
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a revival in such places as Syria, Yemen, Libya, and
Tunisia.
AQO’s affiliate AQAP, while maintaining deep
doctrinal affinities to AQO Central, has substantially
departed in practice from the classic Bin Ladenist, topdown model for carefully planned, long-term, highvisibility, strategically symbolic “Far Enemy” targeting. AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi is based in what
it calls “lone jihad” or the “lone mujahid” strategy. In
its essence, it combines media and non-media terrorist
operations to incite, galvanize, mobilize, train, and deploy individual persons—glorified in its media operations as “lone mujahids” whose martyrdom (Shuhada)
destines them for the highest reaches of Paradise—to
commit for what the vast majority of Muslims consider forbidden terrorist acts: sabotage, targeted assassination, mass arson, mass-casualty bombings,
and a vast array of highly deviant, abominable acts
generally classified within religious law as major sins
and crimes, and within secular law, intentional acts of
malicious, felonious criminal conduct.
Islamic State Organization (Tanzim al-Dawla
al-Islamiyya).
The ISO’s terrorist modus operandi is carefully
outlined in its inaugural online publication Dabiq, and
comprises five key stages:
1. Emigration from a hostile milieu to one where
sanctuary exists or can be created through terrorist acts (Hijra);
2. Creation of the nucleus jihadist organization
(Jama’ah);
3. Destabilization of the existing “infidel” regime
through inflicting mass injury (Nikayah) even-
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tuating in the collapse of existing authority,
and thereby fomenting chaos, and mayhem
(Tawahhush);
4. Creation and consolidation of a territory,
resources, and base accompanied with the
immediate declaration of the Islamic State
(Tamkin); and,
5. Further consolidation expansion of the Islamic
State with the immediate declaration of the
Caliphate (Khilafa).
This ideal five-stage blueprint for restoring the Caliphate (Khilafa) was not followed in practice, however. The very nature of the ISO as an ultra-conservative,
ultra-sectarian, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi organization
led it to hereticize (takfir) virtually all other organizations, tendencies, groups, and movements. As a result,
a stage not specified in their ideal model—the stage
of Fitnah (conflict, strife)—has accompanied ISO from
its beginnings in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi through each
of its metamorphoses. The ISO’s extremism in takfir
is considered extremely deviant within Sunni Islam,
and also again, among virtually every armed Sunni
Islamic organization.262
The ISO’s apocalypticism, anti-Shia extermination,
“Nearest Enemy” and “Near Enemy,” and “Caliphate Now!” doctrines would be little more than a hindrance were these not combined with two additional
factors. First, its creation of a fearsome, highly professional, military leadership cadre comprised of former
Ba’athist military and intelligence officers whose tactics, techniques, and procedures mimic those of totalitarian Soviet and Nazi-era secret police. Second,
the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former
Prime Minister al-Maliki, in the context of a dramatically changed regional dynamic enervated by the
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“Arab Spring,” precipitating deep alienation among
Iraq’s embattled and marginalized Sunnis, and thus
enhancing the ISO’s short-term credibility as their rescuers and defenders.
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT
POLICY AND STRATEGIES
Let us now consider the implications of AQO’s
and ISO’s history, doctrine, and modus operandi for
current USG policies and strategies designed to permanently defeat these terrorist entities. As in previous chapters, we shall treat each organization in
succession.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING USG POLICY
AND STRATEGY TO PERMANENTLY DEFEAT
AQO AND ITS AFFILIATES
The present USG policy is to disrupt, dismantle,
and ultimately defeat AQO, its affiliates, associated
movements, and those inspired by its doctrine.263 This
policy was first declared soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and has been reiterated and sharpened in
subsequent years.264 The strategy designed to realize that policy has also been clearly established and
is centered on the achievement of three key strategic
objectives: attacking and destroying the existing AQO
network, countering radicalization and recruitment
to that network, and protecting the U.S. homeland
against terrorist attacks.265 As earlier stated, the first
and third of these objectives has been largely attained,
while the second continues to present formidable
challenges. Let us briefly describe the implications of
our chief findings for policy and these three strategic
objectives, and also describe the chief instruments of
national power required to realize these.
Existing U.S. policy has been largely effective in
disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating
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the AQO terrorist entity and accomplishing its three
key strategic objectives. This applies especially to effectively countering the mature Bin Ladenist doctrine
and strategy of executing highly symbolic, simultaneous mass-casualty terrorist attacks on American soil.
Let us consider how the chief instruments of national
power—diplomatic, informational, cyber, economic,
financial, intelligence, legal, and military (DICEFILM)—have been wielded to accomplish this.266
Following bin Laden’s mid-1990s debut as selfprofessed enemy of the United States—evidenced in
his 1996 declaration of war, series of high-profile interviews, and formal issuance of the 1998 fatwa—his
status changed from that of a little-known wealthy
Saudi associated with the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, to
a high-profile clear and present danger to American
citizens and interests. The 1998 East Africa embassy
bombings clarified any doubts that USG analysts may
have had about bin Laden’s intentions and lethality.
Diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, legal,
and to a much lesser extent military instruments, were
used from 1998 to the 9/11 attacks to attempt to persuade then ruling emir of the Afghan Taliban Mullah
Omar, on the basis of extensive and incontrovertible
evidence, to extradite Osama bin Laden to the United
States to stand trial for the embassy bombings.267 Mullah Omar’s stubborn refusal to do so—whether on
grounds of affinity with a brother Muslim, duty owed
a person granted sanctuary and hospitality under the
Pashtun code, or idiosyncratic motives—led former
President George W. Bush to issue his final ultimatum
in his September 20, 2001, Address to the Joint Session of Congress: that Omar’s failure to extradite bin
Laden would lead him and the Taliban to share bin
Laden’s fate.
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9/11 dramatically changed the mix of instruments
of national power that would be used to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat AQO. While those earlier instruments remained significant, others central
to an invasion to overthrow the Taliban regime and
to destroy AQO’s terrorist capabilities were soon in
play. Counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and unconventional warfare, using all necessary means, were
pursued across the relevant theaters of operation. The
legal instrument (through the United Nations Security
Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO],
and U.S. legal codes) was employed to classify and
thereby outlaw foreign terrorist organizations, foreign
terrorists, terrorist travel, finances, weapons flows,
and terrorist sanctuaries. The USG employed diplomatic, economic, and military instruments to create
international coalitions, create incentives for cooperation and disincentives for non-cooperation, and hunt
down high value targets in a lethal and systematic
campaign employing elite Special Operations Command forces and the Intelligence Community (IC).
On the American home front, the intelligence and
legal instruments, most notably the Department of
Justice (DoJ) and its Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), along with key partners such as the New York
Police Department (NYPD) and later the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), would protect against
and prepare for possible mass casualty attacks. Hardening civil aviation and transportation more broadly;
creating tamper-proof identification; developing intelligence assets and informants that could monitor
potential terrorist organizations; and restricting and
preventing terrorist travel all had profound effects.268
It is our belief that our findings have few implications for existing USG policy vis-à-vis classic bin
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Ladenism. The net result of this sustained assault on
AQO was the practical decimation of that organization and that classic terrorist modus operandi responsible for organizing and executing bin Ladenism’s
classic “Far Enemy” spectacular mass-casualty terrorist attacks. What arose in its wake, however—though
AQO’s classic “Far Enemy” attacks must still be countered269—was an alternative “lone mujahid” terrorist
modus operandi currently employed by AQO’s most
lethal affiliate, AQAP.
As noted earlier, AQAP’s central strategic focus
at present is inciting and recruiting random “homebased” and “home-grown” persons willing to plan,
train for, and successfully execute felonious criminal
terrorist acts on American soil. Delusionally believed
to affect actual American economic activity or power,
its principal consequence lay rather in successfully inspiring a paltry number of loners and sometimes clusters to carry out murderous attacks.270
The USG has, over the past 5 years or so, rebalanced its strategy and chosen instruments of national
power to address this AQAP “lone jihad” strategy.
This involves a far greater emphasis on intelligence
and legal instruments. It also has led to the need to
more forcefully respond to and counter AQAP’s media operations, now deemed a critical medium for
connecting AQAP media operatives in the cyber and
electromagnetic spectrums, with potential individual
recruits apprised of AQAP’s encryption software,
downloading incitement media, terror craft, and the
broader doctrinal beliefs espoused. The lethal targeting of senior AQAP communications operatives such
as Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan is key. The interagency initiative, Center for Strategic Counterterrorist
Communications (CSCC), begun in 2011, pioneered
counter-AQO media warfare; and through its “Think
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Again Turn Away” campaign, deliberately focused its
messengers, messages, and media to target key audiences believed to be most susceptible to AQO’s and
AQAP’s inspirational terrorist media operations. A
more sustained emphasis on bottom-up buy-in, selfmonitoring and policing, and enhancing community
trust and resilience, now compliments the cyber, informational, and legal instruments most critical to effective domestic counterterrorist operations.271
It is advisable that the USG continue this present
line of effort, i.e., encouraging individual behavioral
dissuasion, discouragement, and disengagement from
terrorism,272 using these existing instruments of national power.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING USG POLICY
AND STRATEGY TO PERMANENTLY DEFEAT
THE ISO
The current declared USG policy is to degrade and
permanently defeat the ISO.273 USG officials believe
this can only be achieved through accomplishing defined tasks across key lines of effort (LOEs). Secretary
of Defense Ashton Carter, and former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General (Retired) Martin E.
Dempsey, identified nine key LOEs:
1. Inclusive effective governance;
2. Military-led denial of sanctuary;
3. Military-led building of partner capacity;
4. Enhancing intelligence collection;
5. Disrupting finances;
6. Countering messaging;
7. Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters;
8. Providing humanitarian support to displaced
and vulnerable persons; and,
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9. Disruption of terrorist threats to the homeland.274
General Ret. John Allen, former special Presidential
Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, identifies five LOEs:
1. Denial of sanctuary and security force assistance;
2. Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters;
3. Disrupting local and international financial
channels;
4. Providing humanitarian relief and stabilization
support; and,
5. Counter-messaging or defeating Daesch as an
idea.275
Whether described as five or nine LOEs, each proposal
envisions a holistic long-term Coalition effort characterized by deep awareness of the political essence of
insurgency and the demand that the military instrument be carefully integrated as one vital but insufficient instrument/means of national power wielded to
defeat the ISO. Each also envisions a strong and effective role for a counterterrorist communications strategy designed in particular not only to exploit a critical
requirement/vulnerability of the ISO—foreign fighter
recruitment—but also for delegitimizing home-based
terrorist activities. Recent comprehensive reviews of
USG and Coalition efforts to date have further iterated
the vital importance of fully sourcing, expediting, and
more aggressively countering ISO along these LOEs.276
Findings based in the author’s examination of the
ISOs doctrinal and strategic concepts appear to substantially support current USG policy and strategy,
though recommendations are suggested by the pres-
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ent author to address the specific “stateness” dimension of ISO. These LOEs may be neatly categorized
into three distinct clusters that correspond to the three
key strategic objectives earlier identified as key to antiAQO strategy: attacking and destroying the terrorist
network, preventing radicalization (i.e., encouraging
behavioral disengagement from) and recruitment to
terrorism, and protecting against and preparing the
U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks.277 The third strategic objective is straightforward and we here examine the first two in greater detail.
1. Attacking and destroying the ISO: (military):
military-led denial of sanctuary and building
partner capacity; (intelligence): enhancing intelligence collection; (financial, legal): disrupting local and international financial channels;
(legal, cyber, informational): disrupting the
flow of foreign fighters.
2. Encouraging behavioral disengagement from
ISO terrorism: (cyber, informational): countermessaging or defeating ISO as an idea.
3. Preventing against and preparing for ISO terrorist attacks: (intelligence, legal): disruption
of terrorist threats to the homeland.
Let us examine these first two strategic objectives
in more detail. The first strategic objective, attacking
and destroying the ISO, is mostly well-supported by
its relevant LOEs and those instruments of national
power required for their realization. For example, denial of sanctuary, disrupting finances,278 and disrupting foreign fighters279 directly addresses the spatial,
monetary, and kinetic resources essential to recruit183

ing, training, fielding, furnishing, and deploying terrorist operatives. The critical roles of U.S. airpower280
and building partner-capacity are key to preventing additional ISO offensive gains, and potentially a
non-U.S. indigenous capacity for sustained counteroffensive action. Though not mentioned in the military LOEs, one must also include the present activities
of JSOC and CIA operatives methodically hunting ,
neutralizing, or capturing key leadership and other
ISO high value targets,281 and meticulously pursuing
intelligence-driven, high-tempo find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) operations.282
Reports suggest that from January through early-June
2016 alone, “more than 120 Islamic State leaders, commanders, propagandists, recruiters and other so-called
high-value individuals” have been killed.283 Some of
the most notable include:
• Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili (aka:
Abu Omar al-Shishani), ISO’s “minister of war”
(March 2016).284
• Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli (aka: Haji
Iman), ISO’s second-in-command and major
operational planner and organizer, and Minister of Finance (March 2016).285
• Abu al-Haijaa al-Tunisi, senior ISO military
leader in Aleppo area (March 2016).286
• Shaker Wahib al-Fahdawi al-Dulaimi (aka: Abu
Waheeb), ISO military emir for Anbar province
(May 2016).287
Several key high value targets have also been killed
since, among them:
• Basim Muhammad Ahmad Sultan al-Bajari,
ISO deputy minister of war (June 25, 2016).288
• Hatim Talib al-Hamduni, ISO military commander (June 25, 2016).289
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• Saad Emarati, ISO in Afghanistan/Pakistan region, founder and senior military leader (July
2016).290
• Hafez Sayed, senior ISO commander in Afghanistan (July 26, 2016).291
• Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, ISO senior spokesman, propagandist, external operations chief, strategist (August 30, 2016).292
• Abu-Muhammad Furqan, ISO Chief of Media
Operations (September 7, 2016).293
Moreover, focus has been placed on silently decimating the ranks of nearly 40 “external operations leaders,
planners, and facilitators” conducting external terrorist operations directed against Coalition and other allied countries,294 and also the JSOC-led capture of key
operatives and critical intelligence. For example, four
to seven terabytes of critical data contained on laptop
computers, cell phones, and other sources detailing
ISO’s financial, logistical, and leadership operations
was recovered by a JSOC-led operation designed to
capture senior ISO financial official Abu Sayyaf. Additional critical information was elicited from the
3-month interrogation of his wife, Umm Sayyaf.295 The
capture and interrogation of another ISO senior operative, Sulayman Dawud al-Bakkar (aka: Suleiman
Daoud al-Afari)—a key operative in ISO’s chemical
weapons program—has led to far greater knowledge
of this program, including how the group weaponized
sulfur mustard and loaded it onto artillery shells, and
also facilitated target selection used to attack and destroy existing manufacturing sites and tactical units.296
USG shaping operations now in progress in Mosul led
to intelligence facilitating what is described as “one of
the largest airstrikes yet on an Islamic State car bomb
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factory. . . hitting a sprawling compound south of Mosul.”297 The recent liberation of the key strategic northern Syrian town of Manbij contributed a huge trove of
vital intelligence that further fed this F3EAD cycle.298
Most recently, in the wake of Secretary of Defense
Ashton Carter’s specific demands, the USG has tasked
the U.S. Cyber Command to embark on a systematic
campaign of publicly acknowledged offensive cyberattacks directed at disrupting, degrading, and dissembling ISO’s command and control.299
The previously mentioned LOEs, however, insufficiently recognize that the ISO is not just a terrorist network or organization with sanctuary, but is endeavoring to build and sustain a state-centered terrorist
enterprise. Though the ISO is a criminal, exploitative,
coercive, proto-police-state neither representative nor
supported by the vast majority of Sunnis who suffer
its rule, it is in de-facto control of territory, resources,
persons, substantial infrastructure, and various means
of extracting monies. It is for this reason that traditional counterterrorism strategies require supplementing.
Suggestive candidates include unconventional warfare300 developed with a broader policy objective of
short-term containment and a final objective of permanent defeat and destruction.301
ISO is an occupying power lacking authority, legitimacy, and support from the vast majority of persons residing in its conquered territories. It has much
in common with a Ba’athist totalitarian police state
and virtually nothing in common with the sovereign
that most persons, if able to determine their own
fate, would choose. Brutal terror, murder, extortion,
coercion, and assassination do not furnish the foundations of a state bound to last.302 Given these facts,
which resemble those applicable to Communist and
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Fascist-conquered Europe, it is highly probable that
an unconventional warfare strategy can pay large
dividends. It is true that resistance to occupation is
mercilessly punished through exemplary crucifixions
and beheadings, and so this is a project that requires a
broadened scope and longer time-frame. Much can be
done to sever essential logistical links to the occupying
ISO terrorist State, and many of the LOEs designed to
repress terrorist networks can be modified to address
states.303
The present author therefore agrees with those
analysts who have recently suggested the prudence
of a short-term containment-to-roll-back strategy to
address ISO’s expansionist designs.304
The second strategic objective—encouraging behavioral disengagement from ISO terrorism—exploits
a key ISO critical vulnerability: the need for a steady
supply of persons willing to either travel to Syria and
assist ISIS’s terrorist State, or—as is increasingly likely—to remain in one’s own homeland and mercilessly
and brutally murder anyone within one’s potential
reach. This message of: “No More Hijra! Stay Home
and Mercilessly Slaughter Your Infidel Neighbor!”
has become far more prevalent following the USG’s
August 7, 2014, commencement of aerial bombing to
prevent a potential genocidal slaughter of the Yezidi
ethno-religious minority, and also an ISO offensive on
the key provincial city of Arbil.305
ISO’s terrorist media operations, as noted by scores
of analysts, surpass those of any terrorist organization
on record.306 Vastly eclipsing classical bin Ladenism
or AQO’s relatively media-savvy affiliate AQAP, the
ISO employs cutting edge film and editing techniques
to produce high-quality, action-packed, dramaticallycompelling videos; operates a virtual social media
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army operating across a range of platforms, including
Twitter and Instagram to broadcast tens of thousands
of messages and images per day; and has employed a
cadre of groomers whose sole mission is to target and
recruit individuals from abroad to either emigrate to
Syria and remain, or increasingly more likely, to plan
and execute home-based terrorist attacks.307
ISO’s juggernaut has finally been facing a far stiffer
wind, however,308 and its media operations have forced
several nations and organizations to develop effective
campaigns designed to counter ISO’s siren song and
effectively encourage behavioral disengagement from
ISO’s terrorist enterprise.309 Leaving terrorism behind,
being based on deeply personal, psychological realities, has now replaced a rationalistically conceived
“de-radicalization” process as the more effective approach to detaching human lives and souls from ISO’s
terrorist enterprise. Though it has taken time to adapt,
a coterie of media operatives is now busy developing
tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter those
ISO has to date used with great effect.310 Other efforts
include targeted removal and exploiting ISO’s online
presence to develop actionable intelligence on ISO’s
operatives and even military operations.311
A notable evolution in USG counter-ISO information operations has been effected that substantially
extends beyond the CSCC’s earlier tactics, techniques,
and procedures directed exclusively at AQO/AQAP.
The CSCC shifted from countering AQAP’s “lone mujahid” terrorism to exclusively focusing on the ISO,312
and has used ISO defectors’ compelling testimony313
in a series of videos that employ highly-compelling
techniques to drive home, rationally and emotionally, several reasons to disengage from terrorism; for
example: observed hypocrisy, deceit, cruelty, murder,
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dishonor, loneliness, broken promises, missed love
one’s, and wasted and destroyed lives.314 The CSCC’s
“Think Again Turn Away” campaign, while laudable,
has recently ceased in its present form, and counterISO information operations reorganized to more effectively pursue and realize the Obama administration’s
demand for a more nimble, sophisticated, and effective counter-ISO posture in the cyber domain.315
Concluding Observation: What is the Difference
between “Defeat,” and “Permanent Defeat” of the
ISO “Idea”?
All LOEs, except one, have now been examined.
We have saved the most important for last. For in a
very real sense it is the beginning and the end of the
ISO story. This LOE is described earlier by the two
senior-most USG officials, below the Commander-inChief, charged with overseeing the nation’s armed
forces. It is inclusive effective governance. It was
said earlier by the present author when examining the
ISO’s doctrine that:
The ISO’s apocalypticism, anti-Shia extermination,
‘Nearest Enemy’ and ‘Near Enemy,’ and “Caliphate
Now!” doctrines would be little more than hindrance
were these not combined with two additional factors.
First, its creation of a fearsome, highly professional,
military leadership cadre comprised of former Ba’athist
military and intelligence officers whose tactics, techniques, and procedures mimic those of totalitarian
Soviet and Nazi-era secret police. Second, the revengeful
anti-Sunni policies pursued by former Prime Minister alMaliki, in the context of a dramatically changed regional
dynamic enervated by the ‘Arab Spring,’ precipitating deep
alienation among Iraq’s embattled and marginalized Sun-
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nis, and thus enhancing the ISO’s short-term credibility as
their rescuers and defenders [italics added].316

It is this second point that is of grave concern here. If
it was willing to employ the means required, the USG
could temporarily defeat ISO within a brief period.
This can be done; it is not beyond U.S. means. Our
reluctance to do so is based in a hard-earned wisdom,
one bathed in the blood and treasure of America, its
allies, and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and now
Syrians. This simple, hard-won truth is that every
genuine insurgency, in this case the Sunni insurgency,
is at heart a political struggle. ISO was able to opportunistically and ruthlessly exploit current Sunni
disenchantment, disfranchisement, and a revengeful
Iranian-backed al-Maliki regime that broke promises
and delivered repression, exclusion, and despair. The
permanent defeat of the ISO idea will only occur when
Iraqis make the choice to create a new social compact
in which its Sunni citizens are respected, represented,
and protected.317
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are suggested to
further strengthen existing policy, strategy, and professional leader education.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SENIOR MILITARY
LEADERS, PLANNERS, AND STRATEGISTS
Two classes of recommendations are suggested: one is doctrine-independent, and the second is
doctrine-dependent.
Doctrine-Independent Recommendations.
By “doctrine independent,” the recommendations
are meant to hold regardless of the worldview, creed,
and doctrine of one’s adversary. It is likely that the
vast majority of relevant recommendations fall into
this category. Terrorism, as earlier described, is a
distinct method. Combating terrorism (CbT), which
combines counterterrorism (CT) and anti-terrorism
(AT), demands knowledge of the method of terror,
regardless of the substantive presuppositions of the
terrorist doctrine. The author’s Terrorist Quadrangle
Analysis (TQA) is recommended, however, as a heuristic for conceptualizing and countering the terrorist
enterprise and modus operandi. It facilitates ready
visualization of its four key inter-related dimensions,
and thereby the clarification of critical requirements,
critical vulnerabilities, and opportunities.
Irregular warfare (IW), most notably unconventional warfare (UW) and counterinsurgency (COIN),
regardless of specific adversarial worldview and doctrine, adeptly attack adversarial states and insurgents.
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U.S. military leadership has for nearly a decade been
crystal clear about how to degrade, defeat, and destroy the ISO modus operandi.318 It is not knowledge
but the mangled, compromised political dynamics of
the present Iraqi state that have limited its effectiveness. The present book offers no greater clarity than
that already possessed by the USG’s highly competent
leadership now possessed of a realistic policy, strategy, and its essential LOEs.
Doctrine-Dependent Recommendations.
Islam, a major world religion, is the third of three
great faiths whose eponymous ancestor Abraham is
considered the superlative exemplar of one who forsook all, including the unimaginable, his firstborn son,
to worship God. Islamic orthodoxy presumes man by
nature is a born monotheist (fitra) endowed by the Creator with the pure knowledge of all worshipful practices demanded of God’s slave. The Arabic word for
God (or better, “the God”) is “Allah” (al-ilah). “Allah
is the Greatest” (Allahu-akhbar) is for non-Muslims recognizable only as the battle cry of criminal and sinful
mass murderers who profess to realize Allah’s Divine
will by murdering in cold blood. This is a great travesty and predicament now facing potentially billions
of persons—Muslim and non-Muslim—who must on
the grounds of Islam itself answer these perpetrators
and criminal masterminds and assist their utter defeat. Fortunately, in the present author’s view, Islam
does amply provide without question the answers
necessary.
This does not demand that one deny that violence
or religiously-inspired warfare has accompanied Islam’s rise. In earlier writings, the present author has
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insisted that a proper and effective answer to countering terrorism conducted in the name of Sunni Islam
cannot honestly, and should not in practice be based,
in denying that the military jihad remains for observant orthodox militant Sunni Muslims a superlative
religious obligation binding until the Day of Final
Judgment.319 Having conceded this “jihad-realist”
premise, however, rather than a slippery slope authorizing further AQO and ISO terrorism, one can and
should be led to the exact opposite conclusion. The
military jihad, even if it is an offensive jihad carried
out to raise Allah’s Word supreme, is governed by a
strict jurisprudence rooted in core religious principles
and values that amounts to an Islamic variant of international law. The present author has previously illustrated how this jurisprudence of lawful jihad may
be used to great effect to attack AQO’s terrorist modus
operandi.320 A brief but pointed critique of ISO has also
been penned.321 It is highly recommended that senior
military leaders, planners, and strategists fully comprehend this jurisprudence of lawful military jihad,
and how key dissident and non-dissident orthodox
Sunni scholars may be leveraged to categorically condemn and proscribe AQO and ISO terrorism committed in the name of Sunni Islam.322
AQO and ISO are extreme deviant criminal outliers within the Sunni Islamic spectrum. Their marginalization ensures their eventual implosion. The vast
majority of Sunni Muslims ascribe neither to the ends
they seek—a supranational Caliphate governed by
medieval Sharia—nor to the means they use. Permanently prying these parasitic organizations away from
their healthy hosts is best achieved by strengthening
the host societies, i.e., creating viable, functional, representative polities capable of protecting populations,
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resolving internal divides, and delivering essential
services. AQO cannot survive if its claim to defend
against a supposed “Crusader War Against Islam”
rings insincere, incredible, and hollow. Its three futures appear to be either evisceration at the hands of
the USG’s lethal campaign to destroy this entity and its
leadership; criminal reorientation into “lone mujahid”
anarchistic-like small-scale terrorist attacks on defenseless populations, Muslim and non-Muslim; and
what may turn out to be its last lifeline, a long-term
reinvention of AQO as secretly-embedded insurgents
within nationalist-territorial Islamist fronts focused
not on attacking the “Far Enemy,” but on transforming “Near Enemy” regimes into Sharia-based states
(e.g. Syria, Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia).323
The ISO based in four signature premises—apocalypticism, genocidal anti-Shi’ism, Caliphalism, and
“Near Enemy” obsession—provide, despite alarmist interpretations now widely in vogue, a far easier
target for near-term elimination. ISO is essentially an
ultra-sectarian mass-murdering terrorist army whose
wealth, social media sophistication, and recent territorial conquests have led many to mistake a mouse
for a lion, and a molehill for a mountain. This ferocity, lethality, brutality, coercion, and police-state sophistication of former Ba’athist officers leading an
apocalyptically-inclined ultra-sectarian extremely deviant organization, has no base and no future in the
world of actually existing Sunni Islam. Mass murder,
threatened and actual genocidal intention, criminal
extortion, ransoming, theft, despotism, tyranny, and
hubris have led the ISO to become a permanent target of virtually every nation and people who shall
ensure its relatively swift destruction. ISO is at the
time of this writing on the strategic defensive.324 ISO
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defeats in Kobani (January 2015), Shadadi (February
2015), Tikrit (March 2015), Baiji (October 2015), Ramadi (December 2015),325 Fallujah (June 2016), Manbij,
Syria (August 2016), Jarablus, Syria (September 2016),
and Sirte, Libya (August/September 2016),326 coupled
with the apparent momentum across a range of other
ISO strongholds, provide key evidence confirming
ISO’s loss of momentum, territory, and battlefield initiative.327 ISO’s strategic defensive posture is now also
evident not only in its brutally vicious tactics directed
at retaining physical terrain and population control,328
but also tactically as it shifts like its predecessor AQI
when losing ground, toward increased emphasis on
high-visibility mass-casualty terrorist attacks.329
The permanent destruction of ISO requires, as
earlier stated, resolution of the intra-Islamic sectarian divide among Sunni and Shia Muslims,330 though
ISO’s targeting of even lay Shia creates the potential
for Sunni-Shia cooperation to prevent this murderous
result. Strategic patience will pay off, and it is highly
recommended that focus also be placed on preparing
for and preventing against ISO’s potential to wreak
massive destruction in the process of its inevitable
defeat.331
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEADER
DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION
The present author presumes that highly competent professionals are already effectively educating
leaders to engage these two terrorist adversaries.
However, in conclusion, we here offer a few reminders or perhaps further extrapolations on points earlier
made. It is highly recommended that leaders acquire
a deepened knowledge of Islam: its essential religious core; key facts of history and evolution; and a
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clear comprehension of the contemporary spectrum
of Islamic activism, including the varieties of political Islam—violent and non-violent—that now and
into the foreseeable future shall also play their role in
shaping the world’s sociopolitical and sociocultural
life. Having a deepened knowledge and genuine respect for this Abrahamic-derived faith, one will also
discover why the vast majority of Muslims can easily
and justifiably disassociate AQO and ISO terrorism
from this faith. The criminal essence of terrorism—
treachery, deceit, murder, creating insecurity, dread,
fear, horror, and calamity—is so far from the essential religious core defining Islam that many deny that
Muslims themselves can actually be behind this madness and murder. Conspiracy theory is rampant, and
denial that this has anything to do with Islam at all is
a certain and emphatic conviction, especially in those
regions suffering its brunt. What is certain is that persons act in the name of Islam, and as earlier stated, it
is for Sunni Muslims themselves to ultimately determine the legitimate versus illegitimate bounds of this
world faith.
Possessed of a deepened knowledge and respect
for Islam, however, leaders can become natural allies in what can and should be an inter-civilizational,
long-term alliance to extinguish terrorist enterprises
as legitimate vehicles for changing lives and social orders. Healthy sociopolitical orders surely doom AQO
and ISO to inevitable marginalization and implosion.
Strengthened host societies and competent security
forces defending legitimate borders, in alliance with
the world’s civilizations—including most certainly Islam—will lead AQO to occupy only virtual territories
and ever-shriveling sanctuaries. The only card left to
play is to poison, polarize, and plot attacks designed
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to estrange Islam and Muslims from the world, and
to incessantly parrot their “Crusader War Against Islam” mantra to ever-diminishing target audiences. Islamophobia, ironically, is their only genuine potential
Western ally, and inter-civilizational dialogue, cooperation, and evolution their only actual genuine enemy. It turns out that “the tyrant,” the “idol worshipper,” and the “Crusader” has not been the West at all,
but these organizations themselves who have made
their own desires and “will to power” their object of
worship, their God; their self-anointing as usurpers
of all authority, their Idol; and their fabricated defense against a non-existent war against Islam, their
Crusade.
AQO and ISO are two extremely deviant Salafijihadi organizations. Fully understanding Sunni Islam
in all its complexity, variety, and majesty, and how
these two deviant criminal terrorist entities attach to
this faith, requires knowledge. Professional educators
should ensure that this knowledge is being adequately conveyed to those who now, and in the near future,
shall ally with Sunni Islam against these terrorist entities.
The war we now wage is not now and has never
been against Islam. Rather, it is the war first quite accurately declared by former President Bush and more
recently by former President Obama: it is a war against
terrorist murderers who act in the name of a faith worthy of great admiration and respect. Detached from
a faith they have maligned, besmirched, and unfairly
damaged in the eyes of the world, they shall again
sooner rather than later become strangers wandering
without land or followers. It is a fate they have earned
for themselves, by their own hands. A murderer is not
a martyr, after all.
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District of New York, United States of America v. Omar Ahmad Ali
Abdel Rahman, et al., S5 93 Cr. 181, 1994), was by then serving his
own life-sentence, without parole in the Federal Medical Center,
Butner, part of the Butner Federal Corrections Center, Butner,
North Carolina.
28. 32 Muslims (26 men, and 6 women) were murdered in the
9/11 attacks. 28 Muslims died in the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center, and 3 were among the passengers on the hijacked
planes. These three were a husband and a wife, who was at the
time 7 months pregnant. Their nationalities included: Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Guiana, Sri Lanka, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Yemen,
Iran, Ethiopia, Turkey, Trinidad and Tobago, Burma, Albania,
Greece, and India. According to Kamal Kobeisi:
the most famous Muslim victim is the only Arab among all 9/11
victims, the Yemeni Abdul Salam Mallahi, who worked at the
Marriott Hotel in World Trade Center. He was very brave and
helped people escape the building. His body has never been
found. The oldest victim was an Iranian woman who was 69
years old, and the youngest were two 25-year old men, Zohoto
Ibis, from Turkey, and a Pakistani, Khaled Shahid.

Kamal Kobeisi, “Remembering the Muslims who were killed in
the 9/11 attacks,” Al Arabiya, September 11, 2011, available from
english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/11/166286.html, accessed on
March 5, 2014. Murder left in its wake many family tragedies; see
also, Rick Hampson, “For families of Muslim 9/11 victims, a new
pain,” USA Today, September 9, 2010, available from usatoday30.
usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-09-03-1amuslims911_cv_n.htm, accessed on August 2, 2016:
Mehr Tariq’s husband Taiq Amanullah, an assistant vice president at Fiduciary Trust, died in the south tower. She is 49 and
lives with her two young adult children in California’s Silicon
Valley, where they moved in 2005 to be near her brothers. . . .
Baraheen Ashrafi’s husband, Mohammed Chowdhury, died
atop the north tower, where he was a waiter at Windows on
the World. Ashrafi, 38, lives in Edmond, Okla., where she
moved with her two children to be near her sister. . . . Ysuff
Salie’s daughter Rahma, who was seven months pregnant, and
Rahma’s husband, Michael, were passengers aboard the jet that
crashed into the north tower. Ysuff, 64, and his wife, Haleema,
58, live in Newton, Mass., and run two bakery-cafes.

208

29. See especially, Sayf al-’Adl (Muhammad Salah al-Din Zaydan al-Misri), “Letter To My Beloved Brother Mukhtar [Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)],” June 13, 2002, available from www.
ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Al-Adl-letter-Translation1.
pdf, accessed on March 6, 2014, for a damning critique of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Osama bin Laden’s catastrophic act.
Consider these excerpts that confirm the “lone wolf” nature of the
9/11 attack. On bin Laden:
The Teacher [Translator: Bin Laden] corresponds directly with
you [KSM] and that, unfortunately, is his absolute habit that
he will not abandon. If someone opposes him, he immediately
puts forward another person to render an opinion in his support, clinging to his opinion and totally disregarding those
around him, so there is no advice, no nothing. . . . To absolve
my conscience before Allah, and to announce my innocence in
front of Allah, I say today [June 13, 2002] we must completely
halt all external operations until we sit down and consider the
disaster we caused. . . . The East Asia, Europe, America, Horn of
Africa, Yemen, Gulf, and Morocco groups have fallen, and Pakistan has almost been drowned in one push. I, not to mention
the other individuals who have also moved and fallen, have often advised on this matter. Regrettably, my brother, if you look
back, you will find that you are the person solely responsible
for all this because you undertook the mission, and during six
months, we only lost what we built in years.

See also the following letter from Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu
Khalid al-Suri, written July 19, 1999, to Ayman al-Zawahiri about
bin Laden, expressing extreme concern at the latter’s impolite,
impolitic, and defiant behavior toward then-ruling Mullah Umar,
emir of the Afghan Taliban. See Alan Cullison, “Al-Qaeda’s Hard
Drive: A Fortuitous Discovery Reveals Budget Squabbles, Baby
Pictures, Office Rivalries—and the Path to 9/11,” The Atlantic
Monthly, September 2004, pp. 59-60:
The results of this crisis can be felt even here in Kabul and other
places. Talk about closing down the camps has spread. Discontent with the Arabs has become clear. Whispers between the
Taliban with some of our non-Arab brothers has become customary. In short, our brother Abu Abdullah’s [bin Laden] latest
troublemaking with the Taliban and the Leader of the Faithful
jeopardizes the Arabs, and the Arab presence, today in all of
Afghanistan, for no good reason. It provides a ripe opportunity
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for all adversaries including America, the West, the Jews, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, the Mas’ud-Dostum alliance, etc, to serve the
Arabs a blow that could end up causing their most faithful allies to kick them out . . . Our brother [bin Laden] will help our
enemies reach their goal free of charge! . . . The strangest thing
I have heard so far is Abu Abdullah’s saying that he wouldn’t
listen to the Leader of the Faithful when he asked him to stop
giving interviews . . . I think our brother [bin Laden] has caught
the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause. . . The only
solution out of this dilemma is what a number of knowledgeable and experienced people have agreed upon . . . Abu Abdullah [Osama bin Laden] should go to the Leader of the Faithful
with some of his brothers and tell him that . . . [1] the Leader
of the Faithful was right when he asked you to refrain from
interviews, announcements, and media encounters, and [2] that
you will help the Taliban as much as you can in their battle,
until they achieve control over Afghanistan. [3] You should
apologize for any inconvenience or pressure you have caused .
. . [4] and commit to the wishes and orders of the Leader of the
Faithful on matters that concern his circumstances here . . . The
Leader of the Faithful, who should be obeyed where he reigns,
is Muhammad Omar, not Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden
and his companions are only guests seeking refuge and have to
adhere to the terms laid out by the person who provided it for
them. This is legitimate and logical.

30. This latest metamorphosis is more fully explored in
Chapters 2 and 3.
31. See especially, Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3,
August 2003, pp. 343-345.
32. For a description of these letters, and access to English
translations, see Will McCants, “Abbottabad Documents,” Jihadica, blog entry, posted May 3, 2012, available from www.jihadica.
com/abbottabad-documents/, for all 17 declassified Special Operations Command (SOCOM) seized documents made available in
easy to access format, in Arabic and English; (Alternately, see
Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point,
NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/
harmony-program); See also especially, Nelly Lahoud, Stuart Caudill, Liam Collins, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Don Rassler, and Muhammad al-’Ubaydi, “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Side-
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lined?” Harmony Program Report, West Point, NY: Combating
Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, May 3, 2012, available
from www.ctc.usma.edu, who describe these as consisting of electronic letters or drafts, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic
and 197 pages in the English translation, dating from between
September 2006 and April 2011. See also their Appendix (pp. 5459) for a brief summary of the facts surrounding and an interpretation of each letter.
33. A similar argument is advanced on Sharia grounds of
those Muslims who deliberately commit intentional homicide.
See Paul Kamolnick, “Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful
Jihad for Anti-Americanism? A Case Study of Ideological Contradictions,” Perspectives on Terrorism,” Vol. 8, No. 6, December 2014,
pp. 36-42, available from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/
pot/article/view/390.
34. See “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” The
Washington Post, September 20, 2001, transcript available from
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/
bushaddress_092001.html, accessed on May 20, 2014.
35. See “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo,” The New York Times,
June 4, 2009, available from www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/
politics/04obama.text.html?_r=0, accessed on August 12, 2013. See
also more recently, Tanya Somanader, “President Obama on the
Causes and Antidotes to Violent Extremism,” blog entry, posted
February 19, 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/19/presidentobama-causes-and-antidotes-violent-extremism, accessed on February
20, 2015.
36. “Tiny fraction, not all Muslims, involved in terrorism,
says Obama,” The News International, November 23, 2015, available from https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/15796-tiny-fraction-notall-muslims-involved-in-terrorism-says-obama, accessed on August
2, 2016.
37. See “Video and Transcript: President Obama: Baltimore
Mosque Speech, Weds., Feb. 3, 2016,” available from www.shallownation.com/2016/02/03/video-president-obama-baltimore-mosquespeech-weds-feb-3-2016/, accessed on February 4, 2016; Michelle
Boorstein, “At Baltimore mosque, President Obama encourages
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U.S. Muslims: ‘You fit in here’,” The Washington Post, February
3, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/
wp/2016/02/03/president-obamas-mosque-visit-will-spotlight-a-newgeneration-of-muslim-americans/, accessed on February 4, 2016; Elahe Izadi, “Obama, Thomas Jefferson and the fascinating history
of Founding Fathers defending Muslim rights,” The Washington
Post, February 3, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/11/how-thomas-jefferson-and-other-founding-fathers-defended-muslim-rights/, accessed on February 4, 2016.
38. See “A Suggestion to Change the Name of Al-Qa’ida (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000009, Combating Terrorism
Center, West Point, NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/
posts/a-suggestion-to-change-the-name-of-al-qaida-english-translation-2. Also, Jason Burke, “Bin Laden wanted to change al-Qaida’s
bloodied name: Documents obtained in US assassination reveal
frustrations of al-Qaida leader and desire to win over world’s
Muslims,” The Guardian, June 24, 2011, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/24/bin-laden-documents-alqaida-struggle, accessed on August 12, 2013. President Obama was made
aware of this later after the Abbottabad raid. It was reported by Jo
Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s
Principles and Will,” The New York Times, May 29, 2012, available
from www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-waron-al-qaeda.html, accessed on May 29, 2012:
Mr. Obama was heartened, aides say, by a letter discovered
in the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan. It
complained that the American president had undermined Al
Qaeda’s support by repeatedly declaring that the United States
was at war not with Islam, but with the terrorist network. ‘We
must be doing a pretty good job,’ Mr. Obama told his secretary
of state.

39. For key insight on why this was predictable, see Charles
Kurzman, The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists, Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011,
ch. 1, pp. 3-24.
40. See “A Suggestion to Change the Name of Al-Qa’ida (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000009.
41. Ibid.
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42. See esp., “Letter from UBL to ‘Atiyatullah Al-Libi 2 (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000010, Combating Terrorism
Center, West Point, NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/
posts/letter-from-ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-2-english-translation-2; see
also, Lahoud, et al., Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?
p. 3, 48-52.
43. See for example: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Jason Fritz,
Bridget Moreng, and Nathaniel Barr, “SMA Support to SOCCENT: The War between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda: Strategic
Dimensions of a Patricidal Conflict,” Valens Global International
Strategies and Securities Study, September 2015, available from
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2015; also, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Bridget Moreng, and Nathaniel Barr, “The Strategic Dimensions of the Competition between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and al-Qaeda,” in
Allison Astorino-Courtois and Sarah Canna, eds., “White Paper
on SMA Support to SOCCENT: ISIL Influence and Resolve,” September 2015, available from https://info.publicintelligence.net/SOCCENT-ISIL-InfluenceResolve.pdf, accessed on September 24, 2015.
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worldview, or in their words, share “similar ideologies”(p. 3), and
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another example of a strategically-reductionist analysis that fails
to appreciate the core creedal, theological, and legal fault lines at
the heart of the ISO/AQO conflict; see also, Daveed GartensteinRoss and Nathaniel Barr, “How al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic
State Challenge,” August 30, 2016, available from www.hudson.
org/research/12788-how-al-qaeda-survived-the-islamic-state-challenge,
accessed September 2, 2016. Interested readers are referred to
chapter one for our primary supporting data.
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be found in an obituary written about him. See “Fazul Abdullah Mohammed obituary,” The Guardian, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/12/fazul-abdullah-mohammed-obituary.
For an excellent, detailed comprehensive analysis of his apologetic 1,156 page autobiography, intended as a corrective to sectarian interpretations of AQO and regarded as the “richest primary
source available regarding al-Qa’ida” (p. 3), see Nelly Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: Al-Qa’ida through the Lens of its Confidential Secretary, Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, NY, June 4, 2012, available from www.ctc.usma.edu,
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Journal, June 5, 2010, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/al_qaeda_in_iraq_is-3.php, accessed on July 27, 2016.
Presciently, that top U.S. general, Odierno, would claim at the
time that AQI:
will attempt to regenerate. . . . I would just say that they will,
obviously, attempt to reconstitute. . . . The issue is, though,
they’ve lost a lot of top leadership very quickly, and so they’re
going to have to develop some new leadership. . . . They want
complete failure of the government of Iraq. . . . They want to
establish the caliphate in Iraq.

Odierno indicates that major intelligence breaks occurred as a
result of U.S. operations in early-2008 in northern Iraq, and also
in early-2010 in Mosul. According to Roggio, these latter raids
“targeted al Qaeda’s leadership, finance, and extortion cells in
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the Mosul region [and] proved crucial to denuding the terror network’s top commanders.” Roggio lists the following top leaders
who were killed or captured between January 5, 2010, and May
3, 2010:
• Mahmoud Suleiman, top Anbar province military commander (captured);
• Ahmad Ali Abbas Dahir al Ubayd, top military commander for northern Iraq (killed);
• Emir of Mosul, and the emir of eastern Mosul (detained);
• Bashar Khalaf Husyan Ali al Juburi, emir of Mosul (killed);
• Abu Ahmad al Afri, overall economic security emir
(killed);
• Khalid Muhammad Hasan Shallub al Juburi, top emir in
northern Iraq (killed);
• Manaf Abdulrehim al Rawi, emir for Baghdad (captured);
• Abu Khalaf, most senior foreign fighter facilitator (killed);
• Ali Hussein Alwan al Azawi, responsible for first major
suicide attack in Baghdad, summer 2003 (detained); and,
• Abu Na’im al Afri, leader in northern Iraq operations
(killed).
156. For Haji Bakr’s significant role in reconstituting the ISI
along professional military, military intelligence, and Ba’athist
police-state lines, see Christoph Reuter, “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal Structure of Islamic State,” April 18, 2015, available from www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-showstructure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html, accessed on April
20, 2015; Kevin Drum, “New Document Cache Shows the Real
Roots of ISIS are as Much Secular as Religious,” April 21, 2015,
available from www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2015/04/new-document-cache-shows-real-roots-isis-are-much-secular-religious, accessed
on April 24, 2015; Ben Macintyre, “Isis Owes More to the Kremlin than the Koran,” April 24, 2015, available from www.thetimes.
co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article4420853.ece, accessed on April
24, 2015; Denise Natali, “The Islamic State’s Baathist Roots,” AlMonitor, April 24, 2015, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2015/04/baathists-behind-the-islamic-state.html, accessed on
April 27, 2015; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Islamic State: The Myth
of a Baathist ‘Hidden Hand’,” IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency
Monitor, June 2015, available from www.meforum.org/5312/isisbaathist-hidden-hand, accessed on August 19, 2015. (Al-Tamimi sent
the present author the previous article since it was not available
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online previously.) Samia Nakhoul, “Saddam’s former army is secret of Baghdadi’s success,” Reuters, June 16, 2015, available from
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi-insight-idUSK
BN0OW1VN20150616, accessed on August 5, 2016; Liz Sly, “The
hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” The Washington Post, April 4, 2015, available in https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-theislamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc3211e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html, accessed on August 5, 2016.
For invaluable insider information on Haji Bakr (birth name,
Samid Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi), likely provided by a defector or dissenter, but providing deeply revealing facts on the internal history and personal relations among key ISI figures, see
Yousef Bin Tashfin (Twitter name: @abounour2006), “English
Translation of @Wikibaghdaddy,” [n.d.] available from https://
justpaste.it/e90q, accessed on September 23, 2014. Yousef provided an English translation of all collected tweets for the following
days: December 14-15, 17-18, 20, 24, 27, and 29-31, 2014; January 1,
5, 8, 12, 19, and 24, 2015; Jacob Siegel, “Someone is Spilling ISIS’s
Secrets on Twitter,” The Daily Beast, June 18, 2014, available from
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/18/someone-is-spilling-isiss-secrets-on-twitter.html, accessed on September 23, 2014. Siegel’s
article covers the June 13, 2014 tweets; Quilliam Foundation,
“Quilliam Exclusive—Alleged Leaks from Islamic State Reveal
International Network of Bribery,” blog entry, posted November
14, 2014, available from www.quilliamfoundation.org/blog/quilliamexclusive-alleged-leaks-from-islamic-state-reveal-international-network-of-bribery/, accessed on November 14, 2014. This post covers
a November 13, 2014 leak on Twitter; For a commentary on the
leaker and its significance, see Matthew Barber, “New ISIS Leaks
Reveal Particulars of al-Qaida Strategy,” Syria Comment, January
12, 2014, available from www.joshualandis.com/blog/new-isis-leaksreveal-particulars-of-al-qaida-strategy/, accessed on September 22,
2014. This includes extensive extracts from the original tweets
of December 10, 14, 15, and 17-18, 2014, along with commentary;
Radwan Mortada, “Al-Qaeda Leaks: Baghdadi and Golani Fight
over the Levant Emirate,” Al-Akhbar (English), January 10, 2014,
available from english.al-akhbar.com/content/al-qaeda-leaks-baghdadiand-golani-fight-over-levant-emirate/, accessed on September 23,
2014; this article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition;
Radwan Mortada, “Al-Qaeda Leaks II: Baghdadi Loses His Shadow,” Al-Akhbar (English), January 14, 2014, available from english.al-akhbar.com/node/18219, accessed on September 23, 2014; this
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article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition; Mshari
al-Zaydi, “Opinion: The Haji Bakr files,” Asharq Al-Awsat (English), January 29, 2014, available from www.aawsat.net/2014/01/
article55328174/opinion-the-haji-bakr-files-2, accessed on October 9,
2014; Truls Hallberg Tonnessen, “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam?
The Relationship Between al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State,”
Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 4, August 2015, pp. 48-61.
Kyle Orton authored three important essays that counsel caution regarding the extreme position being advanced on the basis of the Haji Bakr files confirming a deeply influential role for
former Ba’athists in leadership positions. His key point is that
while that is true, they have not been ideological Ba’athists for a
long time, and are committed to ISO on theological and religious
grounds, though their military and intelligence bona fides have
transformed ISO into a formidable terrorist army. See Kyle Orton,
“Saddam’s Former Loyalists are Leading ISIS—as True Believers,” National Review, July 20, 2015, available from www.nationalreview.com/node/421370/print, accessed on September 18, 2015;
Kyle Orton, “A Response to Criticism: Why the Ex-Saddamists in
the Islamic State Matter,” The Syrian Intifada, blog entry, posted
August 10, 2015, available from https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.
com/2015/08/10/a-response-to-criticism-why-the-ex-saddamists-in-theislamic-state-matter/, accessed on September 18, 2015; Kyle Orton, “How Saddam Hussein Gave Us ISIS,” The New York Times,
December 23, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/
opinion/how-saddam-hussein-gave-us-isis.html?ref=opinion&_r0, accessed on December 23, 2015. His essential thesis is the following:
After long neglect, the media has finally recognized the role
of the FREs—former (Saddam) regime elements—within the
Islamic State (ISIS). But the pendulum has now swung too far:
Some reports are now claiming that the FREs have transformed
the leader of the terror army, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, into nothing more than a front man for the Baathists. These suppositions
are mistaken. Most FREs within ISIS have not been ideologically Baathists for a long time. . . . [T]he ISIS-as-front-for-Ba’athists
storyline has a very serious timeline problem. One of the infamous FREs within ISIS was Haji Bakr (real name: Samir Abd
Muhammad al-Khlifawi), a former colonel in Saddam’s army,
who masterminded ISIS’s expansion into Syria; he was killed
by Syrian rebels when they rose against ISIS in January 2014.
What is noteworthy is that al-Khlifawi had joined ISIS in 2003
when it was a foreign-led organization with al-Zarqawi—the
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patron saint of the takfiriyeen (those who regard only Salafipurists as Muslims)—as its emir. A ‘socialist infidel’—as ISIS
refers to Ba’athists—was not going to pass muster in ISIS at
that time. Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi (real name: Adnan Ismail Najem al-Bilawi), a former captain in Saddam’s army and
until his death in June 2014 the head of ISIS’s military council
(believed to be the most important ISIS military institution),
also joined ISIS in 2003. Abu Ali al-Anbari, the overseer of
ISIS-held territory in Syria, joined ISIS in 2003 as well. It’s no
surprise that al-Khlifawi, al-Bilawi, and al-Anbari were already
Islamic militants in 2003. From the mid-1980s, and with added
intensity after the formal onset of Saddam’s ‘Faith Campaign’
in June 1993, Saddam’s regime Islamized. This was ‘most likely
a cynical step’ on the part of Saddam, wrote Amatzia Baram, an
expert on Iraqi Islam with the University of Haifa, but it gave
Iraq “an extra push in the direction of an authentic Islamization
process.” In other words, it took on a life of its own. . . . The
FREs [Former Regime Elements] matter because they highlight
the hybrid nature of ISIS—its fusion of elements of Ba’athists
with Salafism—and also how difficult ISIS will be defeat. The
FREs are the products of a military-intelligence service trained
by the KGB [former, Soviet Secret Police]. They have brought to
ISIS unique military and counterintelligence skills, directly in
battle and in propaganda. Their skills are aiding ISIS’s military
effort, bringing in fanatical foreigners to use as shock troops,
and helping ISIS restructure the identities of local populations
who have joined ISIS only out of necessity or convenience (as a
means to restore order or against Iran’s proxies, for example).
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159. Ibid.
160. For the transformative military relevance of this ISO professional military and security cadre, see Ben Hubbard and Eric
Schmitt, “Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of
ISIS,” The New York Times, August 27, 2014, available from www.
nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-asfactor-in-isis-successes.html?_r=0; Alex Bilger, “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal Metrics-Driven Military Command,” Backgrounder,
Washington, DC, Institute for the Study of War, May 22, 2014,
available from www.underestandingwar.org, accessed on June 2,
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2014; As-Safir, “ISIS gains from Iraqi military defectors,” Al-Monitor, June 11, 2014, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/06/iraq-isis-control-expansion-experience.html, accessed on
June 12, 2014.
161. For detailed background on IS leadership, see Staff
Writer, Al Arabiya News, “Exclusive: Top ISIS leaders revealed,”
Al Arabiya (English), February 13, 2014, available from english.
alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/02/13/Exclusive-Top-ISIS-leaders-revealed.html, accessed on April 29, 2015; Charles Lister, “Islamic
State Senior Leadership: Who’s Who,” c. November 2014, available from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/
en_whos_who.pdf, accessed on January 12, 2015; Ruth Sherlock,
“Inside the leadership of Islamic State: how the new ‘caliphate’
is run,” The Telegraph, July 9, 2014, available from www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10956280/Inside-the-leadership-of-Islamic-State-how-the-new-caliphate-is-run.html, accessed on
August 5, 2016.
162. McCants, “Baghdadi’s Family Tree.”
163. McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, pp. 78-79. Soon after bin
Laden’s death, ISI publicly affirmed its continuing support for
AQO under its new Emir al-Zawahiri. See Rania El Gamal, rpt.,
Myra MacDonald, ed., “Iraq’s Qaeda pledges support for Zawahiri, vows attacks,” Reuters, May 9, 2011, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-qaeda-zawahiri-idUSTRE74835A20110509,
accessed on December 15, 2015. However, the actual renewal of
a formal bay’ah from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to al-Zawahiri remained secret. See Van Ostaeyen, “Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri—Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in as-Sham”; see
also, Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat an-Nusra reacts on ISIS spokesman
al-’Adnānī (Part I)—Abū Sulaymān al-Muhājir.”
Al-Zawahiri amplifies this assertion in a more recent communique. In it he claims to quote verbatim from an October 23, 2012
letter he received from al-Baghadi:
we are a part of you, and we are from you and for you, and we
owe it to Allah that you are the caretakers of our affairs and
you have upon us the right of listening and obeying as long as
we live. . . . Your advice and reminding us what is right upon
us, and your commands are obligatory upon us, but the issues
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may sometimes require some clarification due to us living the
reality of the events in our field. Therefore, we hope that your
heart would widen to hear our viewpoint, but the matter after
that is for you, and we are nothing but arrows in your quiver.

See Thomas Joscelyn, “Zawahiri again addresses jihadist infighting in Syria,” The Long War Journal, May 25, 2014, available from
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/zawahiri_addresses_j.php,
accessed on May 27, 2014. Though AQO had strategically and organizationally sound reasons, i.e., plausible deniability, for hiding this formal bay’ah, this would deeply complicate al-Zawahiri’s
task of later putting down the ISO rebellion. The ISI spokesman
al-Adnani later forcefully denied that ISO, indeed ISI itself, had
at any time been formally subordinate to AQO; see especially,
Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, trans. by Musa Cerantonio, “Apologies, Amir of al-Qaidah,” Speech by Shaykh Abu Muhammad al
Adnani ash-Shaami, available from archive.org/stream/ApologiesOhAmir/Apologies%20Oh%20Amir_djvu.txt, accessed on December
1, 2014.
164. Salvific jihadism and martyrology, to which we shall
later turn, is one way to attempt to avoid these travails since the
true Mujahid (fighter on Allah’s path), it is hoped, will be immediately evacuated to Paradise and not only enjoy its magnificence
in proximity to Allah and its promised fruits, but also to intervene on behalf of loved ones to increase their odds of attaining
the same.
165. For AQO, the following AQO-affiliated English-language
online publications were analyzed (as of October 15, 2015): [1] Inspire, Qa’idat al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Issues, 1-14,
Summer 2010 to Summer 2015. Archived copies of all issues of
Inspire are available from jihadology.net/category/inspire-magazine/,
accessed on September 24, 2015; [2] Resurgence, Qa’idat al-Jihad in
the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Issues 1-2, Fall 2014 to Summer
2015. See Resurgence, Iss. 1, Fall 2014, available from azelin.files.
wordpress.com/2015/04/resurgence-1.pdf, accessed on May 5, 2015;
Resurgence, Iss. 2, Summer 2015, available from pietervanostaeyen.
files.wordpress.com/2015/06/resurgence-special-issue_summer-2015.
pdf, accessed on June 29, 2015; [3] Al-Risalah (The Letter) Issue
1, July 2015. See Al Risalah, Iss. 1, July 2015, available from https://
pietervanostaeyen.com/2015/07/05/magazine-by-the-mujahideen-of-
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shaam-al-risalah-issue-1/, accessed on July 8, 2015. Al Risalah is produced by AQO’s Syrian affiliate, Nusrah Front (Jabhat al-Nusrah
li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad [Protection
Front for the People of the Levant by the Mujahadin of the Levant
in the Battlefields of Jihad]; hereafter, Jabhat al-Nusrah).
166. Abu Saleh, “Insightful Opinions from the Frontlines: Just
a Thought: How Can They Handle It,” Dabiq, Iss.13, January 19,
2016 [1437 Rabi’ Al-Akhir], p. 48.
167. Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti (aka: Abu
Dujana al Pasha), “The Land of the Prophets Awaits You,” Resurgence, Iss. 1, Fall 2014, p. 39. Note: the more common English
spelling of this author’s name is Muhammad bin Mahmoud Rabie
al-Bahtiyti (aka: Abu Dujana al-Basha), this book uses the spelling
provided in the referenced Resurgence issue.
168. Background on Dujana is found in Thomas Joscelyn, “Al
Qaeda official warns against Islamic State in new speech,” The
Long War Journal, September 27, 2014, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/a_senior_al_qaeda_of.php, accessed
on October 15, 2015. Abu Dujana is Ayman al-Zawahiri’s son-inlaw, and was a long-time Egyptian Islamic Jihad member, who
has closed ranks with AQO against the ISO’s claim to the Caliphate, extremism in takfir in the Syrian theater, and violation of what
he deems essential Sharia regulations pertaining to intra-Muslim
disputes.
169. Al-Risalah, Iss. 1, July 2015; Al-Risalah, Iss. 2, October
2015, archived copy available from https://pietervanostaeyen.
com/2015/10/26/magazine-by-the-mujahideen-of-shaam-al-risalahissue-2/, accessed on October 26, 2015.
170. An English version of all the listed issues, 1-14 of Dabiq,
is available from www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isilpropaganda-magazine-dabiq#, accessed on August 11, 2016. Specific
issues and dates are as follows: Dabiq, Iss. 1, July 5, 2014 [Ramadan 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 2, July 28, 2014 [Ramadan 1435]; Dabiq, Iss.
3, August 2014 [Shawwal 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 4, c. September/October 2014 [Dhul-Hijjah 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 5, November 22, 2014
[Muharram 1436]; Dabiq, Iss. 6, c. December/January 2015 [Rabi’
al-Awwal 1436]; Dabiq, Iss. 7, February 12, 2015 [Rabi’ al-Ahkir

239

1436]; Dabiq, Iss. 8, c. March 2015 [Jumada al-Akhirah 1436]; Dabiq,
Iss. 9, c. May 2015 [1436 Sha’ban]; Dabiq, Iss. 10, c. July 2015 [1436
Ramadan]; Dabiq, Iss. 11, September 9, 2015 [1436 Dul-Qa’dah];
Dabiq, Iss. 12, November 2015 [1437 Safar]; Dabiq, Iss. 13, January
19, 2016 [1437 Rabi’ Al-Akhir]; Dabiq, Iss. 14, April 2016 [1437 Rajab]. Hereafter all citations to Dabiq articles or graphics refer only
to issue number without the publication date. To this author’s
knowledge while AQO dedicates extensive attention in its various online publications Inspire, Resurgence, and Al-Risala to the
superlative value of jihadist martyrology (as does Azzam and the
ISO), apocalypticism and eschatology are virtually non-existent.
Their predominantly inspirational, agitational, and exemplary
role in strategic communication will be taken up in Chapter 2 of
this book on strategy.
171. Middle East Media Research Institute, “Al-Zarqawi’s
Message to the Fighters of Jihad in Iraq on September 11, 2004.”
The original speech on September 11, 2004 was recorded and
broadcast by several Islamist websites the next day. For a prescient article noting the possibility for this development, see David Cook, “Iraq as the Focus for Apocalyptic Scenarios,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 11, October 2008, available from www.ctc.usma.
edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss11-Art8.pdf, accessed on
April 21, 2015; For a deep scholarly analysis of original sources,
consult David Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, Princeton, NJ:
Darwin Press, 2002; For his pioneering role in scholarly study
of what many consider to be merely a “crank fringe,” see David
Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature, Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 2008; David Cook, “Dajjal,” in Kate
Fleet, F. Kramer, D. Matringe, J. Nawas, E. Rowson, eds., Encyclopedia of Islam, 3rd Edition, Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 2007-present,
available from referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaediaof-islam-3/dajjal-COM_25826, accessed on August 2, 2016. Finally,
see McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, pp. 161-181, for a brief, but accessible compilation of key excerpts from the classical source literature—the ahadith, or Traditions of the Prophet—covering “The
Final Days,” “The Victorious Group,” “The Mahdi is Preceded by
an Islamic State,” and “Twelve Caliphs.”
172. See Sahih-Muslim, Vol. 4, Book 39, [“Kitab al-Fitan wa
Ashrat as-Sa’ah”] (Book pertaining the turmoil and portents of
the last hour), No. 6924, p. 1501. In Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, transl.,
Sahih Muslim, Sh. Lahore, Pakistan: Muhammad Ashraf, 2004.
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173. Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 26.
174. These all refer to the following: Dabiq, Iss. 2, “The Flood”
cover art with Noah’s ark, p. 1, and Abū ‘Amr Al-Kinānī, “It’s
Either the Islamic State or the Flood,” pp. 5-11; Dabiq, Iss. 3, “A
Call to Hijrah,” cover art, p. 1; this connects Hijrah to al-Sham
as the land of the final apocalyptic battles. Also “The Islamic
State before Al-Malhamah (The Immigrants to the Land of Malahim [Final End Times Battles]),” pp. 5-11, and “The Liberation of
Dabiq,” p.15, which links Dabiq to its apocalyptic and prophesied
relation to the End Times battles, and also the name of the magazine; Dabiq, Iss. 4, p. 1, cover cites the following 2 articles: see “The
Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” pp. 14-17, and “Reflections
on the Final Crusade,” pp. 32-44, i.e., the Final Crusade, the Final Hour, which includes a section “The Islamic State Founders
on Signs of the Hour,” that contains quotes from Shaykh Abū
Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī, Abū Hamzah al-Muhājir, and Abū ‘Umar alBaghdādī; Dabiq, Iss. 5, “YAHYĀ: LESSONS FROM A SHAHĪD,”
pp. 4-9, which discusses End Times battles and tribulations; Dabiq,
Iss. 7, “THE SALVATION FROM FITNAH IS KHILĀFAH AND
JIHĀD,” pp. 44-45, and “The Hour Will Not Be Established until
Seventy Thousand From the Children of Ishāq Attack Constantinople,” p. 83; Dabiq, Iss. 9, “And Allah is the Best of the Plotters,”
pp. 50-59, in the concluding section, “An Analysis of a Doomed
Plot,” pp. 57-59, is End Times based, for example, p. 57:
In his words [referring to Abū ‘Umar al-Baghdādī’s quoted
speech referred to above] there is a summary on this final plot
. . . of the crusaders and their apostate allies before the major
malhamah [great battles of The End Times].

Next, see “INTERVIEW WITH THE AMĪR OF THE YARMŪK
CAMP REGION,” pp.66-73, which is also presented within framework of End Times. For example, p. 66:
In light of the victories this month in Wilayat Dimashq (Damascus) as the Islamic State continues to advance towards the
future stronghold of the believers during the Malahim, Dabiq
presented a number of questions to the amir of the region encompassing the Yarmuk Camp in the Wilayah.

And a final example in its concluding paragraph pp. 72-73 (see
pp. 66-73 for entire article):
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Our role model and noble Messenger . . . praised Dimashq very
much, and this was mentioned in a number of authentic narrations. Dimashq is the camp of the Muslims during the great
battle (al-Malhamah al-Kubra). But every Muslim who cannot
come and wants to perform jihad and support the Islamic State
can do so wherever he may be, just as he was ordered by the
Khalifah in his latest address. A simple supplication from our
Muslim brothers practicing ribat is in itself support—a great
support for us. Any advance of the Khilafah against the Nusayriyyah and Rafidah, any manifestation of unity through new
bay’āt to the Khalifah, and any attack against the supporters of
the Sahwah—the crusaders and Al Salul—strengthens the mujahidin in Dimashq. May Allah facilitate for the armies of the
Khilafah to liberate Dimashq.

See Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 79, for an untitled, very unflattering picture
of al-Nur Salafi members of the Egyptian Parliament—two were
asleep, and two were distracted—with a note, “The murtaddin
of the ‘Nur’ party in the Egyptian parliament,” accompanied by
an End Times prophecy quote; Dabiq, Iss. 11, “The ‘Mahdī’ of the
Rāfidah: THE DAJJĀL,” p. 16, with a big picture of former Iranian
Prime Minister Ahmadenijad with an ultra-orthodox, anti-Zionist
rabbi sharing space and face-time. The article begins:
As the Hour approaches, it becomes important to reflect upon
the fabricated accounts of future events, as they will undoubtedly play a role in actions by various deviant sects. Of these
accounts is that of the ‘Mahdi’ of the Rafidah who wages war
against Islam and the Muslims, contrary to the just and rightly
guided Mahdi of the future described in the Sunnah. The closer
the Hour approaches, the more the Rafidah fall in line with the
Jews in preparation for the appearance of this awaited evil leader. Upon reading the Rafidi account of the “Mahdi,” it becomes
clear that he is none other than the Dajjal.

The article’s concluding paragraph, p. 17: “We seek refuge with
Allah for Ahlus-Sunnah from the evil of the Dajjal.” Next, see
“FROM THE BATTLE OF AL-AZHĀB TO THE WAR OF COALITIONS,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 46-55, whose final paragraph (p. 55)
ends with an Apocalyptic statement:
Finally, it is not the apostasy and deviance of the weak-hearted
and the hypocrites that will lead to the truce with the Romans
before the Hour, rather it is the patience and perseverance of
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the mujahidin on their way to further consolidation and greater
expansion in the face of the international crusade against Islam
that will achieve such. O Allah, turner of hearts, keep our hearts
firm upon Your path until the last of us fights under the banner of al-Masih [the Mahdi, Messiah] against ad-Dajjal [AntiChrist].

See also, “THE BEST SHUHADĀ’,” Dabiq, Iss. 13, pp. 20-21, which
contains an image with the words: “A Word of Truth” on a letter
resting in a hangman’s noose; and finally, “THE RĀFIDAH: From
Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjāl,” Dabiq, Iss. 13, esp. pp. 44-45.
175. The following book series is devoted exclusively to
prophesies, preparations, and the privileges associated with martyrdom (Shuhada) in these End Times tribulations and battles:
For the original series of 6, Conquest, End Times battle-type
works confirmed by prophecy: East, Syria, Arabia, Persia, Rome,
and Palestine [then Major End Times Signs, Events]:
Unattributed, Black Flags of the East: The Movements Past. Present. & Future-1979-2012+, n.p., n.d., available from https://archive.
org/details/BlackFlagsFromTheEast, accessed on August 12, 2016;
Unattributed, Black Flags From Syria: Revolution 2011-2020+, n.p.,
n.d., available from https://archive.org/details/BlackFlagsFromSyria-Ebook, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, Black Flags
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com/global/archive/2015/02/the-phony-islam-of-isis/386156, accessed
on March 2, 2015; J. M. Berger, “Enough about Islam: Why religion is not the most useful way to understand ISIS,” Order From
Chaos blog entry, posted February 18, 2015, available from https://
www.brookings.edu/2015/02/18/enough-about-islam-why-religion-isnot-the-most-useful-way-to-understand-isis/, accessed on August 12,
245

2016. However, a more reasoned (in the opinion of the present
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Security Report 25, December 2014, available from www.understandingwar.org/jabhat-al-nusra-syria-islamic-emirate-al-qaeda,
accessed on June 2, 2015; “Jabhat al-Nusra,” Mapping Militant Organizations, November 12, 2014, available from web.stanford.edu/
group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493, accessed on July
15, 2015.
On July 28, 2016, AQO affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah officially
changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for the Conquest
of the Levant). Commentary is deeply divided. Some assert this
name change is purely cosmetic, no actual evidence of formal disaffiliation has been produced, and that the USG’s recent formal
proposal to isolate and specifically target Jabhat al-Nusrah, and not
abandonment of AQO’s “jihadism,” sufficiently explains this latest development. See for example: Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al
Nusrah Front rebrands itself as Jabhat Fath Al Sham,” The Long
War Journal, July 28, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.
org/archives/2016/07/analysis-al-nusrah-front-rebrands-itself-as-jabhat-fath-al-sham.php, accessed on July 29, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn,
“Transcript of Abu Muhammad al Julani’s speech,” The Long
War Journal, July 29, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.
org/archives/2016/07/transcript-of-abu-muhammad-al-julanis-speech.
php, accessed on July 29, 2016; Charles Lister, “The Nusra Front
is Dead and Stronger Than Ever Before,” Foreign Policy, July 28,
2016, available from foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/28/the-nusra-frontis-dead-and-stronger-than-ever-before/, accessed on July 29, 2016;
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Thomas Joscelyn, “Rebranding
Terror: Nusra’s Renaming is Part of al Qaeda’s Plan,” Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2016, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2016-08-28, accessed on August 29, 2016. Other
reporting, however, provides evidence indicating that changes
are not merely cosmetic but involve important strategic compromises now being made to further unify the revolutionary
anti-Assad Islamist insurgency. These recent changes, then, are
responses to Jabhat al-Nusrah’s previous unwillingness to openly
distance themselves from AQO’s “global jihadism” targeting the
West; genuine intra-Islamist conflicts over Jabhat al-Nusrah’s reluctance to openly identify with a national-Islamist Syrian project; actual splits within Jabhat al-Nusrah between its hardline
AQO-first wing, and its predominantly Syrian Islamist nationalist
membership; and also, a defensive measure designed to subvert
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recent USG initiatives explicitly and adamantly targeting Jabhat
al-Nusrah as a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
For some of this reporting and commentary, see Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung, “Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra splits from al-Qaeda and
changes its name,” The Washington Post, July 28, 2016; “Al-Qaeda
tells Syrian branch Nusra Front it can drop links,” Ammun News,
July 28, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on
July 29, 2016; Unattributed, “‘Ahrar al-Sham’ Official: Outcome
of Aleppo Battle ‘Will Change the Rules of the Political Game’,”
Al-Hayah, August 10, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 11, 2016; Mona Alami, [interview with Iyyad
al-Sha’ar, commander of the Aharar al-Sham Islamic Movement],
“Al-Sha’ar: I Hope ‘Fath al-Sham’ Will Act in Way that Confirms
Its Complete Disengagement from ‘Al-Qa’ida; Al-Sharq al-Awsat
in Interview with Leader in ‘Ahrar al-Sham’,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat,
September 12, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed
on September 16, 2016; Mona Alami, “Jabhat al-Nusra’s rebranding is more than simple name change,” Al -Monitor, August 5,
2016, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/
jabhat-al-nusra-sever-al-qaeda-focus-local-syria.html, accessed on August 9, 2016; Mu’ayyad Bajis, “Jordanian Abu Julaybib and AbuKadijah Defect from Fath al-Sham,” Arabi 21, August 23, 2016,
available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 26, 2016;
Alex Crawford, “Rebranded Nusra Front Uniting Syria’s Rebels,” Sky News, August 18, 2016, news.sky.com/story/rebels-unite-infight-against-horsemen-of-syrian-apocalypse-10541843, accessed on
August 19, 2016.
202. For an incisive commentary documenting AQO’s
transformation and re-emphasizing of “Near Enemy” strategic
conceptions, see Thomas Joscelyn, “Fifteen years after the 9/11
attacks, al Qaeda fights on,” The Long War Journal, September
11, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/
fifteen-years-after-the-911-attacks-al-qaeda-fights-on.php,
accessed
on September 12, 2016. Joscelyn, an indefatigable documentarian
of AQO’s “jihadism,” remarks:
[T]here is another aspect to evaluating the al Qaeda threat that
is seldom appreciated. It is widely assumed that al Qaeda is
only interested in attacking the West. This is flat false. Most of
the organization’s resources are devoted to waging insurgencies in Muslim majority countries. . . . [T]he point is that al Qaeda hasn’t been attempting to hit the West nearly as much as
some in the West assume.
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203. For the broader history of AQAP, and its relation to
AQO, see Gregory D. Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda,
and America’s War in Arabia, New York and London, UK: W.W.
Norton, 2013.
204. See for example: Lahoud, et al., Letters from Abbottabad:
Bin Ladin Sidelined? pp. 29-35.
205. Ibid., p. 30.
206. See Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment
to Al Qaeda, pp. 7-17, for a comprehensive evaluation of this policy, its legality, and its consequences for overcoming the formidable barriers created by nations unable or unwilling to prevent
terrorist entities from planning external operations on their soil.
207. USG successes in attriting AQO and AQAP leadership
has been substantial. Consider the following extremely high value leadership targets permanently eliminated from these organizations:
• AQO, Founder, Emir, Osama bin Laden (May 2, 2011);
• AQO, Deputy-Emir Abu Yahya al-Libi (June 4, 2012);
• AQO, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman (aka: Atiyatullah al-Libi;
born, Jamal Ibrahim Ashtiwi al Misrati) (August 22, 2011);
• AQAP, Samir Ibn Zafar Khan (Founding Editor, Inspire)
(September 30, 2011);
• AQAP, Anwar al-Awlaki (Major Anti-American Englishlanguage terror-incitement propagandist, Sharia source)
(September 30, 2011);
• AQAP, Deputy Emir, Saudi Sa’id al-Shihri, (2013);
• AQO, Abu Dujana al-Basha, ‘hidden commander’ and
son-in-law and trusted aid to Ayman al-Zawahiri
(August 2014);
• AQO, Adnan Shukrijumah, Major AQ External Ops
figure (December 2014);
• AQO, Adam Yahiye Gadahn (January 19, 2015);
• AQAP, Harith bin Gahazi al-Nadari (aka: Muhammad
al-Murshidi), leader and member of Sharia committee
(January 31, 2015);
• AQAP, Mufti, Saudi Ibrahim al-Rubaysh (c. April 2015);
• AQAP, Deputy general manager, Nasser bin Ali al Ansi
(April 2015);
• AQAP, Emir Nasir al Wuhayshi (early-June 2015);
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•
•

•
•
•
•

AQO, Muhsin al Fadhli, major operative “Khorasan
Group” in Syria (July 8, 2015);
AQO, Sanafi al-Nasr (aka: Abdul Mohsin Abdullah Ibrahim Al Sharikh), a major Senior Leader in AQO and dispatched to Syria as part of external operations-focused
‘Khorasan’ Group (October 15, 2015);
AQAP, Jalal Belaidi, aka Abu Hamza, top commander
and regional emir;
AQO, Al-Shabab, Hassan Ali Dhoore, high level security
and intelligence operative (April 2016);
AQO, long-time veteran and senior member al-Nusrah
Shura Council, Abu Firas al-Suri (April 2016); and,
AQO, Khorasan Group, Rifai Ahmed Taha Musa, Signatory to February 1998 ‘fatwa’ (April 2016).

208. Audrey K. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the
Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton, NJ and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2009/2011, pp. 148-153.
209. See for example: the succinct graphic in Inspire, Iss. 14,
Summer 2015, p. 43, representing what is described as a “Simple
Equation”: “America’s Defeat + Da’awah + Defense = Establishing Khilafa.” An explanatory subheading is provided:
The existence of America, policing the world vanishes [sic] any
hope for the Mujahideen conquering any part of the earth. . .
. That is why we have to converge all our efforts in defeating
America. And place plans and efforts to destroy the American
Economy, which is the main reason for America’s power and
dominance.

And at the bottom are eight Terrorist Operations other than media that are suggested as: “THE TYPES OF OPERATIONS THAT
WILL DEPLETE THE AMERICAN ECONOMY.” They are:
Operation Hemorrage, 1998 Nairobi and Darasalaam Operation, Boston Marathon, USS Cole Bombing, September 11,
Umar Farouk—Detroit Operation, Nidal Hassan—Fort Hood
Operation, Muhahham Youssef Abdulazeez.

This core AQO “grand strategy” is well represented in various
issues, see for examples: “Letter from the editor,” Inspire, Iss. 1,
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Summer 2010, p. 2, which defines the magazine’s mission; Yahya Ibrahim, “LETTER FROM THE EDITOR,” Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall
2011, p. 3; Yahya Ibrahim, “THE GREATEST SPECIAL OPERATION OF ALL TIME: THE EXPEDITIONS OF WASHINGTON
D.C. AND NEW YORK,” Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp. 12-13; Samir
Khan, “THE MEDIA CONFLICT,” Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp.
8-11, where a quote from Khan contains basic AQO worldview,
p. 8:
I remember his advice being spot-on as I stood there nearly 2
years ago in front of AQAP’s Amir, Shaykh Abu Basir, may
Allah preserve him. ‘Remember,’ he said as other mujahidin
were busy working on their computers in the background. ‘The
media work is half of the jihad.’

Abdallah, [Fadil Harun, c. 2009-2011], “What is Al-Qaeda?” p. 35;
“Words of Wisdom,” Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp.
10-11, consisting of quotes from: bin Laden, Sheikh Abu Hamza
Al-Muhajir (AQI/MSC/ISI), Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubeir (Amir
of Harakatu Shabaab Al-Mujahideen), Sheikh Anwar al-’Alwaki,
Sheikh Ayman Adh-Dhawahiry [al-Zawahiri] (Amir of Al-Qaeda), Sheikh Abu Abdul Ilaah Ambed (Amir of AQIM Media),
Sheikh Abu Baseer Al-Wuhayshi (Amir of AQAP), Al Hafidh Abu
Talh Al-Almani; “Jihadisphere: Reviewing important books and
articles concerning the Ummah and Jihad,” Review of Sheikh Abdallâh Azzâm, “Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After
Iman,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 49; Abu ‘Abdillah Almoravid, “THE BATTLE OF MARATHON: MESSAGE TO THE 99% OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 50;
Full page illustration, Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 51, has an
image of Tzarnaev—next to him, a poem, SHEIKH ABU BISHR
NASSIRUD DEEN BIN ABDULLAH, “FAREWELL, O HERO!”
[written to Tzarnaev]; Yahya Ibrahim, “Editor’s Letter,” Inspire,
Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 4, lays out assumptions well in the first
paragraph:
Muslims continue to face the results and consequences of
the fierce crusade aggression against Islam. The aggression
that clearly manifested itself after the blessed 9/11 attacks.
Exposing the hidden and true enmity they had towards
Muslims and Islam. Revealing themselves in different forms
of aggression: plundering Muslim wealth, occupying their
lands, imprisoning their men and women, killing their
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scholars and the worst of all is the aggression towards the
very core principles of Islam. . . . We at Inspire, and in the

cause of the events of 9/11 encourage the Muslims in the West
to join the Lone Jihad caravan. The caravan that has and will
always continue to trouble and bring nightmares to the west.

“WORDS OF WISDOM,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 14-15,
contains quotes from: Sheikh Anwar Al-’Awlaqi, Yahya Gadahn,
Sheikh Ayman Adh-Dhawāhiri, Sheikh Abu Mus’ab Az-Zarqawy, Sayyed Qutb, Sheikh Hussam ‘Abdul-Ra’uf, Hamza Usama
Bin Laden.
See also, the issues of Inspire, which contain works by AQO
senior leadership. For example: Osama bin Laden, “THE WAY
TO SAVE THE EARTH,” Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 8-10;
“RELIVING USAMA’S WORDS,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010,
pp. 18-19, which quotes from Osama bin Ladin, “Address to the
American People,” Address presented in 2004; “An Address to the
Revolutionaries,” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 51-53; “Freedom from Blind Following,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 56 (excerpt from bin Laden’s book, Methodological Instructions [Tawjihat
al-Manhajiyyah]); Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Message to the People of
Yemen,” Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, p. 11; “The Open Meeting
with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 10
(Palestine focused); “Taken from ‘The Open Meeting with Shaykh
Ayman al-Zawahiri’,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 32; “Defending
the Prophet,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 12-13, where he says:
“America has allowed the production of a film which commits
blasphemy against the Prophet”; see also, the “Zio-crusade war”
and “Judaizing of Al-Quds”; “Iman defeats Arrogance,” Inspire,
Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 10-12, described as the first part of a transcript from a recently released As-Sahab film with same name, a
speech; “Letter to the American People,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter
2014, pp. 12-14, includes first heading, “Why Do We Fight and
Resist You?,” and next heading, “To What Do We Call You and
What Do We Want of You?,” then lists seven demands, and conclusion; Adam Yahiye Gadahn, “Legitimate Demands, Barack’s
Dilemma,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 69-70; “Know that Jihad is
Your Duty,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 17; “INSPIRE EXCLUSIVE: From Adam Gadahn,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 3638. At the bottom of p. 36 it describes Gadahn’s promised contribution: “The following is an extract from the promised interview
‘The Arab Intifada,’ which we were not able to release for timing
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reasons . . .” The excerpt comprises three parts: “To the Governments of the Crusader West”; “To the Mujahideen Around the
World”; and “Finally, To Those Calling to Islam and Jihad in General, and Those Working on the Internet in Particular.” Gadahn’s
message to the West (p. 37) is essentially “Get out! Or else!” To
“the Mujahidin” he offers the Classic AQO Bleed USA, France and
Britain to economic crisis and near-collapse, and offers a tradeoff—“either the continuation of the Crusade against the Muslims
and the continuation of their backing of Israel, or the continuation
of viable governments and basic public services [in the West]” (p.
38). Again: “[T]he Arab uprisings show that the American empire
is at an unprecedented stage of weakness and decline” (Ibid.). Our
strategy? “[L]et’s continue to bleed the head of unbelief dry and
let’s beware of all attempts to divert us from our strategic objective or draw us into any battles of lower priority, particularly in
light of the new realities in the region” (Ibid.). And, to “the Callers
and Media,” he advises to use every method, and every media—
old and new—to reach every segment, in a way they understand:
we should fully acquaint ourselves with both the people to
whom we are reaching out as well as the methodology and
cause to which we are inviting them, so that we are able to hone
our methods, refine our techniques and spread our message in
an intelligent and educated fashion accessible to all sectors, sections, levels and factions of the Ummah (Ibid.).

Abu Yahya al-Libi, “The Middle Path and the Enemy’s Plot,” Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 13-15; “It is either Jihad or Disgrace.
So Choose,” Iss. 6, pp. 55-56; “Take from their guidance for there
is no refuge from jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 54-55 (excerpts from his book, Jihad and the Battle of Misconceptions); “Cowardliness will always be cowardliness even if you consider it to
be using wisdom,” Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 49; “The American Army & War Ethics,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 26-27.
This is stock propaganda extolling the Truth and Allah, and the
False America and Shaytan. It attempts to Satanize the American
military over a few select abuses that occurred but were neither
officially sponsored nor condoned. The spirit:
This test is the battle between the camp of Tawheed and the
camp of Kufr; the allies of Allah and the allies of Shaytan. The
allies of Shaytan have a disease in their hearts. This disease
manifests itself with their jealously and plotting against those
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who believe. With their total hate of Allah’s guidance and His
laws [p.26].

210. See the following issues of Inspire, which contain excerpts
from Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, n.p.,
n.d., in a series. Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010,
pp. 48-54, contains excerpts from ch. 8, sec. 4. The following issues
continue ch. 8, sec. 4, defending the necessity of an individualized
terrorist modus operandi:
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES:
[THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010,
pp. 17-21;
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010,
pp. 31-35;
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES:
[THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 2011,
pp. 29-32;
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011,
p. 15;
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES:
[THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011,
pp. 18-19;
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012,
pp. 23-24;
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013,
pp. 22-24;
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014,
pp. 42-43.
211. See the following article series: Anwar al-Awlaki, “Why
Did I Choose Al Qaeda?” in the following issues of Inspire: Iss. 4,
Winter 2010, pp. 48-50; Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 62-64; Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 32-34; Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 50-53; Iss.9, Winter 2012,
pp. 42-43; Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 34-35; Iss.11, Spring 2013, p. 27;
Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 32-33.
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212. “Spying: I am a Muslim, Spying is Kufr,” Inspire, Iss. 4,
Winter 2010, p. 36 (likely related to drone warfare); Anwar alAwlaki, “The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers wealth in
Dar al-Harb,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 55-60; “Targeting
the Populations of Countries that are at War with the Muslims:
Coming Soon,” Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, p. 36 (Advertisement for
al-Awlaki’s upcoming article). Anwar al-Awlaki, “Targeting the
Populations of Countries that are at War with the Muslims,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 40-47; Shaykh Harith al-Nadhari, “The
Ruling of Burning the Forests in the Lands of the Kuffar Enemies,”
Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, pp. 45-48; Sheikh Harith An-Nadhari,
“Condition for the Word of Tawheed,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring
2014, pp. 34-35; Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi, “A Message to the American People Regarding the Killing of the Hostage Luke Summers,”
Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 8-9; “Excerpts from Al-Malahem’s
Q & A Session with Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter
2014, p. 9 (Includes the question, “What is the role of the lone Mujahideen in repelling this crusade?”); Sheikh Harith An-Nadhari,
“The Word of Tawheed: Part 2: The Meaning and the Pillars of the
Word of Tawheed,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 38-39 (also
advertises “Next Issue: The Types of Tawheed” [p. 39]); “Q & A
with Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp.
52-53 (responses to five emailed questions); Sheikh Harith AnNadhary, “Conditions of the Word of Tawheed,” Inspire, Iss. 14,
Summer 2015, pp. 24-29.
213. See the ongoing article series, “Open Source Jihad” (OSJ)
in the following issues of Inspire: Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 31-44;
Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 51-59; Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 37-43; Iss. 5,
Spring 2011, pp. 22-25; Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 36-45; Iss. 8, Fall
2011, pp. 27-39; Iss.9, Winter 2012, pp. 26-40 (includes creedal
permission to firebomb and start forest fires, etc.); Iss. 10, Spring
2013, pp. 49-57 (includes torching parked cars, causing road accidents with oil, ambushing, and tire bursters). For their delusional
reasoning:
The goal is . . . that if enough Muslims fulfill their obligations to
Jihad, the Kuffar and their insurance companies will be so sick
of the terror caused and money wasted by these simple operations that they will press their government to stop the tyranny
against Muslims. These operations come under the umbrella of
deterrence operations [p. 55].
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See also, OSJ Specialist Consultant, “You Ask, We Answer,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 56, who put the question, “Who can
use OSJ tools and ideas?” and supplies the answer:
Inspire Magazine seeks to free the oppressed nations from the
Western Hegemony [sic]. There tools are for muslims [sic] in
particular, but others could also use them in their war against
the present oppressors, America and its allies [emphasis in
original].

“Lone Mujahid Pocketbook: A step to step guide on how to become a successful lone mujahid. Collected from Inspire Magazine
Issue 1-10’s OSJ [sic],” Inspire, Open Source Jihad Special, No
Number given, pp. 1-63; Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 62-72
(on car bombs; at pp. 71-72, a large photograph with the heading,
“The right man in the right place devastates the enemy: Choose
wisely”); Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 15, presents a “martyrdom seeker” with New York City in the background, and states:
“If you Have the Knowledge and Inspiration all That’s Left is to
Take Action. OSJ: Empowering Muslims”; “Interview with the
AQ-Chef [bombmaker],” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 20-21;
“From AQ’s Kitchen: The Hidden Bomb: 1.Breaching Airport Security; 2.Making the Hidden Bomb; 3. Field Tactics,” Inspire, Iss.
13, Winter 2014, pp. 66-109. This OSJ section is earlier introduced
by Yahya Ibrahim, “Editor’s Letter,” p. 4, in the following words:
Hereby, Inspire Magazine is committed to arm Muslim individuals—as well as Muslim groups as is in this issue—in their
Jihad on America. Previously, we have presented Muslims with
different weapons, including bombs and tactics. . . . Now we
are obliged to give your ummah something special. Something
unique that can easily be prepared at home.

Also, at p. 69, see the following dedication:
Dedication: To the vanguard of lone jihad; Ramzi Yusuf, ‘Umar
Farouq, Richard Ried [sic] among other brothers. . . . To he who
Humiliated American’s [sic] arrogance, the lion behind bars,
Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. . . . To our amir Dr. Aiman Adwawahir [al-Zawahiri]. . . . To every Muslim concerned with
supporting the religion.

At the end of this OSJ section an assassination list is supplied,
which includes the following:
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American Economy High Profile Target: We can categorize
them into two groups . . . Economic Personalities. . . and
Wealthy Entrepeneurs—These are people who run the American economy. They are considered to be the great economic
minds. It is not necessary for them to have a large capital [sic].
One example is Ben Shalom Bernanke. He is the current Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United
States, one of the most important influential personalities in the
stock market and world economy.

(A photo of Bernanke accompanies this section.) Also on Inspire’s
assassins list are: “‘Company Owners’: They have the largest
capitals [sic], the greatest investors in America. One of them is
William Henry ‘Bill’ Gates, the current chairman of Microsoft. He
has a great influence in the American economy” [sic] (also accompanied by a picture of Gates). See also, p. 111: Detailed instructions on how to carry out an assassination of these persons, under
the heading, “Preparation Steps of the Operation,” where one is
instructed to wait for a “Chance,” and instructions are offered to
potential targets on how they may avoid assassination:
The economists and wealthy people can save themselves and
their money by following simple conditions: 1. Drawing all
their money from American banks, and moving them to banks
that are not related to the American stock market. 2. Investing
their wealth outside American soil. 3. Declaring via media that
he is far from American policies towards Muslims and America’s support for Israel.

See also, Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 61, appearing just before the official OSJ section, a “Did You Know?” claiming a 95.7%
success rate of smuggling a water bottle through United States
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security measures;
“Assassination Operations,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 6271, includes the following: “A. Specifying a Target, B. Collecting
Information, C. Generating a Plan, Preparing for the Operation,
Executing the Operation”; The AQ-Chef, “Designing a Hand Grenade,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 72-81; Reconnaissance
Team, “Assassinations: Field Tactics,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer
2015, pp. 82-87. Presented here are photographs of: “Economic
Personalities” Bernanke and Robert James Shiller (listing the latter’s accomplishments, and as a co-recipient of 2013 Nobel in
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Economic Science); “Wealthy Enterprenuers [sic] and Company
Owners,” listing multi-billionaires Bill Gates, Warren Buffet,
Lawrence Joseph (Oracle), Charlie and David Koch, Sam Walton,
Sheldon Adelson, and Michael Bloomberg. The article repeats
(see p. 87) the conditions required for removal from their targeted
assassination list:
And we repeat what we had mentioned in the previous issue
to whosover wants to secure himself and wealth [sic], we say.
. . 1. Drawing all their money from American banks, and moving them to banks that are not related to the American stock
market. 2. Investing their wealth outside American soil. 3. Declaring via media that he is far from American policies towards
Muslims and America’s support for Israel.

214. See Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 5-29 for statements
about Nigerian Umar al-Faruq Friday, December 25, 2009, attempted downing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 jet; “Operation Hemmorhage,” Inspire, Iss. 3, November 2010, pp. 3-10, 13-16
(explosive cartridges sent to Jewish synagogues); “Prepared by
The External Operations Team: Neurotmesis: Cutting the Nerves
& Isolating the Head [of the Snake],” Inspire, Iss. 13, front cover,
Winter 2014, and pp. 60-63: This article declares:
In short, the program [Neurotmesis] is about targeting different
modes of transport. These are counted as the security’s Achilles’ heel, e.g. aviation and others. These targets include public
and private, passenger and freight transport system.

It continues: “this program is for you, Muslim in the West. We
single you out because you yearn to act and support, to repel and
expel aggressors and oppressors” (p. 60). It then outlines a general program, including identifying “main pillars of the American
power. [sic] American’s war—like any other country or organization—is based on four main pillars: 1. Military technology; 2. Manpower; 3. Media; 4. Economy.” The article concludes by describing “the Military Policy of Al-Qaeda in its War Against America”
(pp. 62-63) and various direct and indirect economic targets (pp.
62-64); Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi [AQAP], “Statement Regarding the
Blessed Paris Operation: ‘Vengeance for the Prophet’,” Inspire,
Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 7-9; Ibrahim Hassan Az-A’sir, “Charlie Hebdo: Military Analysis,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp.
38-42; “Timeline: Selected list of operations targeting those who
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insult the prophet [sic] and religion of Islam” (10 listed, both successful and unsuccessful attacks), in Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015,
pp. 48-49 (see also, An-Nadhary and al-Awlaki listed at bottom
with lift-out quotes); see also, “The Greatest Special Operation of
all Time: The Expeditions of Washington, D.C. and New York,”
Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, Special Issue: 10th Anniversary of 9/11,
pp. 12-14; “A Decade in Pictures: From 9/11 Till Today,” Inspire,
Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp. 16-35, which leads off with this quote, p. 16:
A great and powerful nation, isolated from the rest of the world
by two great oceans, America believed it could carry on with an
imperialistic policy in the Muslim world without suffering the
consequences. 9/11 proved America wrong. American’s [sic]
evil has come back to haunt it. Following 9/11, George W. Bush
promised a war on Islam and Muslims, which he termed the
‘War on Terror.’ He also forecasted [sic] that this war would
be a long one. Here we look into the main events and consequences of what is turning out to be an epic conflict between the
Muslims and the West.

215. See for example: “How to communicate with us” page
appearing in various issues: Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 72; Inspire,
Iss. 3, November 2010, p. 22; Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 44-46
(including here an extensive discussion of operational security);
Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 65; Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, p.
67 (includes advertisement for digital downloads); Inspire, Iss. 5,
Spring 2011, p. 69; Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 60; Inspire, Iss. 7,
Fall 2011, p. 37; Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 62; Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter
2012, p. 61; Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 60; Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, p. 38.
216. The following is the virtual universal set of these themes
as presented in Inspire. See “O Martyr, You have illuminated,”
Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, p. 30; “MY LIFE IN JIHAD: THE
STORY OF COMMANDER `UTHMAN AL-GHAMIDI,” Inspire,
Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 11-16; Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani “O HESITANT ONE: IT’S AN OBLIGATION,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp.
65-66 (“author” murdered a CIA team in Khost in blackmail); Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 67-68 (re: martyrs); Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter
2010, p. 25 (re: advertisement, “What Will You Choose,” Jannah
[Paradise] or Hellish Torment, and at the bottom of the page the
tag line states: “This ad a product of INDIVIDUAL JIHAD”; Abu
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Khowla, “WHICH IS BETTER: MARTYRDOM OR VICTORY?”
Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 26-28; Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010,
p. 62 (re: Jihadi Cool, Gangsta-type rap poem); Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 64 (re: Shuhada [martyrdom]-type videos); Inspire, Iss.
5, Spring 2011, pp. 56-59 (re: Jihad Stories); Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring
2011, p. 61 (re: Abyan, Yemen In Search of Martyrdom); “Shuhada Exclusive,” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 16-30, with focus
on Abu Ali Al-Harithi, Ammar al-Wa’ili, and Fawaz al-Ma’ribi.
Some lift out quotes include: “So why do you continue to rush to
your homes and not to the palaces of Paradise” (p. 24), and “Before he would set out in any operation, he would raise his hands
to the heavens and beg Allah for shahada, crying endlessly” (p.
29); “Progeny of the Exceptional” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p.
54; Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 57 (re: a quote from Sahih alBukhari):
All my [Prophet Muhammad] followers will enter Paradise except those who refuse. They [his followers] asked, ‘O Allah’s
Apostle! Who will refuse?’ He said, ‘Whoever obeys me will
enter Paradise, and whoever disobeys me is the one who refuses (to enter it).’

Shaykh Ibrahim al-Banna, “The martyrdom of the Commander
Abu Ayman,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 12-15; Ayub Sideeq,
“The unique trait of al-mu’minîn,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 5859 (re: The unique trait of the faithful is incitement to martyrdom);
Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 60-61 (re: two pages—one an advertisement for the “Convoy of Martyrs” video, and the second a
poem, “The hymn of my life”; Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, pp. 8-21
(re: the section, “Shuhada’ Special”). This includes an ultra-martyrdom quote from Prophet Muhammad, p. 8, and the following
articles: Shaykh Harith Al Nadari, “My story with Al Awlaki,”
pp. 9-13; Abu Yazeed, “Samir Khan: The Face of Joy,” pp. 14-19;
Um Ahmed, “They Killed Father, They Killed Son,” p. 20, ”The
Path of Honor,” p. 21 (re: martyrdom-celebrating prose); “OSJ,”
Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 28 (re: “The Convoy of Martyrs: Rise
up and board with us”), located at the beginning of the OSJ section, reads:
The objective of this workshop is to communicate with those
seekmartyrdom [sic] operations or those who want to execute a
slaughter to the enemies of Islam, those who have no means of
contacting their Mujahideen brothers whatever the reasons, the
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aim is to activate them in the midst of the enemy weather [sic]
the enemy was [sic] the Jews, the Christians or the apostates.
It is becoming obvious to many that the concept of individual
jihad which features [sic] have begun to appear recently has
been called for by the leaders of jihad. it [sic] is briefly that

one individual only carries out the entire jihadi operation.
For more information about the concept of individual jihad,
watch the film entitled ‘You are not held responsible except
for yourself’ produced by al-Sahab jihadi foundation. [And
at the very bottom of this one-page introduction, targets are
identified] . . . “Targets: 1-Personalities who are at war with
Islam and Muslims; 2-Economic targets belonging to the
enemy; 3-Military targets belonging to the enemy; 4-Media
targets belonging to the enemy.

It continues under the heading “Targets according to priority” . . .
“American targets; Israeli targets; French targets; British targets;
Apostate regimes targets in the Muslims’s lands” (p. 28); Inspire,
Iss. 9, Winter 2012, (re: quote from the Quran: “The Day their faces will be turned about in the Fire, they will say, ‘How we wish
we had obeyed Allah and obeyed the Messenger’” [Quran 33:67]
(p. 44); Abu Muhammad, “Unremorseful Mujahid,” Inspire, Iss.
9, Winter 2012, p. 59 (re: Umar al-Faruq al-Nigiri); Samir Zafar
Khan, “The Dust Will Never Settle Down,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring
2013, pp. 12-13 (re: It states: “Written by martyred Brother: Samir
Zafar Khan (may Alah [sic] accept his martyrdom); Inspire, Iss.
10, Spring 2013, p. 14 (re: a full-page ad which states, “Yes We
Can: A Bullet a Day Keeps the Infidel Away; Defend Prophet
Muhammed peace be upon him.”), Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p.
15 (re: “Wanted Dead or Alive for Crimes Against Islam”; eleven pictures are posted, and two names without pictures in large
font, for targeted assassination accused of insulting/blaspheming the Prophet); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 19 (re: advertisement for “a video coming soon” . . . “He Takes from Among You
Martyrs, 5.”); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 20 (re: quote, Quran
9:111 [i.e., a key covenant promise of eternal life and abundance
for killing and being killed in military jihad] centered on page,
as stand-alone); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 21, (re: Abu Ziyad
Al-Muhajir, “Brother ‘Askar, Abu Yazeed Al-Qatary,” obituary
on his “martyrdom” in Sana’a); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 25
(re: a photograph of a “mujahid” with gun strapped on shoulder longing to fight with a poem placed in the foreground which
reads: “Whoever does not die by the sword, will die by other
means, Various are the means but death is one, Provided there
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is no escape from death, it is of weakness that you die in a cowardly manner.”); Taiel Haya, Women of Jihad—Facebook, “My
Wish: If only I was a mujahid,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 30;
Umm Yahya, “Women of the Glorious Ummah,” Inspire, Iss. 10,
Spring 2013, pp. 31-33 (re: After deconstructing the shallowness
of materialism, instilling guilt, and perplexity about purpose, and
addressing doubts others raise about female weakness and value,
the following is stated:
O sister, you have to wake up the hearts of the men, and
arouse the determination of the heroes, and say, ‘We refuse
humiliation and subjection, misery or subservience; and we
want to be free from having to bow to the cross worshippers.
You have to push your loved ones to the battlefield’ [emphasis added]. The Lord of the worlds is more deserving that we
sacrifice what is most beloved to us for His sake, from our lives
and our wealth. I say to you my Muslim sister, the least that is
expected from you is when the men leave for Jihad, that you
stay patient and are pleased with Allah’s orders [p. 32].

It continues:
Our everyday life struggle is nothing compared to the agony
and pain of our sisters in Palestine, Burma, Syria, Somalia and
Afghanistan. There is so much more within your reach than the
narrow path you have carved out for yourself. You are not like
the others, you are a strong-willed muslimah [Muslim woman]
who wants to build a nation that says no to oppression. A muslimah who wants to abide by the rules of Allah [p. 33].

Abu ‘Ubaydah Al-Hadramy, “Oh Who Sits Behind,” Inspire, Iss.
10, Spring 2013, p. 40; Ansar Dine, Salafi Media, “America will
never Profit from the Assassination of Imam Anwar Awlaki,”
Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 41; Yahya Ibrahim, “We Are all
Usama,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 42-44 (re: Hagiographic
account of Osama bin Laden, and editor Yahya Ibrahim’s wishful
thinking on bin-Laden’s role in current Arab uprisings;. Sheikh
Harith An-Nadhary, [killed in USG drone strike, January 31,
2015] “To the Knights of Lone Jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013,
p. 46, (re: Lecture excerpt from his “Mujahideen in the Cities,”) it
begins:
You are Lethal! You are Devastating! You are the knight who
strikes the enemy’s heart, penetrating his armor, exposing his
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vulnerabilities. You are the David who cuts down the Goliath.
This unique heroic act can only be performed by you, with
steadfast determination, unfaltering courage and rock-solid
resolution. Few are selected for Allah for this purpose. The following advises [sic] are presented to the knights of lone jihad
[emphasis added, p. 46].

Sheikh Harith An-Nadhary then lays out six principles: Reliance
on Allah, Avoidance of Sins, Trust in the Promise and Reward
of Allah, Perseverance, “‘Have a good omen,’ i.e., Don’t worry,
you will again be near your target, and Patience,” Inspire, Iss. 10,
Spring 2013, p. 47 (re: A lone jihad ad; hoodie-clad, dark, overseeing a huge metropolis, with quote from Quran “So fight in the
cause of Allah, you are not held responsible except for yourself.
And inspire the believers” [4: 84]); “The Battalion of Terror,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 58-59 (re: A full-page ad with M-16,
and suicide belt). It states:
IT IS YOU, YES IT’S YOU AND YOU ALONE—THE TERRORIST NEXT DOOR. SO BE TRUE TO ALLAH, AND BEING
TRUE TO ALLAH IS TAKING YOUR WEAPON, PRAYING
YOUR TWO RAKAAT, ASKING ALLAH TO HELP YOU—
GET OUT TO YOUR ENEMY, HE IS JUST NEXT DOOR.

Among the quotes to follow: “It’s Either Victory or Martyrdom!
. . . Did you Know that the Oppressed Muslims all Over the World
are Waiting for You to Act?” pp. 58-59; “Dear American Muslim,”
Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 16-17 (re: includes
Boston Marathon bombing); Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring
2013, pp. 18-25 (re: Several short incitement jihad/martyrdom
pieces and photographs concluding with Boston bomber); Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, p. 26 (re: Advertisement
for “Convoy of Martyrs, 2,” a video with English subtitles); Muhammad As-San’ani, “An Eye for an Eye; The Dear Price & The
Constant Turmoil,” Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013,
p. 24 (re: adulatory account of the savage beheading of an offduty British soldier by Adebolajo and Adebowale; Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev referenced using agitational
propaganda (“agitprop”); Tamerlan Tsaraev is shown decked out
like a gangsta in Paradise; Abu Abdillah, “Cover Story: Who and
Why,” Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 28-37 (re:
on the Boston Marathon terrorist act, an account using incitement
agitprop; “The Arson Jihad: lex talionis,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring
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2014, p. 14; “Sincere advice from a muhajir,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring
2014, p. 15; “City Wolves,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 30-31;
Muhannad J. S., “24/7 Terrorism,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014,
pp. 36-40 (re: includes a quote from Rep. Peter T. King in lift out,
“We have an enemy that is 24/7 trying to find ways to kill us in
many forms” at pp. 36-37); Abu Nuh, “The Good, the Lamb and
the Ugly,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, p. 41; Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring
2014, pp. 50-51 (this includes a photograph of a lone traveler in a
train and the statement: “For how long will you live in tension?
Instead of just sitting, having no solution, Simply stand up, pack
your tools of destruction. Assemble your bomb, ready for detonation.”); “Interview with the AQ-Chef [bombmaker],” Inspire, Iss.
13, Winter 2014, pp. 20-21 (At page p. 21, after stating “All in
all, we call Muslims to participate in lone Jihad and make use
of what the Mujahideen write and advise so that they achieve
a better result Biidhnillah [emphasis added].”—article includes
six “lone mujahid” quotes including Michael Adebolajo Mujahid
(i.e., the British terrorist who attacked Rigby), Tamour AbudlWahhab, Nidal Hassan (Fort Hood terrorist), Ali Muhammad
Brown, and Faizal Shahzad (attempted but failed detonation of
New York City Times Square Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive
Device [VBIED]); Sheikh Abul-Harith Al-Iraqi, “Strike the Sea
with Your Stick,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 26-27, the lift
out paragraph reads:
Fight in the Way of Allah, even if you have nothing but the
kitchen of your mom, even if you have nothing but matchsticks, even if you have nothing but a pressure cooker. Know
that Allah has subdued everything for us. So be determined
and place your trust in Allah, and have sincerity [emphasis
added].

Also presents photographs of over one dozen “martyrs”; Commander Shamel Basayev, “Independence and Courage,” Inspire,
Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 30 (Excerpt adapted from the book, “The
Book of a Mujahid.”); “The Journey of Jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 30 (re: Advertisement for three part documentary);
Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Banna, “Between yesterday & tomorrow: the
language America understands,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014,
pp. 32-33; Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 34-35 (re: Interview
with AQAP’s Abu Dahdah and Basil Az-Zahrani, “I talk to Inspire [double entendre intended]”); “Jihad profiles,” Inspire, Iss.
13, Winter 2014, pp. 40-41 (re: focus on Ramzi Yusuf [real name:
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Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Kareem], with pictures and timeline); further states that he is the “First Mujahid to Attack the US
Homeland” (p. 40); provides a lift out quote at top of page 41 of
Ramzi Yusuf’s testimony to the court:
Yes, I am a terrorist, and proud of it as long as it is against the
U.S. government and against Israel, because you are more than
terrorists; you are the one [sic] who invented terrorism and using [sic] it every day. You are butchers, liars and hypocrites.”

Also lists eight separate terrorist attacks or attempts, from 19931995; “The Virtues of Inghimaasi: Immersing oneself deep into
enemy lines to inflict damage or attain Shahada,” Inspire, Iss.
13, Winter 2014, pp. 42-45, described as “Chapter in the book
Mashari’ul Ashwaq, by Iman Ibnu Nuhas, translated by Sheikh Anwar Al-’Awlaqi.” Also includes “[five] [e]xamples of Inghimaasi
operations,” which are listed below along with photographs: the
2008 Mumbai, India, attack; 2013 Westgate attacks, Nairobi, Kenya; Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hassan; Yemen Defense Ministry,
and United Nations Headquarters in Mogadishu. It states: “More
than 23 apostates & 17 crusaders killed,” and in a lift out quote,
The Messenger of Allah said: ‘A time will come when the best
among mankind would be a man holding on to the bridle of
his horse in the Sake of Allah, [sic] whenever he hears a call to
battle he mounts his horse and searches for death’ [p. 45].

“It’s Not Necessary,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 53, shows a
picture of a “lone wolf” standing over a crowded street, with the
following words written above:
It’s not necessary to do what Muhammad ‘Atta did, [key 9/11
terrorist perpetrator] it’s enough to do what Nidal Hassan
[Fort Hood terrorist] did. It’s not necessary to see victory over
the enemy, it’s enough to be part of making the victory. It’s
not necessary to travel to the battlefield, it’s enough to kill the
enemy back home [emphasis added].

Abu Muhammad as-Sana-ani, “Inspire Exclusive: Inspiration:
The Story of Abu Rawi As-Sway’ari,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014,
pp. 54-55 (includes a description of “Operation: Martyrdom operation on US drone operations base, Say’un, Hadramat); Muhsin
Ali, “Facing Fear in Jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 56-57
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(includes sidebar, “10 useless matters [i.e., excuses] that cannot be
benefited from [sic]”); Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 58-59 (includes an advertisement sponsored by “A Lone Jihad,” showing
a man walking a big city street with huge knife, backpack, and a
grenade); Khalid As-San’ani, “Suleiman Al-Halaby: 18th Century
Lone Mujahid Assassin: Suleiman Al-Halabi First Lone Mujahid
to Attack the French,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 30-31;
“Some Things are too Beautiful to be Forgotten: Will We Ever
Experience Such a Sight Once More?” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer
2015, pp. 32-33 (shows a picture of 9/11 WTC towers exploding);
Qadhi Bishr, “Remembering Boston: Friday lecture,” Inspire, Iss.
14, Summer 2015, pp. 34-36; Abu Nuh, “A Mountain of Ice,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 37; Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp.
44-45 (Photograph of al-AQAP Emir al-Wuhayshi killed by USG
drone strike in June); “Timeline: Selected list of operations targeting those who insult the prophet and religion of Islam,” Inspire,
Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 48-49 (includes 10 listed [successful and
unsuccessful] attacks); and, An-Nadhary and al-Awlaki (listed at
bottom with lift out quotes); Shaykh Batal’i, “If you Return We
Too Shall Return,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 52-55.
217. For potential insights on ISO derived from social scientific research on gangs, see Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz,
“‘I’m down for a Jihad’: How 100 Years of Gang Research can
inform the Study of Terrorism, Radicalization and Extremism,”
Perspective on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, pp. 104-112, available
from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/405.
218. “THE MURTADD BROTHERHOOD,” Dabiq, Iss. 14,
p. 43.
219. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1,
pp. 38-41.
220. Figure 3 adapted from Ibid., p. 38.
221. Ibid., pp. 34-36 (respectively); See also, “THE CONCEPT
OF IMAMAH (LEADERSHIP): IS FROM THE MILLAH (PATH)
OF IBRAHIM,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 20-30 (4-part presentation); The
requirement of Hijrah and Bay’ah to the Caliph is discussed in
“FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 3-4; Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani
al-Shami, “This is The Promise of Allah,”; Al-Qurashi al-Baghda-
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di, “A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah in the
Month of Ramadan.”
222. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 38.
223. Ibid.
224. Ibid., p. 36.
225. Ibid., p. 35.
226. Ibid.
227. Ibid. The use of the term “mujaddid” here is curious.
It refers not to the Quran but to a hadith in Sunan Abu Dawood,
Book 37: Kitab al-Malahim [Battles], Hadith Number 4278, available from kalamullah.com/sunan-abu-dawood.html, accessed on October 22, 2015, in which it is declared: “Abu Hurairah narrated
that the Islamic prophet Muhammad said ‘Allah will raise for
this community at the end of every hundred years the one who
will renovate its religion for it’.” According to Islamic tradition,
this great renewer returns the faith to purity, cleansing it of unacceptable accretions, but arises from among the most prominent
of Islamic scholars or pious rulers. See the question and answer
from Islamqa.org, “Concept of a Mujaddid and the past and present ones,” available from islamqa.org/hanafi/darululoomtt/52180, accessed on October 21, 2015. Al-Zarqawi’s organization emerges c.
2000, and it appears his sycophantic followers have bequeathed
on him this title, which was reserved in past times for sages and
pious rulers.
228. See Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
in Iraq, chs. 1, 2.
229. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 37.
230. Ibid., pp. 36-37. The “istishhadiyyin” [i.e., those who volunteer to become ‘martyrdom seekers’] are what we now refer
to as “suicide bombers” or “martyrdom operations.” Recall that
al-Zarqawi’s encounter with Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir was key
to his acceptance of these operations on Sharia grounds. See also,
Hamza Mustafa, “Inghimasis’ . . . Fourth Generation of ISIS’s
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Bombers,” Asharq Al-Awsat, July 11, 2016, available from www.
opensource.gov, accessed on July 11, 2016, for a description of this
ultra-fanatical special unit designed, according to Mustafa, to
“fight till the last breath before they explode themselves . . . [and
as] . . . a special faction of ISIS, which pledged victory or death
and never to be captured or run away.”
231. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 37.
232. Ibid.
233. Ibid.
234. Ibid.
235. See Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah, and Muhammad
al-Obaidi, Deadly Vanguards: A Study of al-Qa’ida’s Violence Against
Muslims, Occasional Paper Series, West Point, NY: Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point, December 1, 2009, pp. 2-3, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/deadly-vanguards-a-studyof-al-qaidas-violence-against-muslims, accessed on January 3, 2010.
236. For examples of the earliest publicity glorifying these terrorist operations, and easily classifiable as pertinent to this phase,
see ISLAMIC STATE NEWS, Iss. 1, June 1, 2014, available from
jihadology.net/2014/05/31/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presentsa-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-1/, accessed on August 6, 2014; ISLAMIC STATE
NEWS, Iss. 2, c. June 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/06/05/
al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamicstate-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-2/, accessed
August 20, 2014; ISLAMIC STATE REPORT, Iss. 2, c. June 2014,
available from jihadology.net/2014/06/07/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-mediacenter-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shamsmagazine-islamic-state-report-2/, accessed on July 8, 2014; and,
ISLAMIC STATE NEWS, Iss. 3, c. June 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/06/10/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-anew-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamicstate-news-3/, accessed on August 28, 2014. Hereafter all citations
to the Islamic State News or The Islamic State Reports magazines refer only to issue number without the publication date. This graphic pictorial format accompanied by brief reports on terrorist “ni-

275

kaya” attacks was later incorporated in sections of their flagship
publication, Dabiq. For evidence in Dabiq, see “ISLAMIC STATE
NEWS,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 42-48 (which documents terror attacks
and alleged acts of “repentance”); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,”
Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 13-17 (discussion of fighting, destruction of
“Shirk” (i.e., destruction of Shia tombs, shrines, and mosques);
“ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 12-22 (documents
“punishing the Sahwat,” i.e., punishing in practice everyone who
opposes ISO, does not repent and turn in their weapons; this section includes coverage of terror, destruction, murder, assassination, and the destruction of shrines); “IN THE WORDS OF THE
ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 35-40; “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,”
Dabiq, Iss. 4, pp. 18-29 (includes reports on various aspects of destabilization and terror, but also descriptions of consolidation
[tamkin]of the State, e.g. creation of a new province “Wilayat AlFurat” on basis of the alleged elimination of the historic Sykes-Picot border, [pp. 18-19]; the conquest of Al-Faluja [p. 20], a pledge
from Ansar al-Islam [pp. 21-2], various terrorist operations [2326]; and, “A Window into the Islamic State” [pp. 27-29] which focuses on repaired bridges, restored electricity, elderly home care,
cancer treatment of a child, and services for Muslims, including
street cleaning [pp. 27-29]); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq,
Iss. 6, pp. 26-33 (includes training camps, fighting and consolidation, killing of opponents); “MAJOR OPERATIONS IN LIBYA
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advertisement that portrays a brutal assassin standing above a
kneeling, submissive hostage—with subtitles in English, French,

276

Kurdish, Turkish, and German—and providing instructions on
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Iraq was to be the first incarnation of the resurrected caliphate,
and its leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi was to be the caliph in
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1993, p. 153.
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April 28, 2014, available from https://pietervanostaeyen.
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al-Zawahiri—Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in as-Sham,” pietervanostaeyen, May 3, 2014,
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al-Shami, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Abū Muhammad al’Adnānī ash-Shāmī—Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful: A new statement by IS spokesman Abū Muhammad
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Sufyaan as-Sulami, “Stretch Your Hands to Give the
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Your Hands To Give The Bay’ah To Al-Baghdaadi,” Ansar Al-Kilafah Media, Statement translated by Ubaidullah Ibn Adam Aal-Ebrahim, blog entry, posted December
21, 2014, available from https://ansarukhilafah.wordpress.
com/2014/12/21/stretch-forth-your-hands-to-give-the-bayahto-al-baghdaadi/, accessed on September 7, 2016;
• [AQO] November 4, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “English Translation of the Interview with Jabhat an-Nusra
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dissent among jihadists,” The Long War Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/al_qaeda_in_the_arab_1.php, accessed on November 24, 2014.
(Covers AQAP senior Sharia official Harith bin Ghazi al
Nadhari’s November 13, 2014 response to al-Baghdadi’s
speech; al-Nadhari killed by drone January 31, 2015.)

253. This concept of “consolidation” (Tamkin) is the second
primary focus—the first is terror and inflicting catastrophic injury—of the short-lived, 10+ page full-color online magazines,
Islamic State News, and Islamic State Reports. For examples: Islamic
State News, Iss. 1, pp. 5-6 (Focus on repentant “Sahwat”; “State”
functions of aid distribution, da’wa, Sharia court, and execution
of “sorcerer”); Islamic State News, Iss. 2, pp. 1-3, 9, (Major focus
on trade flourishing, fresh produce [see front cover], implementing the prescribed criminal punishments [hudud], aid, and enforcing participation in prayer.). See also, Islamic State News, Iss. 2,
p. 5, focus on “TO REPENT . . . OR NOT,” showing photos of
persons having to dig their own graves before being murdered;
Islamic State News, Iss. 2, p. 7 (“hunting for sahwat snipers” [i.e.,
abusing the term ‘Sahwat’ to refer to every element that opposes
this State]); Islamic State Reports, Iss. 2, pp. 1-4 (Focus on “stateness” in economic harvest, and collection of the alms tax [zakat
]; “On the Beat Interview [with Abul-’Abbas Ash Shami, Head
of the Islamic Police, Wilayat Ar-Raqqah]: ISR examines how the
Islamic Police safeguards Ar-Raqqa and their importance in State
Building,” Islamic State Reports, Iss. 2, pp. 5-6; Islamic State News,
Iss. 3, cover page, pp. 3-6 (implementing Hadd punishments, including amputations, executions; distribution of flyers explaining
its “aqida” [creed]; provision of security to farmers; “repentance”
from opponents).
Dabiq’s emphasis on tamkin can be found in the following
articles and elements: “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss.
1, pp. 13-18; “THE ISLAMIC STATE: IN THE WORDS OF THE
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ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 32-33; “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1 pp. 35-41, and “ISLAMIC STATE NEWS,”
pp. 42-48 focuses on destruction and “repentance”; “IN THE
WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 31-32; “ISLAMIC
STATE NEWS,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 33-43 (“Stateness” demonstrated in now-incorporated “News” Section from previous Islamic
State News, and Islamic State Reports format with photographs
and reports from various provinces, e.g. Halab, Kirkuk, Ninawa,
Ar-Raqqa, Al-Anbar, Salahuddin, Al-Barakah, and Homs, displaying ferocity, momentum, devastation, terror, taking territory, capturing bases, carrying out Hadd punishments including
beheadings and stonings, distributing “ghanima” (war spoils) to
orphans, i.e., “CARING FOR THE ORPHANS,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, p.
38; “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 3-4, talks of the gruesome
beheading of James Foley; “DA’WAH AND HISBAH IN THE ISLAMIC STATE,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 16-17 (Da’wah [preaching] and
Hisbah [enforcing religious law]); “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 35-40; “REFLECTIONS ON THE FINAL
CRUSADE,” Dabiq, Iss. 4, p. 44. The conclusion of this apocalyptic
article orders ISO adherents to attack any and every citizen in every Crusader country. Under the heading, “RUSH TO SUPPORT
YOUR STATE O MUSLIM,” it declares:
At this point in the crusade against the Islamic State, it is
very important that attacks take place in every country that
has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, especially the US, UK, France, Australia, and Germany. Rather,
the citizens of crusader nations should be targeted wherever
they can be found [emphasis added]. Let the muwahhid not be
affected by ‘analysis paralysis’ and thus abandon every operation only because his was-was [sic] and perfectionism pushes
him towards an operation that supposedly can never fail—one
that only exists theoretically on paper. He should be pleased
to meet his Lord even if with just one dead kafir’s name written in his scroll of deeds [emphasis added], as the Prophet
. . . said, ‘A kafir and his killer will never gather in Hellfire’
[Sahih Muslim]. Every Muslim should get out of his house,
find a crusader, and kill him. It is important that the killing
becomes attributed to the Islamic State who have obeyed its
leadership [emphasis added]. This can easily be done with anonymity. Otherwise, crusader media makes such attacks appear
to be random killings. . . . ‘Rely on Allah and stab the crusader’
should be the battle cry for all Islamic State patrons. Finally, do
not forget that Allah is with the Muslims and will not abandon
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them to His enemies. And the Islamic State will remain until its
banner flies over Rome.

“IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 4, pp. 45-51,
(Vicious, horrific murder and propaganda, including murdered
American-Israeli journalist Steven Sotloff); see also, ISO propagandist John Cantlie, “HARD TALK: THE REAL STORY BEHIND MY VIDEOS”; Dabiq, Iss. 4, pp. 52-55; Dabiq, Iss. 5, cover
page; “THE FIGHT FOR WILĀYAT AL-ANBĀR,” Dabiq, Iss. 5,
pp. 10-11 (“Remaining and Expanding”); “FOREWORD,” Dabiq,
Iss. 5, p. 3, presents “evidence” of ISO’s expansion in the form
of officially announced bay’ah [loyalty oaths secured] and wilayat [provinces conquered]; “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq,
Iss. 5, pp. 10-33 (Again, provides Islamic State Report-type format
with photographs and brief text), for examples see the following
“reports”: “THE FIGHT FOR WILĀYAT AL-ANBĀR,” pp. 10-11;
“UNIFYING THE RANKS,” pp.12-14, (Claims of bay’ah from various quarters); “THE FIGHT FOR ‘AYN AL-ISLĀM,” pp. 15-17,
(formerly Ayn al-Arab, or Kobani); “THE CURRENCY OF THE
KHILAFĀH,” pp. 18-19; “REMAINING AND EXPANDING,”
pp. 20-33. This includes an extensive quote from former ISI Emir
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s most famous speech “Hasad as-Sinin
bi Dawlat al-Muwahhidin” (The Harvest of Years in the State of
Muwahhidin) in Rabi’ al-Awwal 1428 [April 2007]):
And indeed the Islamic State will remain. It will remain because it was built upon the corpses of martyrs and it quenched
its thirst with their blood, and by such the market for Jannah
[paradise] was convened [emphasis added]. It will remain because the success granted by Allah in this jihad is more obvious
than the sun at the center of the sky. It will remain because it
did not become contaminated by a prohibited income or distorted methodology. . . . It will remain because kufr in all its
religions and sects gathered against us, and every treacherous
person of desire and innovation began to slander and vilify us,
so we become certain of the truthfulness of the goal and the
correctness of the path [pp. 32-33].

“IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 5, pp. 34-35;
“FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 6, pp. 3-5 (in support of lone wolf attack carried out in Sydney and elsewhere, emphasizing its connection to IS); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 6, pp. 2633 (“reports” include: training camps, fighting and consolidation,
and killing of opponents); “THE CAPTURE OF A CRUSADER
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PILOT,” Dabiq, Iss. 6 , pp. 34-37 (report is of the Jordanian al-Kasibah [“an apostate pilot flying for the crusader alliance was captured by the Islamic State”] who is “interviewed” as he is subjected
to manipulation, terror, humiliation; “IN THE WORDS OF THE
ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 6, pp. 56-57; John Cantlie, “MELTDOWN,”
Dabiq, Iss. 6 , pp. 58-62 (on meltdown of currency freed from gold
standard, and minting of ISO tied to gold); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 26-45, “reports” include: (“WILĀYAT
KHURĀSĀN AND THE BAY’ĀT FROM QAWQĀZ [Caucasus],”
pp. 33-37; “DOZENS OF ‘NUSRAH’ AND ‘AHRĀR’ FIGHTERS
REPENT AND JOIN THE ISLAMIC STATE,” pp. 38-39 [with
heading “ABANDONING FACTIONALISM AND RAISING
THE BANNER OF THE KHILĀFAH”]); “IN THE WORDS OF
THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 52-53 (with a focus on “The Kafir
Patrick Cockburn” and others); John Cantlie, “THE ANGER FACTORY,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 76-82 (justifying the State terrorist attacks
against the West with anti-Western propaganda advertisement
for a “New Release . . . From Inside Halab” with John Cantlie as
a host); Dabiq, Iss. 8, cover page (“Sharia Alone Will Rule Africa”
[cover art, with monumental feel]); “THE BAY’AH FROM WEST
AFRICA,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 14-15, which is announced:
On the 16th of Jumada al-Ula the mujahid Shaykh Abu Bakr
Shekau . . . leader of Jama’at Ahlis-Sunnah lid-Da’awah walJihad in West Africa, announced his group’s bay’ah to AmirulMu’minin Ibrahim Ibn Awwad al-Qurashi. The bay’ah came on
the heels of a widely successful campaign being waged by the
mujahidin across Nigeria and into neighboring regions, was a
tremendous cause of celebration for the Muslims and yet another source of gloom for the kuffar. The hearts of the Muslims
were healed as they [saw] their brothers in West Africa terrorizing the Christians and the Nigerian army of murtaddin.

“THE LIONS OF TOMORROW: THE LION CUBS OF THE
KHILĀFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 20-21; “ERASING THE LEGACY
OF A RUINED NATION,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 22-24, announced
thusly:
Last month, the soldiers of the Khilafah, with sledgehammers
in hand, revived the Sunnah of their father Ibrahim . . . when
they laid waste to the shirki legacy of a nation that had long
passed from the face of the earth. They entered the ruins of the
ancient Assyrians in Wilayat Ninawa and demolished their
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sculptures, and engravings of idols and kings. This caused an
outcry from the enemies of the Islamic State, who were furious
at losing a ‘treasured heritage.’ The mujahidin, however, were
not the least concerned about the feelings and sentiments of the
kuffar, just as Ibrahim was not concerned about the feelings and
sentiments of his people when he destroyed their idols [p. 22].

”THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF TWO NEW WILĀYĀT IN IRAQ,”
Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 27; “AMONG THE BELIEVERS ARE MEN:
SHAYKH ABŪ TALHAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 31, shows his death
photo as a “martyr” and provides a brief quote:
After the announcement of the Khurāsāni bay’ah, Shaykh Abū
Talhah began touring the region in a caravan of the Khīlāfah’s
soldiers, calling the local tribes to give bay’ah to the Khīlāfah.

Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 38, (advertisement for “A Message to the People
of Kurdistan”); “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 8,
pp. 57-58; John Cantilie, “PARADIGM SHIFT,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp.
64-67, with lift out quote:
After all the gnashing of teeth in September, there appears to
be a grudging acceptance by many Western politicians that the
Islamic State is different to anything they’ve seen before. Their
response, by necessity, has to be different too [p. 64].

“ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 24-37, (“reports”
include: “HEALTHCARE IN THE KHILĀFAH,” pp. 24-26, with
data and photographs depticting an actually functioning health
care sector; “SELECTED10,” p. 27, videos advertised, including presence of hisbah, zakah, monitoring and inspection; “ADVANCING EAST AND WEST,” pp. 31-32; “SELECTED10,” p. 33,
adverstising for 10 more videos including terror-inducing images,
including extreme fear-face, slaughter, and battle. Second place
is “The Islamic State Health Service” and in tenth is “The Lion
Cubs Raised under the Wings of the Khilafah”; “The Yarmūk
Camp,” pp. 34-36, directed at: “the tawāghīt of Hamas are appealing to Iran for intervention, while PLO tawāghīt are agreeing to have their militias serve as a Nusayrī Sahwah [p.35]”); “IN
THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 60-64; Dabiq,
Iss. 9, p. 65, advertisement for “AlBayan Radio, Broadcast by the
Islamic State” in multiple languages; “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss.
10, pp. 3-4, again dedicated to slaughter carried out on Western
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soil by “mujahids”; Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 5, advertisement for “Join
the Caravan of Islamic State Knights in the Lands of the Crusaders,” with thirteen photos of IS operatives, and evidence of a shift
from soliciting emigration (Hijrah) to soliciting localized slaughter; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 25, videos advertised that
include terror, murder, repentance, and in the tenth “MEDICAL
CARE IN THE WILAYAH”; Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 35, advertisement
for “HONOR IS IN JIHAD: A MESSAGE FOR THE PEOPLE OF
THE BALKANS”; “THE QAWQĀZĪ [CAUCASUS] CARAVAN
GAINS PACE,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 36-37; Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 49, advertisement for video “And They Give Zakah,” showing devastating
scenes on top of the page, but the majority of the page shows an
ultra-abundant harvest of ultra-wheat with an ultra-devoted person possessing a share in hand, representing the “purification”
tax owed to the “Khilafah”; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp.
65, adverstising for 10 more videos including the recently horrifically drowned prisoners, emphasizing brutality and submission,
consolidation and expansion, for example: “ONE YEAR OF THE
KHILAFAH”; “ELIMINATING THE JUDGES,” shows an assassin with a rifle attacking an automobile with inhabitants inside;
“CELEBRATING THE ONE YEAR MILESTONE OF THE KHILAFAH”; “HARVESTING THE SPIES 2”; THE LIFE OF RIBAT
IN THE MONTH OF JIHAD”; “AND HE WILL REPLACE THEIR
FEAR WITH SECURITY 2”; includes one at bottom of page from
“WILAYAH WEST AFRICA,” entitled “A GLIMPSE AT THE
COURSE OF BATTLES”; “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,”
Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 66-69; “INTERVIEW WITH ABŪ SAMĪR ALURDUNĪ,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 70-76, with AQO’s Ayman al-Zawahiri in backdrop, with lift out quote:
Allah facilitated for Dabiq to interview the brother Abū Samīr
al-Urdunī (the Jordanian), a former member of Jawlānī’s [Jabhat
al-Nusra] shūrā council. He broke off from the Jawlānī front until Allah blessed him by showing him the contradictions in the
methodology and policies of the Jawlānī front. He also belessed
him by allowing him to witness the realization of hakimiyyah
(tawhīd of Allah in judgment) in the land of the Khilāfah. He
returned to the ranks of the Islamic State and the following is
the conversation we had with him [p. 70].

“SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 15, advertisement for 10 videos
focused on murder, terror, fighting, repentance, and curiously
in the 8th video shows a young, smiling girl’s face exemplifying
the title, “THE AMBIANCE OF EID AL-FITR IN AR-RAQQAH
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CITY,” her face fully unveiled, smiling, and in Western clothes,
and in the 10th, “THERE IS LIFE IN RETRIBUTION,” showing a
sheathed sword; “THE DANGER Of Abandoning Dārul-Islām,”
Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 22-23, with a horrific use of the picture of the
drowned toddler Alan Kurdi, and provides the accompanying
passage:
The repeated events of Syrians and Libyans dying on the shores
of Turkey, Libya, and Italy, or even on the highways of Austria,
is one that should awaken the heart into reflecting upon the
issue of hijrah.

“A SELECTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ACROSS THE ISLAMIC STATE,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 28-30, “report” includes terror operations, military operations, taking and holding ground,
and in one picture describes in a subheading: “Imposing the Jizyah [tax imposed on certain qualified categories of vanquished
non-Muslim groups] on the Christians of al-Qaryatayn after liberating the city [p.30]”and depicts a large gathering of Christians
shown seated in an auditorium, with an ISO official in fatigues
at a lectern signing an official document; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq,
Iss. 11, p. 39, advertisement for 10 videos, including: “THE INGHIMASIYYIN ARE THE PRIDE OF THE UMMAH”; “KILLING
THE APOSTATES IN REVENGE FOR THE MUWAHHIDIN 2”;
“THE TRAVELS OF THE MUSLIM”; “THE KNIGHTS OF IFRIQIYYAH” from “WILAYAH WEST IFRIQIYYAH”; “DETERRING
THE CRIMINALS” etc., depicting terror, submission, death, and
a video-game like death cult; “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 56-58; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, p.
59, advertisement for 10 videos again in shooter-type video format with examples of terror, destruction, consolidation, expansion, and Stateness; “INTERVIEW WITH ABUL-MUGHĪRAH
AL-QAHTĀNĪ: The Delegated Leader for the Libyan Wilāyāt,”
Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 60-63, and involves “Fitnah” with AQO’s groups.
254. Reference here is to Sahih Muslim, but without full citation. This is from Sahih Muslim, No. 1852, and it is considered
Sahih (sound, reliable). See Abu Amina Elias, “Is it required for
Muslims to have one ruler?” available from abuaminaelias.com/isit-required-for-muslims-to-have-one-ruler.
255. “FROM HIJRAH TO KILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 40.
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256. Readers interested in examining the primary documents,
research, and commentary that warrant these conclusions are encouraged to consult the relevant information presented in Chapters 2 and 3 of this book and their corresponding endnotes.
257. The concept of a “deviant organization” is chosen carefully and intends to signify two facts. First, as organizations, they
are deviant in a statistical sense; they are terrorist outliers operating on the extreme unlawful, criminal fringes far from Sunni
Muslims generally, let alone other non-terrorist religio-political
organizations seeking to represent and empower Sunni Muslims
(Ahl-us Sunnah). Second, these are organizations, and not States,
regimes, or representative bodies. While they aspire to represent
the world’s 1.4 billion Sunni Muslims, their very nature as terrorist entities resting on a terrorist modus operandi ensures their
continuing marginality. The present writer concedes that despite
its sociological utility, the concept of a “deviant organization” can
be abused by regime apologists, to de-legitimize and thereby proscribe various types of oppositional politics.
258. See the Introduction of this book.
259. In an oft-quoted tradition (hadith), the notion that a true
Muslim is one that regards other Muslims’ lives as sacred, is the
essence of the matter. Narrated by Abdullah bin ‘Amr, the Prophet [Muhammad] said, “A Muslim is the one who avoids harming
Muslims with his tongue and hands. And a Muhajir (emigrant)
is the one who gives up (abandons) all what Allah has forbidden.” Abdullah bin ‘Amr, “The Book of Belief Faith),” in Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih
Al-Bukhari: Arabic-English, Vol. 1, Book 2, No. 10, Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia: Darussalam, 1997, p. 59.
260. A final tally of ISO’s mass murder, crimes against humanity, torture, brutality, and inhumane conduct will one day be
conducted. Ironically, ISO’s own penchant for fully documenting
these atrocities will likely serve as exemplary exhibits in future
proceedings. For a very brief summary of some of these, see Anup
Kaphle, “The Islamic State’s atrocities,” The Washington Post, February 17, 2015, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/
apps/g/page/world/the-islamic-states-atrocities/1608/, accessed on
March 17, 2015; Jon Gambrell, Associated Press (AP), “A history
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of the Islamic State group’s atrocities, gains,” The San Diego UnionTribune, February 16, 2015, available from www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/feb/16/a-history-of-the-islamic-state-groupsatrocities/, accessed on August 31, 2016; Agence France-Presse
(AFP), “Foreigners executed by IS militants: a factfile,” Yahoo
News, August 12, 2015, available from news.yahoo.com/foreignersexecuted-militants-factfile-154627843.html, accessed on August 13,
2015; “Syria: IS murders over 3,000 in year-long ‘caliphate’,” AlAraby al-Jadeed (The New Arab), June 29, 2015, available from
www.opensource.co, accessed on June 29, 2015; IntelCenter, “Top
10 Most Deadly Terrorist/Rebel Groups in 2014,” IntelCenter Database, July 25, 2015, available from intelcenter.com/reports/charts/
most-deadly-groups-2014/index.html, accessed on January 12, 2015;
Rami Abdurrahman (Ossama Suleiman), “Islamic State executes
2154 people since the declaration of its alleged ‘Caliphate’,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, April 28, 2015, available
from www.syriahr.com/en/?p=18320, accessed on August 31, 2016;
Sarah Almukhtar and Derek Watkins, “The Deadliest Attacks in
Baghdad This Year,” The New York Times, July 3, 2016, available
from
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/18/world/middleeast/
baghdad-attacks-isis-map.html?_r=0, accessed on July 6, 2016; Associated Press, “Some of the Most Recent Deadly Attacks Claimed
by IS,” Daily Mail, July 23, 2016, available from www.dailymail.
co.uk/wires/ap/article-3704877/Some-recent-deadly-attacks-claimedIS.html, accessed on July 25, 2016; Agence France-Presse (AFP),
“Paris—Islamic State attacks on Western targets,”Agence FrancePresse (AFP), August 8, 2016, available from www.opensource.
gov, accessed on August 9, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic State
claims more than 700 suicide attacks since beginning of the year,”
The Long War Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2016/09/islamic-state-claims-more-than-700-suicide-attackssince-beginning-of-the-year.php, accessed on September 7, 2016;
Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Paris—Attacks in France since
Charlie Hebdo slayings,” AFP, July 18, 2016, available from www.
opensource.gov, accessed on July 18, 2016; Erin Miller, “Patterns of
Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002-2015,” START Background
Report, College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), August 2016,
available from www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IslamicStateTerrorismPatterns_BackgroundReport_Aug2016.pdf, accessed on August 9,
2016; Lori Hinnant and Desmond Butler, “IS Buried Thousands
in 72 Mass Graves, AP Finds,” AP The Big Story, August 30,
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2016, available from bigstory.ap.org/article/7b538929486f493da85e8
4d7ee7470a5/buried-thousands-72-mass-graves-ap-finds, accessed on
August 30, 2016.
261. That the “idea” of the ISO had yet to be understood, and
required our full attention, was described by Major General Michael Nagata, U.S. Army, Special Operations Command Central
(SOCCENT), former Director Combined Joint Interagency Task
Force (CJIATF). See Michael Nagata, “Preface,” in Hriar Cabayan,
Sarah Canna, eds., “Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL,” NSI White
Paper, December 2014, pp. 1-2; see also, Eric Schmitt, “In Battle to
Defang ISIS, U.S. Targets Its Psychology,” The New York Times,
December 28, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/
us/politics/in-battle-to-defang-isis-us-targets-its-psychology-.html?_
r=0, accessed on September 14, 2015.
262. See for example: Paul Kamolnick, “On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim’s May 2015 Message to Muslims: Key Problems of
Motivation, Marginalization, Illogic, and Empirical Delusion in
the Caliphate Project,” Small Wars Journal, June 4, 2015, available
from smallwarsjournal.com/print/24089, accessed on June 5, 2015.
263. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks of President Barack
Obama,” May 23, 2013, Washington, DC: The White House, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarkspresident-barack-obama, accessed on May 30, 2013.
264. For earlier formulations, see Barack Obama, 2010 National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White House, May
2010, p. 4, pp. 19-22, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; Barack Obama,
National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Washington, DC: The
White House, June 2011, p. 1, 3, available from www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010, p. v,
6, 15, available from www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defense
Reviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf; Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, Final Report
of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Corrected Advance Copy, 2010, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, p. 26.
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265. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (aka: The 9/11 Commission Report),
New York: W.W. Norton, 2004, ch. 12.
266. For background on this acronym and its relation to
DIME, and DIMEFIL, see Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization
and Recruitment to Al Qaeda, pp. 75-76.
267. For this incontrovertible evidence, and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions formulated in response, see
Paul Kamolnick, “Terrorism, Counterterrorism and the Rule of
Law,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, 2011, p. 841, Notes
#19 and #20. For USG diplomatic efforts, beginning with our recognition of the Taliban’s rise in 1994 until the immediate pre-9/11
attack, see Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to
Al-Qaeda, pp. 69-70, especially endnote #173 for an extensive examination of the declassified intelligence cables specifically pertinent to the claim that the USG at Mullah Omar’s initial request,
had direct communication with then Emir Mullah Omar and his
representatives. See finally, a telling excerpt from members of the
Egyptian Islamic Group, translated from Arabic, in their book,
Islam and the Laws of War, which appeared in serial form in the
newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August-September 2006;
Translated and excerpted in: The Middle East Media Research
Institute, “Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda,” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1301, available from www.memri.org/report/
en/0/0/0/0/0/804/1887.htm, accessed on January 16, 2013. They
state in response to bin Laden’s and AQO’s accusation that the
United States was intent on overthrowing the Taliban as part of its
declared “War against Islam”:
The conception that America is waging a Crusade against Muslims is not true. . . in the worst of cases [one can say that] at
times there have been American policies that have had a religious dimension in opposing some—and not all—of the Islamic
world’s causes. [The fact that this is not a Crusade] explains
America’s positive stand in support of the Afghani mujahideen
in their fight against the Soviet occupation, and [America’s]
positive stand [against] the ethnic cleansing operation against
the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the province
of Kosovo. Likewise, the conception that America aimed to
bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and could not
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have been deterred from doing so is not true. Reality attests
to the fact that America attempted to come to terms with the
Taliban regime in order to realize common strategic goals. . .
and these attempts to come to an understanding ran up against
the Al-Qaeda organization’s actions, which were launched
from Afghanistan and targeted America, and which the Taliban
authorities did not restrain . . . America at that time was looking for new strategies for a new century, and if the Front [i.e.,
Al-Qaeda] and other interpreters of Islam had adopted serious
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